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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIZATION: JEAN-BERTRAND ARISTIDE AND 
THE LAVALAS MOVEMENT IN HAITI 
by 
Dimmy Herard 
Florida International University, 2016 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Ronald W. Cox, Major Professor 
 
 As the 29-year Duvalier dictatorship ended in 1986, the emergence of Mouvement 
Lavalas out of the grassroots organizations of Haiti's poor majority, and election of 
charismatic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990, challenged efforts by Haitian political 
parties and the U.S. foreign policy establishment to contain the parameters of Haiti's 
democratic transition. This dissertation examines the politics of Lavalas to determine 
whether it held a particular conception of democracy that explains the movement's 
antagonistic relationship with the political parties and U.S. democracy promoters. 
Using the qualitative methodology of process-tracing outlined in the works of 
Paul F. Steinberg (2004) and Tulia G. Falleti (2006), this study analyzes primary and 
secondary sources associated with Aristide and the grassroots organizations across the 
period of contested democratization from 1986 to 1991, with emphasis on four critical 
junctures: 1) the rule of the Conseil National du Gouvernement; 2) the government of 
Leslie Manigat; 3) the military regimes of Henri Namphy and Prosper Avril; and 4) 
Aristide's 8 months in power before being overthrown on September 29, 1991. 
 
 vii 
This study concludes that there were systematic differences in how Lavalas 
pursued democracy in Haiti, as contrasted to the political parties and U.S. foreign policy-
makers. Evidence indicates that while Lavalas placed emphasis on popular mobilization 
to challenge Haiti's legacy of authoritarianism, the political parties and U.S. democracy 
promoters emphasized processes of negotiation and compromise with Haiti's anti-
democratic forces. Lavalas was rooted in the long historic struggle of the country's poor 
masses to, not simply establish procedural democracy, what noted political scientist 
Robert Dahl calls polyarchy, but to expand the parameters of politics to guarantee the 
right of all Haitians to participate directly in the process of governing, in order to share 
more equitably in the distribution of national resources, in what critical scholar William I. 
Robinson calls "popular democracy." 
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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 7th 1986, Haiti's dictator, Jean-Claude Duvalier, was forced to 
release the reins of power, ending 29 years of Duvalierisme, and leaving behind one of 
the most sordid legacies of any despot in the region’s history. The Duvalier dynasty, 
begun by Francois Duvalier in 1957, presided over the state-sponsored killing of 
anywhere between 30,000 and 60,000 people, the embezzlement of nearly 80 percent of 
international aid to the country, approximately $10 million more from the national 
treasury yearly, and Haiti’s traumatic descent towards abject poverty along every 
conceivable statistical category.1 After 5 years struggling to wrest power from an ever 
more repressive provisional Conseil National du Gouvernement (CNG), a historically 
disenfranchised people triumphantly ushered in what many believe to be the first truly 
democratic government of Ayiti2 with the inauguration of charismatic priest Jean-
Bertrand Aristide on February 7, 1991. 
But from the very beginning a number of questions emerged regarding the 
democratic orientation of Aristide, and the social movement that ushered him into power, 
Lavalas. According to Samuel Huntington, the greatest barrier to the consolidation of 
democracy is often the lack of commitment to democratic principles by those who seek to 
displace autocrats in the name of democracy. “When they are out of power, political 
leaders have good reason to advocate democracy. The test of their democratic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 James Ferguson, Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1988). 	  
2 Ayiti is the Haitian Creole spelling for Haiti. Ayiti was the original  
indigenous Taíno or Amerindian name for the island meaning land of high mountains.	  
 
 2 
commitment comes once they are in office.”3 Was Aristide the radical leftist demagogue 
that some clamored he was;4 the quintessential Ayatollah Khomeini slash Fidel Castro of 
Haiti?5 Was Lavalas simply a manifestation of the unsorted poor riled up into an 
uncontrollable frenzy towards class hatred, unquestioningly following the instructions of 
their anointed messiah? Or did Mouvement Lavalas represent the emergence of a 
democratic grassroots movement like none ever seen before in Haiti’s history? 
The central intention of this dissertation is to examine the politics of the Lavalas 
movement and its presumed leader, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to determine whether or not 
the movement had a clearly outlined agenda for establishing a particular vision of 
democracy in Haiti. This process will consist of an in-depth examination of the type of 
society Aristide and Lavalas sought to build in Haiti; how the movement’s political 
visions coincided and contrasted with various competing theories and ideologies of 
democratization; and how its politics shifted and fractured over time in response to 
internal tensions and contradictions, as well as external political and economic pressures. 
This research is significant because it delves into areas of Haitian politics 
previously ignored. Much of the literature on the democratization process within Haiti 
following Baby Doc’s fall and the election of Aristide focuses almost exclusively on U.S. 
foreign policy towards Haiti, and Aristide’s actions in response, thus ignoring much of 
the political dynamics that were occurring within Haiti amongst the various segments of 
the emergent democratic sector. While much has been said about Aristide’s supposed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Samuel Huntington, "Democracy’s Third Wave," Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 22. 	  
4  Philippe R. Girard, Clinton in Haiti (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 23. 	  
5 Andrew S. Levin, “Civil Society and Democratization in Haiti," Emory International Law Review 9, no. 2 
(1995): 389-457.	  
 
 3 
deviations from democratic norms and principles, few of these scholars have 
systematically engaged with the concept of democracy itself, nor with the particular 
conceptions of democracy held by Aristide and Mouvement Lavalas. These studies fail to 
investigate whether or not an alternative conception of democracy was coming to the fore 
with the emergence of the Lavalas movement. Part of this failure is related to their 
treatment of Aristide and Lavalas as synonymous, rather than delving into the 
particularities of Lavalas as a separate and distinct phenomenon from Aristide. Their top-
down analysis of democratization, presumably a bottom-up process, ignores the agency 
of the Haitian demos. Most of the literature pertaining to this period in Haitian history 
simply does not give in-depth attention to the broader civil society activity that emerged 
during the last years of Baby Doc’s regime, expanding after his fall, and presumably 
evolving into what is Lavalas and the movement for democracy in Haiti. 
This research will address fundamental questions pertaining to the process of 
democratization and its relationship to broader political, economic, and social processes. 
It will also seek to understand the role of social movements in the transition to 
democracy, and whether or not they are capable of forging democracy in a poor 
developing country with a robust authoritarian legacy. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four parts. In the first I address the 
various assessments of Aristide’s adherence to democratic norms and values throughout 
his involvement in Haitian politics. The second section addresses the primary theoretical 
frameworks through which the concept of democracy has been understood in Western 
intellectual thought, particularly in the age of democracy. In the third part of this chapter 
I present various causal propositions as to why Aristide and Lavalas failed to consolidate 
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democratic gains in Haiti. And in the final section, I outline the methodology that will be 
used to test each proposition, the primary case studies to be analyzed, and sources. 
 
DEMOCRAT OR DEMAGOGUE 
From the very beginning of Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s foray into Haitian politics, 
there have been competing interpretations of his commitment to democracy, and thus 
naturally conflicting interpretations of his role as the presumed leader of Lavalas and as 
the President of Haiti. For many, Aristide’s election held out the possibility of him 
becoming “either the father of Haitian democracy or just one more of its many 
betrayers.”6 
From 1987 to 1991 Aristide was viewed as embodying the aspirations of the 
Haitian masses; their longing for a just and egalitarian democracy.7 Elected in 1990 with 
nearly 70 percent of the popular vote, those who had suffered silently for so long under 
the yoke of economic deprivation and political repression believed that finally they would 
control the country’s instruments of power and provide a central voice in the decisions 
that impacted their lives.8 In the priest-turned-politician, whom some had come to call 
Haiti’s Mandela,9 the poor saw “their most unwavering ally in gaining a greater voice in 
national affairs.”10 For these wretched of the Earth, “Father Aristide alone…could bring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 “Haiti's Choice, and Father Aristide's,” New York Times, December 18, 1990. 	  
7 Alex Dupuy, The Propet and Power (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 20. 	  
8 Ibid., 21. 	  
9 Howard W. French, “A Priest to the Very Poor at the Pinnacle in Haiti: Jean-Bertrand Aristide,” New 
York Times, December 19, 1990. 	  
10 Howard W. French, “Poor in Haiti Back Election of Ex-Priest,” New York Times, December 15, 1990. 	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an end to violent repression and provide dignity.”11 According to Paul Farmer, Aristide’s 
electoral victory was not his own, but rather a victory for the Haitian peasantry. “They’d 
braved intimidation, even massacres, to make it happen and to vote. It seemed as if, at 
last, after centuries of misery, of slavery and subsequent misrule and foreign interference, 
the people of Haiti had claimed their country.”12 Finally, government would be organized 
around the principles of justice, transparency, and most importantly, participation.13 
Despite the hopes and aspirations of Haiti’s poor and previously disenfranchised, 
many others had misgivings about the man affectionately called Titid. Haiti’s small 
educated middle class, who spent decades hoping for democratic change, were 
particularly concerned with how Aristide conceived the presidency. Now that he was out 
front, they felt little reassured.14 Many were profoundly doubtful that Aristide could bring 
peace and stability to Haiti.15 
For others, there was no equivocation as to his intentions. One of the charges 
leveled against Aristide was that he promoted class warfare and mob rule. That he held a 
worldview that instinctively saw the wealthy as bad and the poor as noble.16 That he was 
establishing a rhetorical undertone that was making violence, particularly of the class 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 French, “A Priest to the Very Poor,” 1990. 	  
12 Tracy Kidder, Mountains Beyond Mountains (New York: Random House, 2003), 109. 	  
13 Paul Farmer, The Uses of Haiti (Monroe, Me.: Common Courage Press, 1994), 156. 	  
14 Howard W. French, “Front-Running Priest a Shock to Haiti,” New York Times, December 13, 1990. 	  
15 Howard W. French, “Poor in Haiti Back Election of Ex-Priest,” New York Times, December 15, 1990. 	  
16 French, “A Priest to the Very Poor,” 1990. 	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warfare variant, impossible to contain.17 His sermons were said to have been laced with 
calls to revolution.18 While speaking of repression, misery, and the short-sightedness of 
the rich, he also spoke of guns and war.19 “Vive la guerre!” he clamored before his 
congregations, “so that we will all have bread. Vive la guerre! So that we will all have 
houses. Vive la guerre! So that we will all have land.”20 According to Alex Dupuy, one of 
Aristide’s favorite parables was that of Haiti’s privileged few sitting at a dinner table 
eating steak and pâté while the rest of the country’s destitute majority cowered hungrily 
under the table, in hopes of perhaps tasting the crumbs that fell from the plates of the 
wealthy. Inevitably, Aristide proclaimed, this huddled mass would overturn this table of 
privilege and take what was their rightful share.21 In 1988 Aristide the priest would be 
expelled from his Salesian Order for his supposed ‘incitement to hatred and violence,’ 
and ‘glorifying of class struggle.’22 After his election, Archbishop François-Wolff 
Ligondé attacked “Aristide as a ‘socio-bolshevik,’ and wondered whether or not 1991 
would mean the ‘beginning of a dictatorship.’”23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Howard W. French, "Haiti’s Victors Working to Soothe Fears," New York Times, January 11, 1991. 	  
18 Joseph B. Treaster, “A Haitian Priest is Ousted by Order: Roman Catholic Group Expels Cleric Critical 
of Bishops' Panel and Government,” New York Times, December 18, 1988. 	  
19 Mark D. Danner, “The Struggle for a Democratic Haiti,” New York Times, June 21, 1987. 	  
20 Ibid., 1987. 	  
21 Alex Dupuy, Haiti in the New World Order: The Limits of the Democratic Revolution (Boulder, 
Colorodo: Westview Press, 1997), 75-76. 	  
22 Mark Danner, “The Fall of the Prophet,” New York Review of Books, December 2, 1993. 	  
23 Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 156. 	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In the U.S. media and government circles, a narrative emerged portraying Aristide 
as an archetypical anti-American leftist demagogue;24 a psychotic manic-depressive25 
who used mob violence to intimidate and subdue all opposition, whether Duvalierist, 
democratically elected parliamentarian, or media critic. A starting point for many was his 
casual confession that the slaughter of Duvalier’s supporters following the regime’s 
demise left him marveling at the people’s justice as they carried out what he proclaimed 
to be God’s work.26 Many felt that Aristide tacitly supported the use of Pére Lebrun 
against his opponents, a form of lynching whereby a tire is placed around the neck of a 
targeted person, filled with gasoline, and set afire.27 In fact, they pointed to a number of 
radio addresses following these incidents, where alongside references to the 
‘hideousness’ of the destruction, Aristide proclaimed the legitimacy of the people’s will 
to catch powerful supporters of Duvalierism so that they would not destroy them 
tomorrow.28 Others state that Aristide’s lust for power at all costs was evident when he 
vehemently rejected calls to persuade his followers to abstain from violence should he 
fail to win the 1990 elections as a result of the potential widespread fraud that had 
characterized previous Haitian elections.29 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Girard, Clinton in Haiti, 23. 	  
25 Ralph Pezzullo, Plunging into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Diplomacy (Jackson: University 
Press of Mississippi, 2006), 38. 	  
26 Girard, Clinton in Haiti, 33. 	  
27 Howard W. French, "Troops, Storming Palace, Capture Plotters and Free President," New York Times, 
January 8, 1991. Ralph Pezzullo, Plunging into Haiti, 138. 	  
28 Robert Debs Heinl, Nancy Gordon Heinl, and Michael Heinl, Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian 
People, 1492-1995 (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), 734. 	  
29 Girard, Clinton in Haiti, 88. 	  
 
 8 
For observers like New York Times foreign correspondent Howard French, the 
1990 presidential election was nothing more than a “conflict between two irreconcilable 
forces,” intimating that neither was particularly more virtuous than the other. “The 
Duvalierists have never abandoned their dream of returning to power and have recruited 
their most audacious leader…to accomplish it. ‘The partisans of confrontation with the 
Duvalierists have responded in kind by choosing Father Aristide. The political debate is 
now on the path of radicalization and confrontation.’”30 Many reporting on the events in 
Haiti feared that the “violent confrontations between Duvalierists and Aristide’s 
supporters”31 were simply another iteration of Haiti’s long legacy of zero-sum politics. 
According to the head of the Haitian Center for Human Rights, Jean-Jacques Honorat, 
Aristide was “inciting people to riot,” and producing an environment with “all the 
ingredients for a new fascism.” He declared that human rights violations were as severe 
under Aristide as they were during the Duvalier dictatorships.32 
Others pointed to Aristide and Lavalas’ utter disdain and rejection for the legal 
and institutional trappings of a democratic society. Often Aristide would respond to 
criticisms of his supporters’ actions by stating that the people were the law, and thus 
whatever they did was constitutional.33 Aristide and Lavalas were also seen as 
dismissive, if not openly hostile, to the idea of the Haitian media’s role in holding the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Howard W. French, “A Duvalier Ally and a Foe Seek Election in Haiti, Raising Fears of Violence,” New 
York Times, November 5, 1990. 	  
31 “Top Duvalierist Among 10 Barred from Seeking Haiti's Presidency,” New York Times, November 7, 
1990. 	  
32 Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 156. 	  
33 Girard, Clinton in Haiti, 34. 	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movement and his government accountable. Haiti’s media held particularly mixed 
feelings regarding the movement and its leader. On the one hand was their enthusiasm for 
Haiti’s first truly democratic election. On the other were misgivings concerning the 
media’s right to criticize Aristide’s actions in the face of potential retribution from what 
they saw as his fanatical supporters.34 
Lavalas’ supposed contempt for accountability is often credited to the 
movement’s messianic sense of Aristide’s role in Haitian history. His candidacy was 
characterized by a certain mysticism. “There is nothing prosaic, planned or typically 
electoral about 37-year-old Aristide’s last-minute bid to be president. Instead, steeped in 
the emotion of a religious revival and the language of the apocalypse, his is raw, cathartic 
populism with a messianic message.”35 According to Dupuy (2007), Lavalas was nothing 
more than a cult-of-personality with little to no mechanisms of accountability or real 
adherence to democratic processes.36 In his The Prophet and Power, Dupuy outlines what 
he sees as two contradictory tendencies that characterized the ex-president’s political 
ideology. He argues that while Aristide’s theologically inspired political philosophy 
allowed him to embody the aspirations of Haiti’s poor and destitute majority for equal 
and dignified participation in the country’s political and economic life, it also produced a 
charismatic form of leadership that rejected the rule of law and constitutionalism as 
legitimate limitations on his power.37 	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For Dupuy and others, Aristide’s support for popular justice rather than the rule of 
law emanates from his belief that the struggle of Lavalas against Duvalierism was one of 
Good against Evil, thus leaving little room for moderation and reconciliation. During the 
dechoukaj, as “delirious crowds methodically stripped bare the great houses of the 
dictator’s cronies, and mobs beheaded, stoned or burned alive the more murderous of his 
denim-clad Tontons Macoutes militia…[Aristide] ‘stood and marveled at the justice of 
the people’…. ‘These Macoutes, they were the devil incarnate. The people were doing 
God’s work,’”38 he declared. 
His critics contend that it is this notion of moral struggle that shapes his view of 
constitutional checks and balances, and limited government in general. “President 
Aristide stated in his autobiography that he envisioned a ‘direct’ democracy rather than a 
representative one,”39 which led him to eschew the left-of-center coalition that helped 
him come to power and to ignore the give-and-take of parliamentary politics. Such petty 
politics were viewed as a negation of the power that the people had bequeathed to him, 
their chosen representative.40 “He stood above all other political actors or organizations, 
who lacked this symbiotic relationship with the masses…the ‘prophetic’ people had 
propelled him onto the historical stage…only he and his Lavalas movement could bring 
about the transformations that the people demanded.”41 As one of the former priest’s 
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supporters exclaimed, “he doesn’t need any program. Aristide is a symbol.”42 Under this 
logic, institutions were viewed as illegitimate, particularly if they were deemed as 
obstructing the moral work that was to be carried out by Lavalas and its chosen 
representative, Aristide. 
As Aristide gained prominence as Haiti’s first democratically elected president, 
Howard French wondered whether or not he might not also become a new and strikingly 
different sort of Haitian ‘Big Man’?43 For Robert Fatton, Aristide’s messiah complex was 
no different from that of the country’s previous rulers. “The overwhelming majority of 
Haitian rulers, including Toussaint Louverture, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, Francois 
Duvalier…have claimed that their own person embodied the popular will and that God 
had sanctified their mission.” 44 Each believed that they had a special relationship with 
the people; a relationship which was to be privileged over the mundane practices of 
formal democracy. “The fusion of mysticism, martyrdom, and anti-macoutism added a 
messianic character to Aristide’s leadership and immediately won him the devotion of a 
population that—crushed by the abject exploitation of the dominant classes and the 
violence of the dictatorships and steeped in its own religious mysticism—was ready to 
accept a savior.”45 It is believed that Aristide exploited this vulnerability in the Haitian 
masses for authoritarian ends. 
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It is for these reasons that many in Haiti, in the U.S., and in the international 
community, view the eventual September 30th, 1991 removal of Aristide from power by 
the military as “rife with murky complexities.” Though Aristide became the President of 
Haiti through free and fair elections which he won handily, and continued to maintain the 
support of Haiti’s poor majority, these same persons argued that Haitian democracy was 
not contingent upon the return of Aristide to power. According to Mr. Widmair of Radio 
Métropole, “you cannot justify the coup, but there is much to blame Aristide for. All of 
the sectors of society wanted to participate in the democracy, but for seven months they 
were bombarded with nothing but threats.”46 Upon removing Aristide from power, 
General Cedras and members of the military argued that the coup was necessary to ensure 
respect for the constitutional order, to guarantee democratic liberty, and to prevent the 
pillaging and lynching that they accused Aristide of encouraging.47 North Carolina 
Senator Jesse Helms declared the ousted President a demonstrable killer, who “made 
fiery speeches exhorting his followers to use the necklace method, as it is called, to 
destroy his enemies in agony.”48 Though initially showing unequivocal support for the 
restoration of Haiti’s first democratically elected president, U.S. officials eventually 
shifted their position, conceding that “Father Aristide’s condoning and even 
encouragement of vigilante justice by mobs of his supporters in the streets has 
jeopardized his moral authority and popularity.”49 The coup, they declared, had been a 	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reaction to “flagrant abuses of power.”50 As a precondition to supporting his return to 
Haiti, the Clinton administration called on Aristide to renounce his advocacy of violence 
against opponents, and to declare his support for the constitution and the rule of law. 
With Aristide’s return to Haiti, some observers argue that what had been merely 
subtle tendencies in his first few months in power became much more overt. Rather than 
the public exhortations supporting mob lynchings that characterized his first 
administration, it is claimed that Aristide had turned to a silent campaign of 
assassinations against those associated with the coup and the subsequent military 
dictatorship, as well as former political allies no longer deemed loyal. Alongside this 
campaign of elimination, Aristide was said to have been arming young men in the slums 
of the capital, known as chimere, to intimidate opponents of the regime. Aristide’s 
demobilization of the Haitian Army and supposed efforts to subsequently control the 
process of building Haiti’s new police force were viewed as part of a strategy to 
monopolize the capacity for violence in Haiti as Duvalier had once done. 
For Fatton, the clientelism of Lavalas became quite apparent with Aristide’s 
return to Haiti through the United States orchestrated Operation Uphold Democracy in 
1994. Others argue that Aristide’s populism was but a mask; that despite his rhetoric, he 
was never fully with the people. Instead, the former priest is portrayed as nothing more 
than a representative of the narrow class interests of the weaker factions of the 
bourgeoisie, particularly the petite bourgeoisie, that were excluded from Duvalier’s inner 
circle. It was mostly members of this class that made up the leadership of the various 
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Lavalas organizations.51 Dupuy describes Aristide as an anarcho-populist, who, while 
claiming to be subject to the dictates of the masses, actually remained broadly popular by 
securing the ongoing support of their leaders using traditional clientelism.52 Aristide was 
able to “solidify support from his mass base by giving its leaders public-sector jobs 
whether or not they were qualified for them."53 Once back in Haiti, Fatton contends that 
Aristide’s Lavalas regime began to exhibit the patterns of nepotism and clientelism that 
have characterized traditional Haitian politics more overtly. Lavalas had transformed 
from being a broad-based movement focused on social justice for the poor and destitute 
of Haiti into a vehicle for the enrichment of a new class of grands mangeurs (big 
eaters).54 For critics, corruption and narco-trafficking became the leitmotif of the returned 
Lavalasians.55 With such a transformation, power was not to be shared. It was “the 
springboard to material well-being and class climbing for the relatively marginalized but 
educated petite bourgeoisie from whose ranks come most Haitian politicians,"56 including 
those within Lavalas. 
Beyond the corruption, the cronyism, and the elimination of political enemies, 
perhaps the most damning charge against Aristide was the view that upon his return to 
power, he fundamentally betrayed the aspirations that once imbued Lavalas with popular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Dupuy, The Prophet and Power, 96. 	  
52 Ibid., 96. 	  
53 Ibid., 126. 	  
54 Robert Fatton, Haiti’s Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy (Boulder, Colorodo: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 10. 	  
55 Fatton, The Roots of Haitian Despotism, 210. 	  
56 Fatton, Haiti’s Predatory Republic, 14. 	  
 
 15 
purpose. In order to gain U.S. support for his return, Aristide “signed on to a neoliberal 
structural adjustment program identical to that implemented by Baby Doc in the 1970s 
and 1980s…Aristide betrayed the peasants through trade liberalization, canceled equity 
projects for the poor and sweatshop workers, and instead opened Haiti for business.”57 
Fatton argues that Aristide had become an advocate for the dictates of structural 
adjustment that he once vociferously denounced. He now wooed U.S. investors with 
promises of reduced phone, electricity, customs fees, and tariffs.58 Later he would 
champion the displacement of thousands of peasants in the name of export-processing, 
continuing the ‘American Plan’ that had become all the rage under Baby Doc. 
 
POLYARCHY OR POPULAR DEMOCRACY 
While the accusations leveled against Aristide and the Lavalas movement may or 
may not be valid, it is my contention that the primary cause for the failure to consolidate 
democratic gains in Haiti had as much to do with the dissonance between the particular 
conceptions of democracy that informed the politics of Aristide and Lavalas and the 
hegemonic notions of democracy that have been aggressively propagated by the United 
States and its Western allies since the end of the Cold War. 
Though many presume that democracy is a rather straightforward thing, the truth 
is that it is a highly contested concept mired in a multitude of ideological and political 
struggles, competing visions, definitions, and interpretations. But, if one looked to the 	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popular discourse, this would not be readily apparent. According to critical scholar 
William Robinson, one particular perspective of democracy has become internationally 
hegemonic amongst intellectuals, the media, and policy-makers: polyarchy.59 But, before 
outlining what polyarchy is, Robinson believes that laying out a historical understanding 
of democracy is essential to seeing how polyarchy is a tragic distortion of the concept. 
Traditionally, the term democracy, meaning ‘rule of the people,’ described the 
form of government that existed in the Greek city-states of antiquity. “Rule of the people’ 
was synonymous with popular democracy, or government based on the broad distribution 
of political power and the participation of as many as possible in the making of 
government policy, directly or through elected representatives. According to Robinson, 
popular participation should function as a means to undo unjust social and economic 
realities. He argues that broad participation without corresponding movement towards a 
more egalitarian socioeconomic order is pointless, and does not meet the standards of 
democracy as the term is historically understood. The process of equal participation 
should naturally lead to increased wellbeing for the majority.60 Flowing from this 
understanding of popular democracy is the concept of social democracy, which interprets 
fundamental human rights to include economic and social rights, with the intent of 
democratic processes being to provide a minimal floor of health and welfare in addition 
to personal freedom for the majority. Social democrats believe that the right to vote and 
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to be free from torture is insufficient without provisions to sustain healthy human beings, 
such as the equitable distribution of food, clothing, shelter, medicine, and education.61 
On September 25, 1991, five days before being ousted from office, Aristide gave 
a speech at the United Nations that outlined some of his views on democracy, views that 
seem to reflect the spirit of popular and social democracy. In his Ten Democratic 
Commandments speech, Aristide presented three human rights that he believed were 
necessary complements to the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness found in 
the U.S. Declaration of Independence. They were: the right to eat, the right to work, and 
the right for every individual to demand what they were owed in terms of social and 
economic justice.62 “To guarantee these rights, Aristide argued that his government 
would be based on the principles of ‘justice, participation, and openness.’”63 So, for 
Aristide, democracy required the protection of economic and social rights alongside 
political rights, what Alex Dupuy calls a maximalist conception of democracy. 
Aristide also argued that democracy in Haiti would be centered on serving the 
needs of the poor, the segment of the population that constituted the majority. Therefore, 
Aristide and his government promoted the Growth-with-Equity or Basic-needs model of 
development. In this model the state plays a central role in regulating the economy and 
redistributing resources in a manner that secures the welfare of the most vulnerable 
segments of the population. This means that the state structure and the development 
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process is subjected to the ‘logic of the majority,’ and thus to the class and social interests 
of the majority. “The basic-needs approach begins by redefining development in class 
terms since it assumes that the development process is not neutral vis-à-vis the class 
interests it primarily serves.”64  In Haiti, this means that development should focus on the 
needs of the historically under-privileged majority: the peasants, the workers, women, the 
unemployed, the impoverished, and those in the informal sector. It means ensuring that 
these groups have the basics in terms of clean drinking water, access to land, healthcare, 
education, and protection from oppressive social relations.65 
This form of democracy would also require a different conception of participation 
than what is often championed by Western democracy promoters. In order to achieve this 
maximalist democracy, politics could not be left up to the politicians. Rather, the people 
would have to be mobilized throughout Haitian society. It is important to remember that 
Lavalas initially rejected elections, political parties, and all the other institutional 
trappings of so-called Western democracy. Aristide initially criticized the idea that 
elections or candidates could possibly produce social transformation. Instead, they were 
viewed as tools to constrain and undermine popular demands.66 Aristide was simply 
capturing what was a popular sentiment at the time. “On every corner, Haitians selling 
mangoes or cassettes will tell you in disgust that…the very idea of elections is a grim 
joke in Haiti—a country in which a vote can be bought for a swig of rum; so-called 
political parties flourish for a season before fading away with the candidate’s name, and 	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the notion of politics as a means to further the public good is utterly unknown.”67 Instead 
of elections, democracy was viewed as the movement itself; organizing at the grassroots 
level, in the village and neighborhood committees, peasant associations, religious and lay 
brotherhoods, political clubs, women’s groups, and associations of workers and the 
unemployed. Democracy was “a certain degree of freedom, a political space independent 
of government, which [had] been conquered inch by inch by the people.”68 It was the 
multitude of popular organizations forming the “counterpower in the streets”69 that 
finally brought democracy to Haiti, not elections or politicians. 
Lavalas called for the decentralization of politics away from the capital, and the 
integration of structures that enhanced the popular participation of the underprivileged 
directly into formal decision-making structures.70 This model of democracy implies that 
the traditionally disenfranchised would have a significant role in the formation of the 
social, economic, and political policies that inevitably dictate the terms of their lives.71 
Many scholars reject the notion that democracy necessarily entails particular 
economic and social rights, or even that it requires popular participation in politics. Much 
of these claims are viewed either as inconsequential or only secondary to the concept of 
democracy. Instead, these scholars have a much more limited perspective on what is 
essential to a proper definition of democracy. According to premier American political 	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scientist Robert Dahl, it is important to distinguish between democracy as an ideal and 
democracy as it is actually practiced. Dahl’s aim in his seminal book, Democracy and Its 
Critics, “is to set out an interpretation of democratic theory and practice, including the 
limits and possibilities of democracy, that is relevant to the kind of world in which we 
live.”72 He places particular emphasis on moving away from a normative discussion of 
democracy, towards identifying the empirical characteristics of actual democratic 
societies.73 
While it is possible to outline what the ideal characteristics of democracy are, 
realizing such conditions is described by Dahl as utopian.74 These “advocates of 
democracy sometimes appear to believe that the values of democracy constitute the 
complete universe of value: if you could have a perfect democracy, they imply, then you 
would have a perfect political order, maybe even a perfect society.”75 He wonders, “how 
much if any of the Greek vision of democracy is relevant to our times.”76 Instead, he 
believes that it is necessary to establish a minimum threshold of meaningful democratic 
achievement. 
In Democracy and its Critics, Dahl argues that many of the characteristics 
necessary to establish the democratic ideal of the Greek city-state simply do not exist in 
the modern world. The requirement in popular democracy that all citizens participate 	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directly in governing is no longer feasible in the contemporary setting, where cities 
themselves are often populated in the millions, and no longer act as the central political 
units of government they once were, subsumed in importance by the nation-state. Thus, 
the mechanisms of representation characteristic of modern democracies developed out of 
necessity. “As the number of citizens increases beyond a rather small if imprecise limit, 
the proportion of citizens who can assemble together (or, even if they can, have an 
opportunity to participate by anything more than voting) must necessarily grow smaller 
and smaller.”77 
There is little need for popular participation in Dahl’s conception of polyarchic 
democracy. He argues that in modern democracies, citizens delegate enormous 
discretionary authority to not only elected officials, but to various administrative, 
bureaucratic, judicial, and even international bodies.78 In fact, “what we call 
‘democracy’—that is, a system of decision-making in which leaders are more or less 
responsive to the preferences of nonleaders—does seem to operate with a relatively low 
level of citizen participation.”79  In fact, it requires it. In the polyarchic version of 
democracy, the accountability of government to the people is not established by mass 
participation in government, but by the bargaining and negotiating of organized groups of 
minorities within representative institutions.80 The endless mobilization of the masses is 
seen as simply disrupting this process. 	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According to many within the democratic transition literature, popular 
mobilization may be necessary for the dismantling of dictatorships and movement 
towards democracy, but it cannot continue indefinitely if democracy is to be sustained. 
Even Fatton argues that “the moment of democratization, however 'electric' and dramatic, 
is an ephemeral historical event that promises much but offers little by itself.”81 After 
popular mobilization forces a shift from authoritarian rule, “a certain normality is 
subsequently reasserted” as most who were once active in the push for democracy 
depoliticize and de-radicalize themselves, either as a result of disillusionment or fatigue 
with politics.82 As popular forces lose energy, they are “eventually co-opted by better 
organized and financially more independent social forces…Formerly excluded parties 
and leaders of the dominant classes and middle sectors begin to reimpose their power.”83 
By this phase of the democratization process, the soft-liners (moderates) within the 
previous authoritarian regime, as well as the social classes that supported it, have come to 
tolerate “conflicts and demands, modifications in the rules of the game and institutional 
arrangements, as well as levels and patterns of popular demands and organization they 
would never have accepted at the beginning of the transition—and have found that they 
can live with them.”84 But this is all predicated on the substantial demobilization of the 
popular movement and the emergence of moderate liberal democrats. The long-term 
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process of implementing and consolidating democracy seems to require this.85 But is it 
the case that the popular sectors simply become fatigued with politics and decide to 
delegate their authority to elected officials, or are they systematically pushed out of 
politics through a variety of means, subtle and indirect as well as overt and coercive? 
Dahl’s polyarchy also rejects the notion that majority rule is a necessary feature of 
democracy. The two critical features of polyarchy, “elections combined with continuous 
political competition between individuals or parties,” do not necessarily lead to majority 
rule, the leitmotif of a classical conception of democracy.86 Nevertheless, Dahl argues 
that somehow these processes advance popular sovereignty and political equality by 
increasing the “size, number and variety of minorities whose preferences must be taken 
into account by leaders.”87 So, the distinction between dictatorship and democracy, as 
seen through a polyarchic lens, is not between minority and majority rule, but between 
government by a minority and government by a group of minorities.88 These groups of 
minorities, the result of the increasing diversity of the modern nation-state, make it nearly 
impossible to have the ancient city-state vision of democracy, according to Dahl.89 This 
pluralist view of society is echoed in Fatton’s writings about the fall of the Duvalier 
dictatorship and the election of Aristide. According to Fatton, these events were made 
possible as a result of the rapid emergence of a variety of groups and organizations in 
civil society, and their ability to gain independence from the Duvalier regime and 	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eventually challenge its hold over their lives. Fatton particularly emphasizes the 
importance of “private spaces” in the resistance to authoritarian rule. “The prime 
characteristic of civil society is its capacity to fight the intrusion of the state…the 
development of pluralist and self-organizing civic associations bent on defending their 
own corporate interests against the exactions of the state has the potential to erode and 
perhaps block any authoritarian temptation.”90 This orientation fundamentally negates the 
role of the state in establishing social justice. 
Polyarchy facilitates the political participation of “a significant number of social 
groups and organizations that are relatively autonomous with respect to one another and 
to the government itself,” in ways that were not feasible in the Greek city-state. For Dahl, 
polyarchy is necessary to establish democracy in pluralist societies.91 So, “polyarchy is 
neither pure majority rule nor unified minority rule. It is an open, competitive, and 
pluralistic system of ‘minorities rule.’”92 But are there no interests along which the 
majority of the population is aligned, particularly in poor underdeveloped societies such 
as Haiti? Is there no “common good” that the majority of Haitians can agree on? Are 
social groups truly autonomous from each other and from the state? Is there no role for 
the state in terms of social justice? Or is society simply fragmented into a variety of 
minority interest groups? Is the only role of civil society to prevent government intrusion 
into citizen’s private lives? Or can civil society petition government to act towards a 
“common good”? 
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According to Dahl, the democratic process should not be expected to produce a 
particular result, principally some supposed “common good.” Dahl argues that there have 
always been philosophical difficulties in determining what the common good is, and how 
we are to find it. “The lack of consensus on the meaning of the public good—and even on 
whether such a thing exists—creates genuine difficulties for public life.”93 Another 
objection focuses on the impracticality of the notion of a “common good” to the 
establishment of real world democracy. “No one has been able to produce a concept of 
the common good that isn’t either too general to serve as a relevant guide to collective 
decisions or else is appropriately specific but would lead to unacceptable policies.”94 
Dahl also argues that reasonable notions of the common good can conflict with one 
another. The goals of “peace, order, prosperity, justice, and community—could conflict; 
conflicts would require tricky judgments about priorities and trade-offs.”95 In a 
polyarchy, the idea of the “common good” is necessarily stretched more thinly than in the 
classical sense to incorporate the diversity of people that make up the citizenry and their 
many divergent beliefs and interests.96 The “common good” thus shifts away from a 
particular end objective, towards a focus on processes that allow for these diverse 
interests to be given their appropriate opportunity to participate in the bargaining process 
that polyarchy facilitates. But are all interests competing on an equal playing field? 
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For Robert Dahl and Samuel Huntington, polyarchic democracy is defined as a 
political system that is competitive, inclusive, and protects civil liberties.97 The seven 
institutions necessary to establish polyarchy, according to Dahl, are: (1) elected officials, 
(2) free and fair elections, (3) inclusive suffrage, (4) the right to run for office, (5) 
freedom of expression, (6) alternative sources of information, and (7) associational 
autonomy.98 Polyarchy thus is primarily a procedural conception of democracy, referring 
almost exclusively to the process of making decisions rather than the substance of 
policies. It is minimal, in that it focuses on the smallest number of attributes that produce 
a viable standard for democracy. Dahl and Huntington distinguish between what are 
primarily political aspects of a regime, and the social and economic relations that are 
potential causes or consequences of democracy rather than the features of democracy 
itself.99 Thus, democracy is not to be judged based on the outcomes it produces, but based 
on the process used to make decisions. According to Dahl, “a possible defect in almost 
any process for making decisions is that it may fail to achieve desirable results. Even a 
just process might sometimes produce an unjust outcome.”100 But what if this so-called 
"just process" continually produces unjust outcomes? And what kinds of injustices are 
tolerated by such a system, and what kinds are not? 
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Despite debates on whether democracy should be reduced to a procedural concept 
or to its outcomes, Dahl considers polyarchy the highest possible level of real world 
democratic achievement. “While democrats describe many different visions of what the 
next stage of democracy should be, so far no country has transcended polyarchy to a 
‘higher’ stage of democracy.”101 For Dahl, these institutions, while criticized and treated 
with contempt by democratic idealists in countries with long histories of uninterrupted 
polyarchy, are often highly coveted by those who have lived in countries with extensive 
histories of authoritarian rule.102 But is it the case that those who live in repressive non-
democratic societies only wish to replicate the polyarchic structures of Western societies? 
Or do they have their own ideas about what democracy entails? 
 
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY 
A number of statements made by Aristide highlights that he understood his vision 
of democracy contrasted greatly with that of the United States and perhaps much of the 
Western industrialized world, and that he rejected the notion that theirs was the only 
possible model of democracy. “The popular democracy symbolized by the election of 
Aristide was not at all the democracy expected by the powerful.”103 While he traced his 
vision of democracy to the French Revolution’s Declaration of Human Rights of 1789, 
which is in line with much of Western democratic tradition, Aristide did not believe that 
“liberal and parliamentary democracy [was] in itself the indispensable corollary, the sole 	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result and unique end of the movement for human rights.”104 The democracy that Lavalas 
sought to establish in Haiti would not resemble a Haitian adaptation of liberal or classical 
parliamentary systems.105 
While Aristide claimed to be building Haitian democracy on different grounds 
than that on which most modern democracies have been built, perhaps participation in 
elections sponsored by the U.S. and the international community was problematic to 
begin with. This is something that Aristide believed before joining the electoral race for 
president in 1990. Though some view his election as the product of the Haitian masses’ 
usurpation of a U.S.-sponsored demonstration election106 intended to co-opt and bound 
the popular movement’s demands to organize autonomously, participate in the country’s 
politics, and share in the social and economic resources of the nation.107 Others, critical 
of any form of political process promoted by the United States, believed that Aristide’s 
participation in the elections signaled a sort of deviation from the social movement that 
removed Baby Doc from power and now clamored for a more substantive democracy 
than formal elections would promise. Many who sought this systemic change believed 
that “Aristide would never participate in something as irremediably filthy as Haitian 
politics.”108 They saw political parties as part of the traditional instruments of the 
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powerful. “In truth…a very influential group of citizens was pressuring Aristide to run 
for president. These individuals were by no means radical; most were well-to-do 
residents of Port-au-Prince.”109 In participating in U.S. sponsored elections, they believe 
that Aristide had already begun to deviate from the popular agenda. The people wanted 
“a president who is popular, and revolutionary!”110 
Others would come to argue that Aristide stifled the potential of Lavalas to 
genuinely establish democracy in Haiti. “While the masses erupted on the political stage 
and finally claimed their full rights as citizens, they have been unable—so far—to 
translate these rights into a coherent program of social and economic emancipation. This 
failure stemmed not only from the ruling classes’ intransigent defense of their privileges, 
but also from the incapacity or unwillingness of the Lavalas movement and Aristide to 
implant viable institutional structures of popular representation. In fact, the authoritarian 
habitus111 reasserted itself within Lavalas; the messianism and ‘one-manism’ of past 
practices came to embody Aristide’s presidential monarchism and absolute control of his 
Fanmi Lavalas party. He left no autonomous political space to his followers; Lavalas was 
Aristide, and Aristide was Lavalas.”112 
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These tensions between Aristide’s participation in Western sponsored formal 
political processes and the vibrancy of the social movement for democracy embodied in 
Lavalas present another aspect in our attempt to engage the question, “what is 
democracy?” For Sheldon Wolin in his work Fugitive Democracy, “democracy is a 
project concerned with the political potentialities of ordinary citizens, that is, with their 
possibilities for becoming political beings through the self-discovery of common 
concerns and of modes of action for realizing them.”113 For Wolin, constitutional 
democracy, or polyarchy, is contrary to this project. Polyarchy is the restriction of 
democracy by a constitution. “It is not democratic or democratized constitutionalism 
because it is democracy without the demos as actor…In sum, a constitution regulates the 
amount of democratic politics that is let in.”114 Dahl’s statements about the origins of 
many of the institutions of polyarchy support Wolin’s position on constitutional 
democracy. Many of the legislative bodies that became associated with democracy in the 
modern period initially represented the interests of aristocrats, commoners, the landed 
interest, and commercial interests. As popular forces challenged these exclusionary 
institutions, these legislative bodies were reformed by adopting electoral systems that 
would make their members more representative of the entire population.115 
Nevertheless, these bodies remained elite controlled institutions. This is 
confirmed by additional statements made in Dahl’s On Democracy. Dahl admits that, 
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“attached to the institutions of polyarchal democracy that help citizens to exercise 
influence over the conduct and decisions of their government is a nondemocratic 
process, bargaining among political and bureaucratic elites.”116 Despite acknowledging 
that popular control of elites is quite imperfect, Dahl argues that these elites are not 
despotic because elites’ competing interests serve as checks and balances, and because 
elite bargaining occurs within the limits of the democratic process whereby periodic 
elections force them to keep their eyes on public opinion.117 For Wolin, this emphasis on 
elections is a farce. After elections, the demos “must now get its politics vicariously and 
passively through the pronouncements of television oracles, talk-show babble, and the 
political burlesque hustled by the pundits.”118 The people are thus systematically 
excluded from the political process. 
For Wolin, this form of democracy is not democracy at all because it rejects 
democracy’s revolutionary impulse. If we look at democracy historically, we will find 
that it always emerges alongside revolution. The radical expansion of who was allowed to 
participate in politics was quite often a bloody affair, as the previously marginalized had 
to fight to be recognized as political equals. Democracy necessarily required revolution. 
“Revolution might be defined for our purpose as the wholesale transgression of inherited 
forms. It is the extreme antithesis to a settled constitution…Democracy was born in 
transgressive acts, for the demos could not participate in power without shattering the 
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class, status, and value systems by which it was excluded.”119 This is another way to 
think about democracy, one that sees the popular struggle for inclusion in political life as 
democracy itself. “Revolutions activate the demos and destroy boundaries that bar access 
to political experience. Individuals from the excluded social strata take on 
responsibilities, deliberate about goals and choices, and share in the decisions that have 
broad consequences…Thus revolutionary transgression is the means by which the demos 
makes itself political.”120 Once the revolutionary phase ends and the institutionalization 
of politics begins, then democracy in the strongest sense begins to wane. The democracy 
of the revolutionary period becomes viewed as disorganized, inefficient, unstable, and 
even dangerous. This is where the distinction between Aristide’s government and the 
Lavalas movement needs to be made. Aristide struggled in managing the tension between 
being the leader of a mobilized social movement, and being a political figure that became 
head of the Haitian state through polyarchic elections. In seeking to reconcile these two 
positions, he seemed to have neglected the principles of both. 
 
CENTRAL PROPOSITION 
The focus of this research will be an examination of the type of democracy and 
the particular processes by which Aristide and Lavalas pursued democracy in Haiti, with 
the understanding that their stated ideological positions vis-à-vis democracy should 
structure their preferences, dictate how they make decisions, and which decisions are 
made. This research paper will attempt to show that there are systematic differences in 	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how Aristide and Lavalas pursued the objective of democracy in Haiti, and how 
democracy in Haiti was promoted by the United States, the international standard bearer 
of polyarchy; that these differences are critical to explaining the tensions that emerged 
from the beginning between Aristide, Lavalas, and the United States. 
If the U.S. and the international community truly pursued a polyarchic vision of 
democracy in Haiti, there are sets of behaviors that we would expect to identify while 
outlining the history of American involvement in the country during the transition 
following the fall of Duvalier. This includes, first and foremost, respect for democratic 
procedures. Did the United States support free and fair elections? What was the political 
orientation of those whom the United States supported in Haiti? Did it side with those 
who were sincerely committed to the democratic process? A second important 
component of polyarchy is pluralism and the protection of civil liberties that fosters its 
development. To what degree did the United States accept the emergence of varying 
competing voices in Haitian politics, or support elements in Haitian society who were 
dedicated to the protection of civil liberties? To what degree did narrow elite interests 
capture U.S. policy towards Haiti? 
If Aristide and Lavalas truly adhered to the dictates of popular democracy, we 
would expect policies that sought to decentralize the decision-making process so as to 
promote participation at the grassroots level, with the belief that such participation would 
lead to policies that sought to change the economic status quo towards greater 
redistribution of society’s resources. To what degree did Aristide incorporate as many 
elements of the popular movement that he was supposed to represent into the formal 
decision-making process? Did Aristide concentrate political power in his administration 
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or decentralize power? Also, did Aristide promote the gradual redistribution of wealth 
through the incorporation of a larger segment of the population, which in Haiti is 
predominantly poor, in the decision-making process, or did he support revolutionary 
armed conflict as a means of redistribution? 
To examine these questions, my analysis of Aristide and the Lavalas movement's 
conceptualization of democracy will focus on the period of contested democratization in 
Haiti from 1986 to 1991, situating this period of democratic transition within a broader 
history of efforts by the Haiti's poor and marginalized to enter the political sphere as 
agents of their own political destinies. Following an overview of the Lavalas movement's 
place within a long historic struggle between Haiti's competing ruling classes and the 
masses for political prominence, my analysis turns to an examination of four distinct 
periods in Haiti's democratic transition: 1) the period of CNG-rule, from Jean-Claude 
Duvalier’s departure on February 7, 1986 to the November 29, 1987 election-day 
massacre; 2) the Leslie Manigat government, which comes to power through the 
fraudulent military elections of January 17, 1988, and is ousted on June 20, 1988 by the 
military; 3) the period from the ascension of Henri Namphy's military regime following 
the coup, to the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide on December 16, 1990; and 4) 
Aristide's first 8 months in power, from the inauguration of his government on February 
7, 1991 until the military coup on September 29, 1991. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Process-tracing will be the principle methodology used to analyze the degree to 
which a particular conception of democracy was influential in dictating the political 
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actions of Aristide and the Lavalas movement. Process-tracing begins with the premise 
that there is always an element of indeterminacy when attempting to establish the cause 
of a historical event. There are often multiple variables, uncertainty as to how these 
variables interact with one another, and the weight of each variable in leading to the 
outcome under scrutiny. These outcomes are generally the product of an intricate chain of 
occurrences that coalesce over time in ways that often cannot be captured by the rigidity 
of regression analysis, which presents its explanations in terms of snapshots of 
covariation. Process-tracing sheds light on the dynamism of political processes and the 
intervening pressures and circumstances that may force outcomes away from 
intentions.121  
 The strength of process-tracing lies in its ability to serve as a bridge between 
historical narrative and the social science obsession with determining causality. While 
historical narrative focuses on rich description to draw out general themes and trends, in 
process-tracing, potential hypotheses explaining an outcome are explicitly stated, and 
causation is determined by outlining the sequence of events from antecedent to outcome, 
and the relationship between events as they pertain to competing theoretical 
explanations.122 The researcher starts out with a set of competing hypotheses believed to 
explain the event in question. From each hypothesis stems predictions about the patterns 
that should be observed if the causal theory the hypothesis implies is valid. The 
researcher then proceeds to reconstruct the history of the outcome by identifying key 	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moments, processes, or decisions that link these plausible hypotheses to the outcome of 
interest, with the objective of determining the consistency of each hypothesis in 
predicting the sequence of events leading to the outcome.123 “In essence, process-tracing 
breaks down complex chains of events into smaller pieces, and distant relations between 
antecedents and outcomes into more proximate cause-and-effect couplings. Causal 
processes are selectively decomposed further and further until the plausibility of the 
component cause-and-effect relationships is so high that further explanation is 
unwarranted.”124 Thus, process-tracing goes beyond an explanation of a particular 
historical event to emphasize the stream of behaviors that led up to said event. 
In terms of outlining Aristide and the Lavalas Movement’s role in Haitian 
democratization, I will be referencing primary documents produced by the movement and 
its major actors, significant public statements and speeches, books and position papers 
written by Aristide, along with policies crafted by his administration. This will be 
supplemented by a close review of statements and declarations made by key individuals 
within the Lavalas Movement representing its various elements, from elites directly 
involved in the Lavalas government, those who were originally associated with the 
movement at the grassroots but inevitably became critics of the Aristide presidency, to 
Lavalas supporters on the ground within the public. 
This research is significant to the study of democracy not only because Aristide 
and the Lavalas movement are reflective of broader historical trajectories in Latin 
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America and the Caribbean, but also because they speak to recent trends in other parts of 
the world. Aristide’s particular conception of democracy flows from a movement that 
goes beyond Haiti, and is essentially entrenched in the broader ideological and political 
struggles that have characterized the region over the past 40 to 50 years. Aristide and the 
grassroots movement that emerged in Haiti are not divorced from the broader context of 
Latin American social thought, but rather deeply immersed within them. It is also 
important to note that the question of democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean is 
not yet resolved. Haiti itself is still undergoing a faltering transition to democracy 20 
years after Aristide became Haiti’s first democratically elected president. In other 
countries in the region there is a noticeable disillusionment with the direction of the kind 
of democracy that has been promoted by the United States and the region’s elites, with 
the rise of figures such as Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia as 
markers of this disenchantment. As the Arab Spring spreads throughout the Middle East 
and North Africa, these questions regarding the content of democracy have reemerged 
once again.  
 
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
In the substantive chapters of this research project, I examine the coherence of the 
conceptions of democracy put forth by Aristide and the Lavalas movement, and how they 
interacted with U.S. democracy promotion in Haiti. The second chapter provides a broad 
historical analysis of the relationship between the Haitian state and society, with an 
emphasis on the historical exclusion and exploitation of the poor and working class 
majority, and their efforts to mobilize and enter the political arena on their own terms. 
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The third chapter focuses on the circumstances that explain the timing of the popular 
uprising that became Lavalas in the 1980s. It highlights how various structural factors, 
domestic and international, as well as the emergence of ideologies such as liberation 
theology, came to produce the conditions for mass mobilization against the Duvalier 
dictatorship and for popular democracy. It also examines how these factors came to shape 
Aristide and Lavalas’ ideas about what democracy would have to entail moving forward. 
The following three chapters and the conclusion provide a close analysis of the 
critical junctures in Haiti's democratic transition from the fall of the Jean-Claude 
Duvalier regime on February 7, 1986 to the coup d’état against the democratically elected 
government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide on September 29, 1991. In these chapters, I track 
the dynamic interactions of the principal stakeholders in Haiti's democratic transition 
process across four distinct periods, outlining and analyzing how their rhetoric and 
actions align with competing conceptions of democracy. Particular emphasis is placed on 
analyzing critical junctures where top-down efforts by elites to establish polyarchy clash 
with bottom-up mobilizations of grassroots organizations to advance popular democracy. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the competition between the CNG military-government 
that comes to power in the aftermath of Jean-Claude's ouster in 1986, the newly returned 
exile political class, and the grassroots popular organizations, over the shape and tenor of 
Haiti's transition to democracy, and the breakdown of this process as a result of the 
November 29, 1987 election-day massacre. The fifth chapter analyzes the Leslie Manigat 
government that emerges out of the military-controlled elections of January 17, 1988, and 
efforts by U.S. surrogates in the Caribbean to legitimize the rigged elections in the face of 
opposition from the political class and the grassroots organizations. The sixth chapter 
 
 39 
focuses on the escalating confrontation between the military regimes that come to power 
following the ouster of Manigat on June 20, 1988 and a broadening mass movement for 
popular democracy. It examines Aristide's role as a critical defender of the poor and 
working class majority, and their grassroots movement to actively resist repression or 
cooptation in support of particular processes of democratization that marginalize their 
agenda as autonomous and equal political actors. It concludes with an examination of the 
1990 presidential campaign and election, particularly emphasizing some of the tensions 
between those pushing for participation in the elections and those advocating for more 
radical measures. The conclusion discusses some of the issues faced by Aristide in 
converting an election victory on the wave of popular mobilization amongst the poor and 
working classes, into policies that meet the objectives of the grassroots organizations and 
their vision of popular democracy, once he is in the presidency. The difficulties faced by 
Aristide in power, and his inevitable removal from power by the military, point to a 
broader question concerning whether processes that were crafted for a polyarchic 
understanding of democracy, can be co-opted for the purpose of advancing the agenda of 
popular democracy. 
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CHAPTER II 
DISCIPLINING HAITI’S LABORING MASSES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Haiti’s history of political struggle is a long one of competition between two 
principle factions of the elite, those utilizing populism to mask one-man rule, and others 
espousing republican constitutionalism to mask oligarchy. Behind the veils of benevolent 
tutelage, a parallel struggle between these elite cliques and the poor masses has served as 
a constant. In both instances, whether intra-elite competition or class conflict, political 
strife has revolved around who was to have dominion over Haitian land and labor, 
principally through control of the state apparatus. Traditionally, these tensions have 
become most apparent during periods of transition from overt authoritarian rule, when the 
possibilities of political liberalization and mass mobilization were the greatest: after the 
demise of French colonial rule and establishment of the post-colonial Haitian state; after 
the overthrow of the Boyer regime in 1843; after the U.S. occupation and eventual 
Revolution of 1946; and in the aftermath of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986. This 
chapter outlines this history of confrontation, highlighting periods where the intrigues of 
rival elite factions have opened up space for the laboring classes to mobilize and 
potentially overturn elite rule, espousing their own vision for a Haiti where they are 
empowered. 
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PRESERVING THE PLANTOCRACY 
 While the revolution back in metropolitan France beginning in 1789 seemed to 
portend similar revolutionary changes for the black slave masses in Saint-Domingue, the 
colonial name for the country that became Haiti, efforts to maintain the plantation system 
were simply clothed in the language of revolutionary egalitarianism. In August 1793, two 
years after the enslaved Africans set about freeing themselves through mass insurrection, 
commissioner Léger-Félicité Sonthonax of the newly established French Republic 
declared them free. Nevertheless, this was not done to end the plantation economy that 
had contributed so greatly to French prosperity, but rather to ensure that its principle 
structures remained intact.125 
 Though “no longer...the property of another,” the commissioner explained that the 
newly freed were to show their appreciation for this gift by rejecting indolence and 
banditry, and producing for the Republic.126 As the former slaves abandoned plantation 
labor to expand their garden plots, the French commissioner decreed: “this land does not 
belong to you. It belongs to those who have bought it or inherited it from those who first 
acquired it,”127 essentially, their former masters. What the self-proclaimed abolitionists 
had hoped for was a gradual end to slavery that did not fundamentally change the 
distribution of land or the relationship between those that worked it and the planter class 
who once owned them.128 Fearful that continued mass insurrection during a period of 	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parallel upheaval in the French metropole provided an opening for rival European powers 
to shape events on the island, legal emancipation had simply been a ruse to retain 
France's most prized sugar colony.129 Forced to sign three-year contracts, the former 
slaves were to remain “attached” to their plantations, under the close supervision of the 
colonial army. In return, they were granted subtle improvements in disciplinary practices 
and some remuneration for their work.130 Only those incorporated into the colonial army 
were legally free from plantation labor,131 setting a precedent whereby militarism became 
one of few avenues of upward mobility for the descendants of former slave laborers. 
 When black general Toussaint Louverture rid the colony of its French 
Commissioners, again there was hope for the dismantling of the forced labor regime, but 
the project to maintain the plantation system in the name of the French Republic 
continued. While Louverture's Constitution of 1801 declared that “there can be no slaves 
in Saint-Domingue”...that “all men here are born, [will] live, and die free and French,”132 
it was written exclusively by a committee of white and mulatto property owners, 
completely excluding the voice of the former slaves.133 Rather than challenge the status 
quo, it established the inviolability of the property rights of the planter class and imposed 
forced labor on the cultivateurs, the title given to the former black slaves to mask their 	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continued enslavement.134 Having appropriated the abandoned plantations of the 
colonialists who had fled Saint-Domingue, Louverture and the other black military 
officers sought to maintain plantation agriculture at the expense of the laboring black 
masses. "Rather than being promised any possibility of obtaining their own land, the 
mass of black fieldworkers were reminded that ‘the colony...cannot afford the slightest 
interruption in work on its crops,’ and that they were subject to the authority of the 
landowners employing them.”135 The multiracial egalitarian society that Louverture 
envisioned only applied to the landed elite, both old and new, not the vast majority of 
laborers, who were subject to “an iron-clad regime of discipline and repression under the 
direct supervision and inspection of the military generals.”136 
Upon the betrayal and exile of Louverture by French General Charles Leclerc, 
sent to quell the insolence of the gilded negros, another black general, Jean-Jacques 
Dessalines, took over where Louverture left off. Again, the possibility of a radical break 
from the past emerged. While defeating the invading French forces and leading the drive 
towards independence, contradictions persisted between his unequivocal declarations that 
the blacks of Saint-Domingue would never again be enslaved, and his efforts to maintain 
the plantation economy. Where Louverture sought to preserve the colonial relationship, 
enthusiastically championing the ideals of French Republicanism, Dessalines rejected 
them altogether for their barefaced hypocrisy. In his Act of Independence, Dessalines 
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called “into question the politics of European cultural models."137 Unlike Toussaint, 
Dessalines’s more recent experience of slavery and illiteracy may have provided him 
with the necessary distance from European worldviews to fundamentally challenge their 
tropes concerning liberty and freedom. Thus, he referred to the French as the enemies of 
the rights of man,138 and the ‘tree of liberty,’ as the “ancient tree of slavery and 
prejudice,” which he called upon the former slaves to bring down with their axes.139 
Dessalines’ constitution sought to sever the country’s ties with its colonial past, 
by changing the its name from Saint Domingue to Hayiti, the Amerindian appellation for 
the island before European colonization;140 declaring that all Haitians were to be 
addressed as Blacks,141 including Polish defectors of Leclerc’s French expedition who 
fought alongside the former slaves;142 and that “no white man...shall put his foot on this 
territory with the title of master or proprietor.”143 While legally considered property 
rather than people, labeled “brigands” of a rouge colony, embargoed and encircled by 
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European slave-holding powers,144 Dessalines declared, “we dared to be free when we 
were not free, by ourselves and for ourselves.”145 
Despite the world-shattering character of the Haitian Revolution in terms of its 
challenge to notions of racial hierarchy, the inheritors of the new Haitian state, the ancien 
libres and negres libres, persisted in their efforts to restore the plantation economy and 
the labor discipline it entailed. The fight against white San Domingan colonists and 
French Napoleonic forces required a tenuous alliance between two groups: anciens libres 
and nouveaux libres.146 Ancien libres (literally old freemen) were members of the 
military and political elite who were free prior to the revolutionary period. Typically the 
mixed raced descendants of the white planter class, they occupied a class position 
between the white planter elite (the grand blans) and white urban artisans, working class, 
and plantation managers (the petit blans). But in terms of color, they occupied a caste 
position between the petit blans and the black slave masses. Referred to as gens de colour 
(gentleman of color), they were often French-educated, owned land and slaves passed 
down from their white planter ancestors, had established their own coffee plantations, and 
were thus relatively wealthy. Prior to the mass mobilization of the enslaved population 
for freedom, the primary concern of the gens de colour was equal legal and political 
status with the white colonialists, not the abolition of slavery.147 Throughout the 
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revolutionary period this class shifted back and forth between support for and resistance 
to French colonialism as they were caught between the threat of white racial oppression 
and the insurrection of the former slaves. 
Within the class of freedmen, gens de couleur, as freeborn persons of color, were 
to be distinguished from negres libres (free blacks), who were born into slavery, but had 
gained their freedom at some point in their lives, like Louverture and Dessalines. As they 
came to occupy top positions within the revolutionary army, and eventually the post-
colonial state, they served as a rival faction to the gens de couleur. They, along with the 
masses of blacks that freed themselves through revolution, made up the nouveaux libres 
(literally, new freemen). Within this population of new freemen, there were further 
distinctions. Most free blacks were born in Saint Domingue, and thus as creoles were of 
higher status than blacks born in Africa, the bossales. Occupying important positions 
within the military hierarchy, many free blacks were able to acquire plantations as French 
planters abandoned them for fear of being massacred by their former slaves. So as the 
colony moved towards independence, the emergence of an autonomous small-holding 
peasant-society outside of the plantation order threatened the newfound positions of 
prominence of both the free blacks and the old free gentlemen of color, who sought total 
control over land and labor. 
 These two groups sought to exclusively dictate the direction of the post-colonial 
state and society. “Of the thirty-seven officers who signed the declaration of 
independence, more than two-thirds were of mixed racial descent, and none was African 
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[born].”148 It is doubtful that the writing of the subsequent constitution was any different. 
Yet again, those who claimed to speak for the Haitian masses were exclusively from the 
propertied military elite. Though Dessalines’ 1805 constitution would strongly reject 
slavery and racial hierarchy, the population over which the new state would rule were to 
be subjects rather than citizens. While Louverture’s Constitution of 1801 made pretenses 
to liberalism, Dessalines’ 1805 Constitution did not bother. The country was divided into 
six military divisions. There was no legislature, only a Council of State made up of the 
country’s generals. The Emperor, Dessalines, alone served as the head of the armed 
forces, made the laws, collected taxes, and named his successor. No mention was made of 
broader civil or political rights.149 
Between Louverture and Dessalines, two traditions emerged, feigned 
Republicanism in adherence to Western cultural values, alongside unabashed autocracy 
in the name of black-nationalism. These two traditions would characterize the country’s 
post-independence history.150 With Dessalines' assassination in 1806, the nation was 
divided in two, between what became the Kingdom of Haiti in the North, with black 
general Henri Christophe as ruler, and the Republic of Haiti in the South, with the 
mulatto general Alexandre Pétion as president. The mulattoes were always more 
dominant in the South and West regions of the country, while the blacks held political 
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and military power in the Artibonite and Northern regions.151 The constitution of the 
Northern Kingdom unambiguously asserted Christophe’s autocratic rule, in the tradition 
of Dessalines. It rejected the notion of democracy all together as nonsensical, arguing that 
distinctions in rank were natural, and not incompatible with liberty. The population was 
believed to be “unstable by character, averse to labour and tending to disorderly 
conduct...[and] therefore liberty must be contained within due bounds.”152 
By contrast, the constitution of Petion’s Republic presumably limited the power 
of the president. Proponents of the regime claimed that in the Republic, all were equal, 
and that government was “the result of a contract between the people and their 
leader...sovereignty resid[ing] in the body of the people.”153 To a great extent, these 
pronouncements belied what was in fact a military oligarchy. “A careful reading of the 
constitution as well as an examination of the practice, would reveal that, despite talk 
about the sovereignty of the people, real power was in the hands of a small self-
perpetuating elite.”154 Denunciations between the Northern Kingdom and the Southern 
Republic simply masked what was truly a conflict between two elite groupings, neither 
“particularly interested in the welfare of the mass of former slaves, though both groups 
relied on their support.”155 
In the Northern Kingdom, Henry Christophe’s Code Henry of 1812 gave the state 
military the responsibility of ensuring that cultivateurs, the traditional agricultural 	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laborers, remained confined to the plantations they had once worked as slaves.156 Military 
campaigns were organized to round up and return so-called fugitive laborers to their 
respective plantations. Their subsistence gardens and food crops were destroyed, their 
modest parcels of land returned to the state, and the sale of small plots that fragmented 
plantations outlawed.157 The Kingdom also drafted many former slaves to work on state 
construction projects, particularly fortifications and palaces, making it clear that though 
Haitians were legally free, in reality, they were viewed as property of the state. Through 
an extensive network of spies and informants, Christophe ensured that laborers remained 
confined to Northern plantations and construction sites.158 
Similarly, Jean-Pierre Boyer, heir to Petion’s Republican tradition, utilized the 
state to secure labor for the plantation economy. Upon reuniting the north and south after 
Christophe’s suicide, Boyer issued the Code Rural of 1826 to return those who had 
escaped to live an autonomous existence back to the plantations. Boyer’s “Republic” 
outlawed subsistence farming and cattle-raising, as these activities “produced little or no 
revenue for the state.”159 The “Republic” relied on an island-wide network of jails and 
prisons to support forced labor policies. “Provincial capitals and regional commercial 
centers all had their own prisons …demonstrat[ing] the importance of regional prisons as 
pillars of the republican regime.”160 Under Boyer, the Code Rural “officially classified 
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the rural population as a distinct group with limited rights and subject to special 
regulations.”161 So the legal system that emerged in Haiti is one where the majority of the 
population did not have equal status. Interestingly enough, the rounding up of “escaped” 
peasants and their confinement on plantations occurred alongside the liberal electoral 
politics of the period. 
Despite the conflicts that emerged between the two elite factions, they were in 
concert when it came to preserving plantation production for export and the forced labor 
that relied on. Both were fundamentally “opposed [to] the formation of an independent 
and landed peasantry,”162 which would undermine their control over land and access to 
cheap pliant labor. Adherents of both the Republican tradition and the authoritarian 
tradition would continue in their efforts to build the nation by subduing the mostly 
African-born bossales, who once served as the draft animals of the colonial economy, 
into the status of cultivateurs confined to plantations.163 
 
THE REVOLUTION OF 1843 
Throughout this period of political evolution, from the first armed slave 
insurrection to post-colonial independence, efforts to sustain the plantation economy 
consistently came into direct conflict with the substantive conception of freedom held by 
the mass of former slaves. During the colonial period under Louverture, the laboring 
black masses revolted against their status as cultivateurs for the French Republic. In 	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October 1801, Louverture’s own adopted nephew, Hyacinthe Moise, led an uprising in 
the North against the system of forced labor. Unwilling to enforce the labor 
regulations,164 believing that the black masses were being exploited for the benefit of 
France, Moise called for popular land redistribution, making him “the idol of the black 
workers.”165 With Moise arrested, tried, and executed, Louverture would have 
commanders Henry Christophe and Jean Jacque Dessalines, two future heads of the 
Haitian post-colonial state, brutally suppress the rebellion.166 
Other figures would also lead popular resistance movements against Louverture’s 
forced labor regime. Guerilla fighters and maroons such as Petit Noel, Sylla, and Sans-
Souci in the northern mountains, as well as Lamour Dérance in the Western Province, 
mounted countless attacks against Louverture. The conflict between these guerilla leaders 
and the black generals of the colonial army was “over the land and class questions in San 
Domingo in terms of which class would dominate and in whose interests would the 
colony be reorganized.”167 While Toussaint and the black military officers contended that 
a plantation system based on wage labor was the most effective and efficient means to 
preserve the freedom of the black masses because it generated wealth for the colony and 
France,168 the reality was that “this new class of military officers and property owners 
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had its own interests that opposed those of the former slaves.”169 The agenda of the 
formerly enslaved population was radical land reform, which would transform them into 
smallholders, depriving the emergent black landowning class of a cheap and exploitable 
labor force.170 It is only with the betrayal and exile of Louverture, and subsequent French 
efforts to reestablish direct rule, that the guerilla leaders would come to fight alongside 
the former black and mulatto generals of the colonial army in an all-out war for 
independence. Nevertheless, these class tensions would persist throughout the country’s 
history.171 
They reappeared immediately after independence. Though Dessalines sat atop the 
militarized Haitian state that maintained the forced labor regime, pressure from the 
peasants may have been pushing him towards reform. “In a well-known statement 
Dessalines referred to the unjust situation whereby the anciens libres retained all the 
private property of the country, while the former slaves remained without land.” 172 
Having nationalized all the land previously belonging to the French, and establishing a 
state agency to manage their distribution to those who fought in the revolution, it was 
believed that Dessalines hoped to lessen the stark concentration of private land in the 
hands of the affranchis and black military elite. 
“How does it come to pass that since we have chased away the colonists, their 
children are claiming their property? The Blacks whose fathers are in Africa will 
then have nothing? Be careful of yourselves, Negroes and Mulattoes, we have all 
fought against the Whites; the property we have conquered in spilling our blood 	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belongs to all of us; I insist that it be shared with equity.”173  
 
For many, it is unclear whether Dessalines sought to divide and distribute national lands 
as broadly as possible, creating a nation of small-holders, or if state ownership was 
simply a means to improve the position of the new black elite in relation to the traditional 
mulatto elite.174 
As Dessalines undertook his agenda of nationalizing land, both the ancien libres 
and the negres libres increasingly felt threatened,175 assassinating him for challenging the 
concentration of land in their hands.176 The two principle conspirators would become 
heads of the successor states, the black general, Christophe, and the mulatto general, 
Petion. As the two segments of the elite vied for power, former slave Jean-Baptiste 
Perrier, popularly known as Goman,177 lead a peasant revolt in the South, eventually 
establishing the Peasant Republic from 1807 to 1819.178 According to Pétion, Goman’s 
peasant insurrection represented legitimate discontent amongst the cultivateurs, who were 
never considered actual citizens of the republic and thus treated unjustly. Only with the 
reuniting of the country under Boyer, after Pétion’s death, would the Peasant Republic be 
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dismantled.179 This pattern would be replicated time and again throughout Haitian 
history. As factions of the elite became preoccupied with fighting one another, the 
working classes would seize the moment to mobilize for systemic change and substantive 
participation in the political process. Once these competing factions realized the outright 
threat to their class positions, they would shift from conflict to cooperation in order to 
repress the potential revolution from below. This narrative would play itself out again 
during the Revolution of 1843. 
In 1843, the demands of a liberal faction of the elected elite for greater checks on 
presidential power and a liberalization of Haiti’s politics provided an opportunity for the 
peasantry to push for the “freedom, political rights, and social justice that... their (grand) 
parents—had fought for in the revolution and war of independence...”180 Most of the 
liberals spearheading what would become the Revolution of 1843 were from the segment 
of the mulatto elite left outside of Boyer’s ruling circle. On September 1st, 1842, at a 
meeting of the "Society of the Rights of Man and Citizen," they proclaimed a 
"Manifesto...to their Fellow Citizens" announcing their grievances against Boyer’s 
dictatorial rule.181 According to the Society, the central causes of tyranny in Haiti were 
the defects of the constitution, which gave the Senate and the President powers so great 
and absolute that the sovereignty of “the people” and the inalienability of their rights had 
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been forgotten.182 The Manifesto declared the formation of a new constituent assembly 
with the power “to create ‘a democratic constitution that would openly proclaim the 
sovereignty of the people and the principle of timely elections for most public positions,’ 
including most notably the presidency.”183 
Even as they sought to displace Boyer in the name of popular sovereignty, the 
Society was particularly distrustful of the masses of impoverished peasants. While the 
revolution needed the support of peasant laborers, emphasis was placed on leading them 
rather than having them develop their own agenda.184 Their distrust was particularly 
embodied in the person of Charles Rivière-Hérard, the regional military commander who 
was declared president after the Manifesto’s signing. “He recommended ‘above all that 
no cultivators be introduced into the ranks of the national guard, which must be 
composed only of proprietors, sons of proprietors, farmers, and under-farmers, etc.,’”185 
those who had a vested interest in preserving the plantation economy. So, while they 
sought to overthrow Boyer’s autocratic rule, they were also concerned with preserving 
the confinement of cultivateurs to their agricultural work. 
Another line of contention emerged between the Society and the black elite, led 
by the large landowning Salomon family. They argued that the overthrow of Boyer 
simply empowered the petit milats to the exclusion of the black masses, who the 	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Salomons claimed to represent. Pronouncing that this new faction threatened to destroy 
the black small landowners, the Salomons denounced it and Boyer for having been “‘the 
oppressor of the black class’ and called upon the new government to give justice to the 
blacks.”186 General Herard subsequently imprisoned the Salomons, but they would 
eventually escape and call for mass revolt. Though this initial insurrection was put down, 
and the Salomons exiled to Jamaica, not long after, the peasants would mobilize again, 
autonomously, as Herard became preoccupied with quelling a separate rebellion on the 
eastern part of the island of Hispaniola incorporated into Boyer’s Republic at the time. 
“Calling themselves ‘the Army of Sufferers’ “the cultivators [of the South]...armed 
themselves with rifles and pikes of hardwood, [from which they came to be known as the 
Piquets], and organized themselves into cavalry and infantry.’”187 
Though this uprising is often portrayed as emerging due to color conflict, the 
peasants’ agenda was one based on class rather than color. Believed to be in reaction to 
Boyer’s Rural Code of 1826,188 the Army of Sufferers would emerge from the same 
regions where the Peasant Republic had existed under Goman. Under the leadership of 
black peasant farmers and former soldiers, Jean-Jacques Acaau and his lieutenants, the 
Army of Sufferers demanded respect for the constitution, national public education, and 
economic reforms reducing the price of staple imports, establishing fairer compensation 
for their crops, and reducing their work load. Though they initially pursued their agenda 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 77. 	  
187 Sheller, "The Army of Sufferers," 45-46. 	  
188 Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, Endnote 43, 275. 	  
 
 57 
through public addresses and proclamations,189 as the Herard military regime increasingly 
engaged in outright repression, the Army of Sufferers became radicalized. Ultimately, 
they sought to confiscate lands owned by wealthy elites for distribution to those who 
worked them, as their predecessors had done during the Haitian Revolution and after.190 
What began as a struggle between different elite factions for control of the state, 
broadened into a fundamental challenge to the distribution of power and resources along 
class lines. 
The Army of Sufferers espoused a clear class-based ideology, identifying their 
enemies in terms of class and status rather than simply skin color.191 For Acaau, “the rich 
Negro who can read and write is mulatto; the poor mulatto who cannot read nor write is 
Negro,”192 meaning that “all poor mulattoes should be considered as blacks, and...all rich 
blacks should be considered as mulattoes.”193 So, for the Army of Sufferers, color was 
simply a proxy for class. The Piquets fought in the name of the peasant laborers, against 
the large landowning elite, whether mulatto or black. In a show of solidarity, their leaders 
“utilized the dress and Kréyol speech of the peasantry," symbolically reflecting their 
ultimate goal of opening Haitian politics to the peasantry.194 195 Their ideology would be 
called "negro communism," likened to the Revolutionary wave of 1848 in Europe.196 
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As Herard was removed and the black revolutionary hero, General Philippe 
Guerrier, declared president, it became clear that the black elite never truly represented 
the interests of the black masses. While Guerrier's presidency did not immediately halt 
the peasant insurgency, eventually many of the Piquet leaders would acquiesce to the 
new government.197 Recalled from exile, the large landowning Salomon family would 
play a central role in reestablishing elite rule, using "their influence in the South to 
contribute to the neutralization of the Acaau movement in 1844." Lysius Salomon would 
become a senator and influential minister, but never pushed for the democratic inclusion 
of the peasantry for which ‘the Army of Sufferers’ had fought.198 Black elite claims made 
in the name of Haiti’s black peasants were simply a means to gain access to positions of 
prestige and power vis-à-vis the better-established mulatto elite.199  
Where they could not displace their rivals, they would be contented to share 
power, at least for a time. Guerrier became one of many presidents from the black elite 
that would serve to mask the continued political and economic dominance of the mulatto 
faction, in what came to be known as the politique de doublure (rule by proxy). The 
image of a black figure in the top political position, was supposed to distract the poor 
black majority into believing their interests were being attended to. But black figurehead 
presidents like Guerrier (1844 – 45), Jean-Louis Pierrot (1845 – 46), and Jean-Baptiste 
Riché (1846 – 47), were described at the time as noirs rather than nègres. Since the term 	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nègre had applied to black slaves, and negres libres signified slaves who had gained their 
freedom prior to the revolution, as former negres libres established themselves as the 
black elite, they increasingly came to refer to themselves as noirs. The designation nègre 
would continue to apply to those who remained agricultural laborers. The Army of 
Sufferers “combined a critique of hierarchical divisions of color, class, and status within 
a discourse of egalitarian citizenship...The careful distinction made between noir and 
nègre in the political discourses of the period indicate that this was a matter of more than 
color alone.”200 They would continue mobilizing against the landed elite, black or 
mulatto, when it became evident that they did not represent their interests. 
While the use of the politique de doublure sometimes backfired on the milat elite, 
with the coming to power of Faustin Soulouque (1847 – 59) as a prime example, it never 
meant democratization for the majority of Haitians, the peasantry. Thought to be rather 
unintelligent, and chosen to be yet another black figurehead president, Soulouque was 
able to wrest power from the mulatto elite who sought to control him in the name of the 
blacks. While Soulouque replaced mulatto military officers with black ones, placed 
prominent members of the black elite like Salomon in his government, and utilized state 
power to wrest economic power from the traditional mulatto elite, he rejected the notion 
of the democratic participation of the masses altogether. Initially allied with the peasant 
armies of the South, the piquets, against the mulatto elite, he eventually sought to 
suppress them201 as they demanded greater land redistribution.202 Where segments of the 
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impoverished majority were included in the regime’s activities, it was primarily in 
repressing potential rivals within the mulatto and black elites as members of his 
paramilitary group, the zinglins. With all centers of potential resistance repressed, 
Soulouque proclaimed himself Emperor Faustin I.203 
The failure to maintain a progressive agenda, first with the tacit alliance between 
the liberal faction of the elite and the peasant population, then between the black elite and 
the peasantry, produced the context for the emergence of a Soulouque. “This was not the 
triumph of blacks over mulattoes, but the triumph of statist autocracy over the potentially 
democratic alliance of radical segments of the elite, the black small land-owning class, 
and republican peasants and cultivators.”204 As a result of these failures, the armed 
peasant bands largely devolved into roving mercenaries. This lack of clear political 
orientation became apparent as subsequent Haitian governments faced the constant threat 
of ouster by piquets from the South, and what became known as cacos from the north, led 
by dissident generals who hoped to capture the state to enrich themselves and their 
clique.205 
Though unable to take control of the state apparatus to direct it towards their 
interests, the peasant masses were able to resist efforts by Haiti’s nineteenth century elites 
to force them back onto the plantations. Rejecting abstract legal notions of freedom, “the 
Haitian insurrectionists laid the groundwork for a peasant society with the most evenly 	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distributed land ownership of any former plantation region of the Americas.”206 
Confronted with the choice of selling their labor to large landowners for wages, or 
working their own lands independently, time and again the peasantry chose the latter. “It 
clung to its control of the labor process and refused to be regimented by the landlords.”207 
 
GRANDONS, MILATS, AND OCCUPATION 
Unable to maintain control over peasant labor directly, the military elite largely 
abandoned the large-scale plantation economy of the colonial period, developing into two 
distinct economic groupings, largely paralleling the earlier divide between anciens libres 
(old freemen), the mulattoes, and negres libres (free blacks), the elite blacks. Most of the 
negres libres remained attached to the land, developing into a mostly black large 
landowning class that came to be known as the grandons (great dons), while the anciens 
libres evolved into a mostly mulatto urban merchant class, known as the milat 
bourgeois.208/209 The grandons were mostly the descendants of the dark-skinned officers 
who had ascended in the military ranks under Toussaint, Dessalines, and Christophe,210 
while the bourgeois were the offspring of the lighter-skinned, French-speaking, and often 
European-educated landlords, who were better able to build relationships with foreign 	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merchants, cementing a dominant position within Haiti's retail and wholesale trade.211 
Nonetheless, both the grandons and the urban merchant class relied on the exploitation of 
the peasantry for their wellbeing. While the grandons accumulated their wealth and 
power by extracting “surplus value from peasants through a form of semi-feudal share-
cropping called the two-halves system or dèmwatye,”212 the merchant class has 
historically controlled the import-export sector,213 where it redistributed wealth upwards 
through a number of taxes on peasant agricultural goods in the urban markets and 
customhouses, and on imported goods necessary for the peasantry to subsist, from flour 
and oil, to candles, kerosene, and matches.214 
Throughout this historic conflict between Haiti’s landowning and merchant elites, 
the militarized control of the peasant population has always remained a central concern. 
This is particularly embodied in the one institution to survive elite efforts to sustain the 
plantation economy after the colonial period, the rural police known as the chef de 
section. Haitian state-building has always required an alliance between the central 
government and the commandants of the country's various regional militias. These 
regional military commanders, though chosen by the holder of state power, were often 
members of the local grandon elite, and thus critical power brokers. A commandant 
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would in turn appoint a prominent peasant as chef de section in each rural section under 
his jurisdiction. This represented a nominal alliance between the central government and 
the country's numerous regional and local elites.215 The chef de section’s primary role, as 
a member of the Armed Forces, was to maintain order in their rural section. “For the 
immense majority, he was the sole visible government functionary; in effect he was the 
government.”216 As the only link between the rural communities and the central 
government, the chef de section had the final word in all important local questions.217 He 
acted as the "justice of the peace, district attorney, notary, land surveyor, and agent of the 
army. In other words, the sheriff makes the law, implements the law, and interprets the 
law."218 
Worse yet, the system of rural policing was built on the accepted exploitation of 
the peasantry. Not only did rural section chiefs serve as unpaid government agents,219 in 
fact, they paid the military for their positions. Their assistants, who often numbered in the 
hundreds, paid them in turn. The real compensation was what they could extort from the 
local population.220 Thus, payment served as an investment for the opportunity to exploit 
the populations under their jurisdictions. Most "earned their income by collecting various 
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fees from the peasants which they divided among themselves and the state."221 The chef 
de section also served as an agent of the large landowners,222 while also performing 
surveillance functions for the Haitian state. The chef de section executed orders sent 
down from the region's commanding officer to stifle any political mobilization of the 
peasant population, with the collaboration of the local prefect, magistrate, and justice of 
the peace.223 With nearly 565 section chiefs throughout Haiti, one for each rural 
section,224 the peasantry lived under what amounted to a veritable police state. 
Despite their collaboration in suppressing autonomous peasant mobilization for 
structural change, the two factions of the elite were often divided in terms of their 
particular economic interests. As the merchant class sought to purchase crops for export 
from the grandons at the lowest prices possible, and large landowners sought to keep 
prices high, conflict often ensued. These tensions were further exacerbated by the 
merchant class’s relentless efforts to increase foreign investment in Haiti, a prospect that 
always inflamed the nationalist sentiments of the large landowning elite.225 While the 
grandons were never able to gain full control over the Haitian state because their power 
was fragmented across the particular regions where they held land and could organize 
peasant laborers into regional armies, the merchant class’s dependence on the standing 
army meant that its power was also tenuous. As a means of black mobility, the Haitian 
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army was never an institution under the direct control of the mulatto merchant elite. In 
Haiti, the bourgeoisie never conquered the ‘right’ to rule, but always had to ‘negotiate’ 
this ‘right’ through an intermediary,”226 the black military elite, who in return for power 
in government and the spoils therein, allowed the bourgeoisie to maintain its dominance 
over the private sector. Nevertheless, the stability of such an arrangement was always 
fragile. The nearly 30 or so coups d’état’s in Haitian history are principally the result of 
this rivalry. “The grandon often organized rural militias which would run bourgeois 
presidents out of the capital, and the bourgeoisie often ousted grandon presidents with the 
standing city-based Army.”227 
As Haitian presidents aligned with the bourgeoisie sought to attract American 
investors to reestablish plantation agriculture in Haiti, the number, frequency, and 
intensity of caco insurrections against the capital increased significantly, eventually 
prompting a U.S. response. In 1911, president Antoine Simon was ousted by strong 
resistance in the agriculturally rich Artibonite and Northern Department regions228 as a 
result of a concession to American James P. McDonald that gave his corporation the right 
to build a railroad line across the region, to grow fig bananas on 12 miles of land on 
either side of tracks, and a monopoly over the crop's export. The political upheaval led to 
the eventual revocation of the banana concession, crippling the railroad project 
entirely.229 Future American interests would make it clear that investments in Haiti would 	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only follow direct U.S. control of the country.230 It was the public lynching of pro-U.S. 
president Guillaume Sam in 1915 and the growing influence of anti-U.S. political figures 
like Rosalvo Bobo that prompted the 19-year U.S. occupation of Haiti. 
With the U.S. deciding to set the affairs of its unruly neighbor straight, a primary 
agenda for the occupation was to open the country to American investment, particularly 
in agriculture.  “In 1921 a State Department officer prophesied that the fantastic 
prosperity of French-colonial Saint Domingue could be re-created under American 
auspices…”231 For American investors, Haiti was a place with seemingly “abundant and 
untapped land and labor.”232 What was missing was “initiative and industry.”233 But 
before Americans would invest in civilizing the Haitian countryside, they would have to 
first establish ownership of the land. This would require overturning Dessalines' law 
against foreign ownership of Haitian land that remained an integral part of every Haitian 
constitution since 1805.234 As the 1917 Haitian National Assembly refused to ratify the 
American-sponsored constitution removing the law against foreign ownership of land, it 
was subsequently dissolved by the Marine-created Haitian Gendarmerie. Concerned that 
new elections would produce another hostile National Assembly, the occupation forces 
would push through the constitution the following year using an extralegal plebiscite 
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closely supervised by the Gendarmerie. With less than 5 percent of the population 
participating, and the Gendarmerie ordered to arrest anyone who publicly opposed the 
constitution, 98,225 voted in favor, with only 768 opposed.235 A string of presidents from 
the mulatto elite (Philippe Sudré Dartiguenave, Louis Borno, and Louis Eugène Roy) 
would collaborate in the effort to open Haiti to U.S. investment, simultaneously 
increasing the influence of their class. 
Modern technology, irrigation, skilled management of production, efficient 
marketing, all required that the system of land-tenure where each peasant owned and 
farmed his little plot of land be destroyed.236 According to Financial Adviser Arthur C. 
Millspaugh, rural Haitians had to be transformed from being the contented, indolent, and 
shiftless peasants that they were, “if they [were] to be citizens of an independent self-
governing nation."237 This would only be possible through working on foreign-owned 
plantations for wages. Moreover, the occupation forces believed that the indigenous 
traditions of labor exploitation would facilitate this transition. Typically Haitian laborers 
were paid 20 cents for a twelve-hour workday, far less than anywhere else in the 
Americas. “The greatest asset Haiti has is cheap labor….’”238 In fact, the largest 
employer of local labor at the time, the Haitian American Sugar Company (HASCO), 
simply integrated its profit-making enterprise into the traditional system of rural 
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repression by “sub-hiring workers through native gang bosses.”239 American promises of 
prosperity and progress would be wrought through the exploitation of the Haitian 
peasantry, just as had always occurred. 
As U.S. occupation forces pushed through the Constitution of 1918, overturning 
the ban on foreign ownership of land, various high-level officers of the occupation sought 
to carve out pieces of Haiti for themselves. Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, investigated possibilities for investment throughout the country, particularly 
on the islands of La Gonave, La Tortue, and Ile a Vache.240 Dr. George F. Freeman, 
Director of the Agricultural Extension and Teaching Service (the Service Technique) 
established by the occupation in 1923, sought to imitate the plantation agriculture he 
witnessed in Indonesia, eventually interesting the U.S. government in selecting Haiti as a 
site for developing “a rubber supply in its own sphere of influence.”241 Firestone and 
Goodrich would explore the possibility throughout the 1920s. The country’s proximity to 
the U.S., the possibility of pushing “squatters” off of old colonial plantation land, and a 
seemingly abundant and pliant peasant population that could serve as workers on rubber 
estates proved rather enticing. Dr. W.W. Cumberland, the occupation’s financial advisor 
to the Haitian government, set plans for sisal production, of particular interest to the U.S. 
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Navy, which found the plant’s fibers useful for products like rope and twine.242 Similar 
inquiries were made into “pineapples, bananas, cotton, and other products."243  
These investments were made possible through the active displacement of the 
peasantry. Even after the abolition of the law forbidding foreign tenure, the problem of 
accumulating enough land to plant efficiently plagued efforts to establish corporate 
plantation agriculture. The proliferation of peasant small-holders throughout Haiti stood 
in the way. In 1928, HASCO would launch a cadastral survey of agriculturally rich areas 
of the country using aerial photography as a pretext to engage in the mass eviction of 
peasants without land titles. In 1930, the Union Nationaliste accused the Haitian-
American Development Corporation of destroying the homes and crops of the peasantry 
in the regions where sisal competed with them for acreage.244 They argued that the 
Haitian government, in collusion with the occupation forces, used the pretext of non-
payment of rent to the state to remove families that had subsisted on their land since the 
19th century.245 The concern was never payment, but rather land expropriation. 
Beyond outright land expropriations, the occupation fundamentally disrupted life 
in the countryside. Alongside widespread rape and arbitrary killings, the occupation 
forces revived Haiti’s 19th century system of forced labor known as the corvée to expand 
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the country’s road network, allowing them to better administer the military occupation.246 
For many, the corvée invoked the historical memory of colonial slavery, leading to a 
cacos rebellion amongst the northern peasantry under the leadership of former officers of 
Haiti's dismantled military, Charlemagne Peralte and Benoit Battraville.247 Though armed 
peasant resistance would eventually be neutralized for the most part by the Marines and 
the Gendarmerie by 1920, the threat of cacos insurrection ended the official use of the 
corvée. Nevertheless, many simply left the countryside,248 either for the country’s urban 
centers or to become cheap and pliant labor in American-owned sugar plantations in 
Cuba and the Dominican Republic. 
While the occupation would come to an end in 1934, displacement of Haitian 
peasants in order to expand plantation agriculture would not. WWII would serve as a 
period of further expansion for plantation agriculture, particularly rubber cultivation. 
Between 1939 and 1941, Haitian President Sténio Vincent agreed to a long-term program 
for the development of Haitian agriculture with the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). The following year, Élie Lescot, a member of the mulatto elite with close ties to 
U.S. economic interests, succeeded Vincent as President of Haiti and establish the 
Société Haïtiano-Américaine de Développement Agricole (SHADA) Corporation. While 
owned exclusively by the Haitian government, it was financed by a five-million-dollar 
U.S. Export-Import Bank loan. The company was granted a 50-year lease on 150,000 
acres of land, and a monopoly on the sale and export of natural rubber from Haiti. As the 	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Japanese cut the U.S. from its source of rubber in Southeast Asia, Haiti became an 
important alternative. By 1943, 47,177 acres were cleared for the cultivation of 
cryptostegia,249 "a latex producing plant that would help ease the rubber shortage."250 
SHADA plantations would rely on security forces of fifty to sixty members of the Gard 
d'Haiti, the outgrowth of the occupation period's Gendarmerie.251 
Initially celebrated as a shining example of Pan-American cooperation and “a step 
forward in the modernization of Haitian agriculture,"252 its actual impact on the Haitian 
countryside would be particularly devastating. In declaring the most arable lands strategic 
zones for the cultivation of rubber and sisal, Lescot's government supported the mass 
removal of peasant families from their lands.253 As synthetic rubbers emerged, yields 
suffered due to drought conditions, and WWII came to an end, U.S. support for rubber 
cultivation ended.254 With massive unemployment following the demise of SHADA, as 
well as continued drought conditions, living standards for Haiti's rural and urban poor 
deteriorated significantly. As the black middle class grew in influence, claiming to 
represent the black rural and urban poor, Lescot would eventually be deposed in what 
became the Revolution of 1946. 
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THE REVOLUTIONS OF '46 AND '56 
 The Lescot presidency represented the last vestiges of mulatto elite hegemony 
that had been sustained by the U.S. occupation. Some members of this group "supported 
the Americans, seeing the invasion as a short-term intervention which would re-establish 
order and refurbish their own position as the governing elite..."255 Unlike Stenio Vincent, 
a nominal member of the mulatto elite able to recognize the growing influence of the 
black middle class, thus including them in his government, Lescot took the opposite tact. 
He pursued a policy of mulâtrification, whereby the sons of the mulatto elite occupied all 
the upper echelons of the military, the diplomatic corps, the civil service, and the 
cabinet,256 harkening back to the preferential treatment they received during the 
occupation. Alongside the exclusion of the black middle class, the Lescot regime 
provided tacit support for the Roman Catholic Church's 1941-42 anti-superstition 
campaigns against Vodou, the religion of Haiti's peasant majority. Some contend that the 
campaign was a means for the mulatto elite to restrain the growing noiriste opposition,257 
which came to challenge its cultural, social, and political hegemony. It has also been 
associated with the expropriation of peasant land on behalf of American interests.258 
 Reactions against the racism of the occupation and associated mulatto hegemony 
were first manifested in the emergence of the Ethnology movement. Black intellectuals of 
the movement such as Justin Dorsainvil, Dr. Arthur Holly, and Jean Price Mars, 	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emphasized the essential African roots of the Haitian people and their culture. They 
vehemently rejected the notion perpetuated by the Haitian elite that the "black African 
slaves of Saint Domingue had simply perished on the plantations without posterity," and 
that Haiti was "a cultural colony of France." 259 Instead, much of the customs and 
traditions of the black African slaves had been preserved throughout Haiti's countryside 
amongst the peasantry. As Haitians suffered under the thumb of U.S. imperialism, the 
Ethnologists called for a return to the traditional values of their revolutionary ancestors, 
which survived in the Haitian countryside: their oral traditions and language (créole); 
their religion (Vodou); and their mode of production (peasant agriculture). Along with 
advocating for the use of créole in education, and broader acceptance of Vodou, they 
called for providing peasant farmers with access to more land, and for the development of 
technical and agricultural schools, along with regional development banks.260 
 This cultural reaction to the occupation would turn into political currency in the 
post-occupation period. While the Ethnologists talked about the significant gulf that 
existed between the numerically small French-educated elite, and the mass of 
impoverished, illiterate peasants, they also pointed to the black middle class as the 
potential catalysts for Haiti's social evolution.261 It was thought that they could provide 
the leadership necessary to improve the condition of the country's poor black majority. 
The potential for such a reality would emerge with the Revolution of 1946. 
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The ouster of Lescot in 1946 opened the door for mass politics as never before. 
"The elections of May the 15th 1946 gave birth to a new generation of politicians and a 
new crop of statesmen..."262 Socialists, labor unionists, and black nationalists (noiristes), 
competed over who would mobilize the masses for change, as well as the nature and 
direction of such change. At the center of this emerging mass politics was the black 
middle class that grew out of the U.S. occupation. While mulatto politicians of the 
traditional elite had little chance of winning power through elections, considering the 
politics of the period was largely a reaction against the mulatto hegemony of the Lescot 
period, they searched for a black proxy. Nevertheless, the new Congress elected the first 
black president in thirty years from their own class, Dumarsais Estimé, independent of 
the traditional elite.263 
Despite strong support amongst the most aggressive elements of the noiriste 
movement, Estimé sought to pursue a middling position between the rising black middle 
class and the mulatto elite. Having represented the Artibonite in the legislative assembly, 
and serving in the Stenio Vincent government, Estimé received support from the black 
elite and middle class from the provinces, while also remaining open to the old mulatto 
elite.264 In order to mitigate opposition amongst the urban poor and working class, Estimé 
included their most powerful advocate, Daniel Fignolé, into his government.265 He would 
go on to push forward a number of progressive initiatives, including the establishment of 	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a minimum wage, the facilitation of industrialization, urban reconstruction, and 
improvement of the water supply in urban centers, as well as irrigation schemes, hydro-
electric power, maternity and child welfare, and the construction of new schools in rural 
areas.266  
Though considered more-or-less a progressive defender of the black masses, in 
reality, Estimé's election in 1946 signaled the shifting nature of class power in Haiti, with 
his regime representing the upward mobility of the black middle class. The most vocal 
voices of this reality were the noiristes, the black nationalists who used the notion of "the 
greatest good for the greatest number" to secure their dominant position politically and 
economically in the name of the black masses. They used their access to the state to 
challenge the economic hegemony that the mulatto elite and U.S. corporations held over 
the country. In 1947, the Estimé government wrestled control of the banana industry from 
the Standard Fruit Company, passing legislation establishing a state monopoly over the 
parceling and distribution of bananas, with banana concessions distributed to six 
companies owned and operated by his political allies. A year later, similar state 
monopolies would be established over tobacco.267  
Rather than serve as an opportunity to strengthen the political and economic 
relationship between the black middle class and the peasantry, these concessions were 
poorly managed, paying peasants reduced rates for their produce, making little effort to 
offer peasant farmers incentives such as insecticides and fertilizers. "Benefiting only the 
local companies that exploited the unchecked system of state patronage, the project was 	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an unmitigated disaster from which the regime would never recover."268 Nationalism had 
simply been a means to empower and enrich the black elite and middle classes. 
Other instances belied the government's genuine representation of the interests of 
the black masses. As the U.S. occupation displaced large numbers of peasants, and 
economic activity became increasingly concentrated in Port-au-Prince, the city's 
population expanded exponentially, creating a base for labor organizing. While the first 
embers of the labor movement in the aftermath of the U.S. occupation were thoroughly 
suppressed by the Vincent and Lescot government's, they would reemerge in the same 
political vacuum that brought the black middle class to power after Lescot's 1946 ouster. 
Labor was similarly attracted to noirisme, which called for the empowerment of a 
political class to represent the black majority, and thus looked to the black middle class 
for leadership.269 This led to a tentative alliance between working class movements and 
the noiristes. The populist figure, Daniel Fignolé, would emerge as the voice of Port-au-
Prince's urban poor, making him a threat to all the governments of the era, from Lescot to 
François Duvalier. In 1947, Fignolé would form the Mouvement Ouvrier Paysan (MOP), 
the Worker Peasant Movement, heading a federation of 29 unions by 1949.270 
Though Estimé initially included Fignolé in his government, and even encouraged 
some level of trade unionism, this was done more as a means to co-opt and mute their 
demands and autonomous mobilization. According to noiriste supporters of the regime, 
"the mentality of the Haitian workers...is different from that of workers in advanced 	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industrial countries; they need to be guided and educated."271 As Fignolé pressured the 
government from within for substantive policy strengthening the position of labor, he 
would be removed from his post and MOP banned along with other independent unions. 
The truth is, the noiristes who came to represent the core of Estimé's government 
fundamentally rejected democracy as a legitimate form of government for "the Haitian 
temperament." Elections and democratic representation were described as "sordid tinsel 
designed to mislead the masses," perpetuating the continued colonization of Haitian 
society by foreign concepts and principles.272 Instead, the noiristes called for the 
reassertion of order and discipline under an authoritarian government composed of 
members of the black middle class, who were to rule in the interest of the black 
masses.273 
Despite Estimé's efforts not to antagonize or alienate the traditional mulatto elite 
and their supporters in the United States, the dominant position of noiristes within his 
government, and his initial willingness to court the urban poor and working class by 
including Fignolé in his administration, were viewed as particularly threatening. Both 
would turn to their ally in the military, General Paul Magloire of the traditional black 
elite, to depose Estimé in 1950, mimicking the politique de doublure of the 19th century. 
Magloire would receive support from leading mulatto businessmen, the army elite, the 
Catholic Church, and the United States. Nevertheless, the black middle class would not 
be denied its turn at the seat of power. In 1956, Magloire himself would be ousted by a 
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section of the armed forces with close ties to the noiristes, who then supported the 
election of François Duvalier in 1957. 
Duvalier claimed that he was elected to complete the revolution that Estimé had 
begun. For him, this meant completely subduing the traditional mulatto elite who stifled 
the rise of the black masses. He argued that the poverty of the black majority was a 
consequence of mulatto racism and exploitation throughout the country's history, 
increasing his support amongst the black middle class from which he hailed, the 
grandons, which had historically vied for power against the predominantly mulatto 
merchant class, and the poor black masses, who he promised to protect against mulatto 
predation. 
Duvalier also used noiriste rhetoric to gain control over the institutions that 
safeguarded the interests of the mulatto merchant class and their Western patrons. “The 
Church, with its French hierarchy, its Breton seminary, its foreign (overwhelmingly 
French) clergy, represented a prime example of ecclesiastical colonialism,”274 and thus 
had to be placed under national authority. French bishops and archbishops, the entire 
Jesuit order, as well as prominent Protestant leaders, were all expelled. The foreign 
diplomatic corps was similarly under siege. “To demonstrate to Haitians that he was 
strong enough…to bully and harass foreign powers and their blanc ambassadors…he 
expelled more foreign chiefs of mission than had been expelled during the whole of 
Haiti’s history.”275 Similar means were used to remove the international press and human 
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rights organizations. Duvalier’s prime objective was to isolate Haitians who potentially 
posed a threat to the regime from their Western allies. 
This was also true for the greatest threat to any Haitian president holding power, 
the Haitian Army. Prior to Duvalier’s coming to power, the Garde d'Haiti had served the 
interests of the mulatto merchant class, who were proxies for U.S. economic interests.276 
Though Duvalier was allowed to become president with the belief that he would be but a 
civilian puppet of the military, instead he systematically weakened the Haitian Armed 
forces. Duvalier either killed or forced into exile the top officers from the previous 
regime, replacing them with those close to him. He disconnected the Army from its U.S. 
benefactors by removing all Marine-trained officers, canceling pending U.S. officer 
training courses, and eventually closing the Academie Militaire in 1961. He randomly 
shuffled and cycled military officers, preventing them from developing independent 
bases of power, setting a clear precedent that Duvalier intended to sustain civilian 
supremacy over the military. Perhaps the most effective measure taken by Duvalier to 
counterbalance the military was his creation of a separate autonomous coercive 
apparatus, the Milice de Voluntaires de la Sécurité Nationale (Militia of National 
Security Volunteers or VSN), a civilian militia informally called the Tonton Machoutes. 
While Duvalier’s civilian militia neutralized a Haitian military that had 
historically guarded the economic and political interests of the merchant class and its 
American benefactors, for Haiti’s poorest, not much had changed. “Noirisme, which hails 
the occupation of the highest political offices by blacks as the inevitable conquest of 
power by the poor masses, [was] nothing more than an ideology of an emerging class of 	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black rulers in search of hegemony.”277 Under Duvalier, Haiti’s class structure did not 
undergo a radical qualitative transformation. The black middle class faction that took 
over the state apparatus simply established itself as the brokers through which the 
traditional merchant class would continue their control over certain segments of the 
economy. Duvalier “had no objection to the merchants prospering...But he insisted on the 
right to dictate the economic and social price that the merchants would pay for this 
domination, and he saw to it that the state’s share of the spoils increased so as to fit 
current political realities…Similarly, if it valued its social domination, it would, at the 
very least, have to learn to share control of the social system with the nouveaux riches 
from the black middle classes.”278 Duvalierisme did not represent an overturning of class 
relations.279 After the successful pacification of the mulatto bourgeoisie, those willing to 
cooperate with the regime were allowed to continue their dominance over the import-
export sector. 
With unchallenged control over the state established, François Duvalier was able 
to guard grandon interests for a time by forestalling attempts by U.S. capital to open 
Haiti’s economy to investments in industrial agriculture and U.S. agricultural imports, 
and insuring that they were able to expropriate the land of small peasant landholders with 
impunity.280 He was also able to expand access to the spoils of power, not only to the 
black middle class who came to occupy most of the appendages of the state, but also to 	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the poorest Haitians willing to commit violence in the name of the regime, broadening his 
base in ways that had not existed before.281 Nowhere was this more evident than in 
Haiti’s hinterlands. 
When François Duvalier came to power, he made use of the chef de section 
system for his own agenda, strengthening what had been a historically tenuous tie. Not 
only was Duvalierist power politics extended into Haiti's rural areas,282 the grandon were 
also provided with an ideology which contended that Haiti’s progress was only possible 
with an authentic representation of the black masses at the country’s helm, someone who 
understood their rural and African cultural roots. With the establishment of the VSN and 
the tonton macoutes, Duvalier provided the black landed elite with a national presence 
they had never had before. Representing the Duvalierist state and the grandon, their 
“uniform—blue denim shirt, pants, and hat, with a red kerchief—evoked the traditional 
costume of the Vodoun god Zaka (the peasant god of agriculture), the colors of the 
Haitian national flag before Duvalier, and the peasant armies of the nineteenth 
century.”283 The iconography of the state was thus made to reflect the values of the 
Haitian countryside, while the institutions of the countryside were increasingly 
transformed into appendages of the state. This was particularly possible because 
Duvalier’s "militia respected the local hierarchy to the extent that it tended to recruit 
major Vodoun priests, village big men, rich peasants…landowners and commanders,”284 	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ensuring that the network of macoutes and section chiefs was thoroughly integrated. 
Often the chef de section was also a tonton macoute.285 The militia thus served as “local 
proof of state power…suggest[ing] to the community how far the arms of the state could 
reach,"286 while also reinforcing the authority of those who already ruled the countryside. 
The VSN also created the illusion of “a significant popular mass of support for 
Duvalier’s regime.”287 It was one of few institutions that was readily recognizable 
throughout the country, and which every segment of the population could participate, no 
matter their class, age, or gender. Most importantly, it actively recruited the poor. “And 
many among the urban and rural poor joined…not just because it was a ‘genuine 
[economic] elevation’…but also because for the first time they were becoming citizens—
acknowledged members of the nation.”288 
An important development to note during François Duvalier's reign was the 
extension of this surveillance apparatus into Haiti's urban areas to deal with the threat 
that, not only the merchant elite and the traditional Armed Forces, posed to the regime, 
but also Port-au-Prince's growing urban poor. As migration from rural areas into the 
country’s urban centers increased due to declining agricultural production and the lure of 
jobs in the burgeoning light manufacturing sector, so did the need for an apparatus of 
control increase in these same urban spaces. A new population of potential workers 
needed to be watched and disciplined. Having been mobilized by Fignolé's MOP 	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throughout the 1940s and 1950s into his infamous woulo konpresè (steam-roller),289 this 
population would be thoroughly suppressed during François Duvalier's rule, only to 
become politically mobilized again in 1986 after the demise of Jean-Claude Duvalier's 
government.  
The emergence of Duvalierisme represented the failure of the 1946 Revolution 
and the Estimé regime it produced to bring the black middle-class, the peasantry, and the 
urban poor and working class together in a progressive coalition supporting broad-based 
democratic participation. Efforts by the mulatto elite to maintain its hegemonic position 
over the black middle-class by overthrowing the Estimé government served to radicalize 
the noiristes further. But the resurgence of the black middle class under Duvalier did not 
simply mark the suppression of the mulatto elite, but all sources of opposition, including 
the black peasantry and working class it claimed to represent. Thus, while Duvalierisme 
had the symbolic trappings of a mass movement, in reality, the domination of the urban 
and rural poor by the elite, or those aspiring towards elite status, did not fundamentally 
change. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The eventual breakdown of the Duvalier dictatorship had much to do with the 
Jean-Claude Duvalier government’s growing estrangement from the base that his father 
had built domestically, symbolized by the reemergence of Haiti’s traditional merchant 
bourgeoisie within the halls of power and growing U.S. economic and political influence 
over the country. The shift between the Francois and Jean-Claude regimes involved “the 	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deepening of relations between the state and holders of capital at home and abroad....”290 
Many of the institutions which once operated as checks on the Haitian presidential prior 
to Francois Duvalier’s coming to power were allowed to reassert their traditional 
influences over Haitian politics, while the black middle class and its noiriste ideology 
were increasingly being displaced within the regime.  
“Unlike the father, Jean-Claude Duvalier increased the power of the Army and 
decreased that of the traditional Tontons Macoutes. The son also abandoned the strident 
black nationalism of the father and forged an alliance with the mulatto bourgeoisie.”291 
His marriage to a nominal member of the mulatto business class, their ascendance within 
his regime, and the increasing lavishness of their corruption in the face of a declining 
standard of living, even for the grandons, further solidified in the minds of many black 
Haitians that Jean-Claude was not for them. As the U.S. pushed the regime to curtail the 
human rights violations committed by the tonton macoutes and increasingly invested in 
the power and professionalization of the military, “he gradually lost the support of many 
macoute leaders who, by the early 1980s proclaimed that they were unwilling to stick out 
their necks very far to defend the regime.”292 
This was compounded by increasing U.S. economic penetration of Haiti, and the 
emergence of a new element of the merchant class, the industrialists. As U.S. 
corporations experienced declining rates of profit due to increasing global competition 
and political pressure to provide American employees with a high standard of living, they 
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sought to defray their operating costs through “a new form of industry, assembly 
industry, in which foreign capital could be imported into countries like Haiti,”293 were the 
repressive state guaranteed lower labor costs. In order to attract more foreign capital, the 
segment of the merchant class connected to the assembly industry sought to curtail the 
corrupt practices of the Haitian state, and place technocratic economic managers like 
Marc Bazin within Jean-Claude’s administration to further liberalize the Haitian 
economy. Both the traditional merchant class, who relied on monopolization of imports 
and exports to generate its wealth, and the black middle class, which secured its income 
through control of the state's various bureaucracies, would resist these reforms.294 As 
Jean-Claude vacillated between elite groupings, he inevitably alienated both. 
With the economic liberalization of what came to be known as Jean-Claudisme 
exacerbating the rapid decline of peasant agriculture by allowing the unabated flooding of 
Haiti's market with cheap imported rice, the ranks of the urban slums swelled. Not only in 
Port-au-Prince, but throughout the provinces in cities like Gonaives, Cap Haitien, Jacmel, 
and Jeremie, reviving the spirit of what had once been Fignolé’s woulo konpresè.295 As 
the regime fragmented between the new guard and the old guard, and its ability to utilize 
repression on the population was constrained by the international community's concerns 
with human rights, a mass movement uniting the increasingly desperate urban poor and 
peasantry emerged. It is in this political opening that a new vision for Haiti is espoused, 
evolving to become Lavalas. 	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CHAPTER III. 
 
LAVALAS, THE FLOOD 
INTRODUCTION 
What is a Lavalas in the literal sense? At once terrifying, and magnificent, a 
Lavalas is a torrential deluge that pours fourth from Haiti’s mountains and hillsides 
during the rainy season onto surrounding communities, washing all in its path out to sea. 
It is cleansing through flood. The term Lavalas was first popularized in a 1987 Tét 
Ansanm (Heads Together) song declaring the resolve of the peasant movement to fight 
against the military violence directed at its activists during that year’s elections.296 The 
chorus of the song, ‘Yo pare pou nou/ Nou pare pou yo, Mezanmi nou se lavalas/ N ap 
pote y ale’ (They’re preparing for us/ But we’re prepared for them/ My friends, we’re the 
deluge/ We’ll wash them all away), was a declaration of the popular movement’s strength 
in the face of Haiti’s longstanding traditions of elite and military abuse against the 
country’s moun andeyo.297 
As one of the most vociferous voices challenging the repression and corruption of 
the dictatorships, even to the brink of death, Aristide came to represent the aspirations of 
Haiti’s poorest, most marginalized, and most disenfranchised. According to many, it was 
through Aristide’s election that the aspirations of Haiti’s poor urban slum dwellers and 
rural peasants finally entered into the previously closed world of Port-au-Prince politics. 	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And thus he came to call the movement that brought him into power in 1991 Lavalas, in 
homage to the song that captured the essence of the broad-based struggle for democracy 
spearheaded by Haiti’s poor. Aristide’s slogan for the Lavalas movement, “‘Yon sél nou 
féb, ansanm nou fó, ansanm ansanm nou se lavalas’ (Alone we’re weak, together we’re 
strong, united we’re a deluge),” came to represent and reinforce the spirit of solidarity 
that characterized this period in Haitian history.298 
There are two ways one can choose to understand Lavalas. On the one hand, 
Lavalas can be reduced to the political apparatus that emerged around liberation 
theologian turned president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. On the other, Lavalas provides an 
imagery of the broad-based grassroots movement that materialized prior to the fall of 
Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986 and the fleeting retrenchment of Duvalierisme that 
followed. While these two interpretations of Lavalas are not the same, they cannot be 
treated as mutually exclusive. This chapter will present the factors that were pivotal to the 
rise of the Lavalas movement and the eventual election of Aristide during this critical 
juncture in Haitian history. The first section will outline how the increasing prominence 
of human rights as a central component of U.S. foreign policy during the 1970s 
significantly restrained the capacity of the Jean-Claude regime to use repression against 
the population, providing the social and political openings necessary for mass 
mobilization against the dictatorship. The next sections will present how important shifts 
within Haitian media and the Catholic Church occurring around the same time as the 
U.S.’s emphasis on human rights helped to foster a new social and political 
consciousness amongst Haiti’s urban poor and rural peasantry, generating a civil society 	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resurgence that would come to play an essential role in the eventual ouster of the Jean-
Claude dictatorship, and its successor, the military-led Conseil National de 
Gouvernement (CNG). The fourth section will address Ronald Reagan’s re-
conceptualized of human rights within the narrow framework of democracy promotion, 
and how this, while contributing to the removal of Duvalier, also sought to restrict the 
boundaries of change sought by the newly emergent civil society. The final section of this 
chapter will discuss how the popular movement challenged currently dominant 
conceptions of civil society and democracy. 
 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA 
Following the national disgraces of President Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal 
in 1974, the conclusion of the decades-long Vietnam War in 1975, and the 1975-76 
Church Committee revelations showcasing CIA involvement in manipulating elections 
and plotting political assassinations around the world, the tenor of American politics 
fundamentally changed. “These events…shook the entrenched national myth that the 
United States had a unique heritage of morality and respect for human rights 
worldwide.”299 Jimmy Carter’s election in 1976 was framed as an effort to right the ship 
once again. He espoused a ‘morality-in-politics’ that promised a government that would 
be “honest, decent, open, fair, and compassionate.”300 One aspect of this effort to 
reestablish America’s moral leadership in the world was the Carter administration’s 
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supposed human rights agenda. As the Carter administration sought to make human 
rights a tool of U.S. foreign policy, the Jean-Claude regime, like many other governments 
throughout the Third World dependent on U.S. largess, became fundamentally restrained 
in its ability to use repression against the Haitian population, a development that provided 
social and political space for the emergence of the vibrant civil society that would later 
become Lavalas. 
This new emphasis on human rights resulted in a number of institutional changes 
within the U.S. foreign policy apparatus. An independent Bureau for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs was created within the State Department. Embassies and 
ambassadors increasingly accounted for human rights conditions in their countries of 
operation. The Department of State was now legally required to submit reports to 
Congress regarding the status of human rights in countries that received U.S. economic or 
security assistance, which the U.S. used as leverage within international financial 
institutions. And, critically, the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs was made a full member of all interagency committees approving 
security assistance and arms transfers.301 President Jimmy Carter’s increasing use of the 
rhetoric of human rights was cited as a factor in making it a subject of national policy 
debate in many countries; a topic of focus in the discussions of international 
organizations; a subject in the world media; and increasingly, part of the popular 
consciousness across the globe.302  
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The growing global emphasis on human right’s had a significant impact on Haiti 
during this period. This was particular true due to the rapid opening of the country to 
foreign economic investment and aid that followed François “Papa Doc” Duvalier’s 
death, and the succession of his 19 year-old son, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, to 
power in 1971. The initial rapprochement between the United States and Haiti that began 
with the elder Duvalier’s 1969 meeting with then, New York governor Nelson 
Rockefeller,303 turned into a growing dependency as Baby Doc embarked on what he 
came to call Jean-Claudisme. 
Jean-Claudisme emerged in the wake of U.S. foreign policy establishment that 
increasingly utilized human rights rhetoric as leverage to force country's to carry out 
liberal economic reforms. So, he emphasized a reformed Duvalierisme that curtailed the 
most overt forms of repression while promoting limited economic and political 
liberalization as a means to attract international aid and foreign capital investment. 
Liberalization served to maintain the regime’s favorable standing with the international 
community, ensuring the continued flow of resources that could then be distributed 
amongst a vast network of cronies. 
From the start of his rule, Jean-Claude sought to present a decidedly different 
image of the regime than had his father. Upon Francois Duvalier’s death, thousands of 
Haitians, along with nearly 100 foreign reporters, were allowed into the palace, a place 
“once regarded as something of an ogre’s castle,” as a sign of the regime’s new openness. 
Jean-Claude subsequently ordered the arrest of three of Papa Doc’s cruelest Tonton 
Macoute civilian militia leaders, a public step towards curbing the violent excesses of the 	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past. And, in his first speech to the Legislative Assembly, he called for a national 
reconciliation with those exiled during his father’s 14-year reign of terror, in an effort to 
“work towards a new Haiti, generous and progressive.”304 Part of this new progressive 
Haiti included efforts to make substantial reforms to improve Haiti’s tax system, 
reorganize its bureaucracy, and reduce corruption.305 
This new face to Duvalierisme provided the international community with an 
opportunity to increase its economic ties with Haiti once again. Immediately, U.S. 
Ambassador Clinton E. Knox called for an increase in American aid to the new regime, 
aid that had been virtually cut off in 1962 by then President John F. Kennedy in response 
to the elder Duvalier’s violent repression of political opposition.306 Soon after, a 
representative of the United States Agency for International Development returned for 
the first time since 1963 in hopes of renewing economic and technical assistance to the 
country.307 And the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) of the Organization of American States began 
calling Haiti a place where “the climate for loans, grants, and investments had markedly 
improved.”308 Between 1976 and 1977 alone, the Duvalier government received $39 
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million in grants from the United States.309 By 1979, two-thirds of Haiti’s budget, about 
$81 million, came from the international community. Of this, 50 percent came from 
multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the Inter-
American Development Bank, supplemented by bilateral aid primarily from the US, and 
$15 million more from non-governmental agencies.310 Along with this aid came rapid and 
substantial increases in “tourism and foreign investment”311 
This growing foreign economic activity, while increasing the wealth of those 
associated with the regime, also left Jean-Claude open to greater international criticism 
and control as he “mortgaged even further the autonomy which Francois Duvalier had so 
zealously guarded.”312 Increased dependency on international aid led to demands that 
went beyond what the regime had initially prepared to concede. This became particularly 
evident with the 1976 election of Jimmy Carter and his emphasis on human rights. 
As the Carter Administration prepared to take office, a House of Representatives’ 
International Relations Committee report prepared by the State Department pointed to 
Haiti as one of six countries engaged in serious human rights violations in contrast to the 
outward facade presented by the Jean-Claudiste regime.313 Upon taking office, Carter 
criticized the amount of U.S. aid being given to Haiti, and on August 14, 1977, sent U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, to Haiti as part of a broader 	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Caribbean-wide trip to impress upon the Duvalier government the administration’s 
concerns with its human rights record.314 These threats to withhold aid if further reforms 
weren’t made prompted the Jean-Claude regime to act.  
Jean-Claude would allow for a freer social and political climate to emerge in Haiti 
in order to maintain the flow of aid money that bought the regime continued support from 
the military, the traditional elite, and the nouveau rich that came to represent its inner 
circle. In 1977 he invited U.S. representatives and foreign journalists to witness the 
release of 104 political prisoners. In 1978, he ratified the Inter-American Convention on 
Human Rights,315 allowed more exiles to return to the country, drastically loosened press 
controls, even to the point of allowing open criticism of the regime’s failings.  In 1979, 
“to sate the appetite of the international community for [more] signs of ‘progress’ on the 
human rights front,”316 the regime declared elections for the Unicameral National 
Assembly. Though only Duvalierists were allowed to run for nearly all posts, in Cap 
Haitïen, schoolteacher and opposition candidate Alexandre Lerouge was allowed to run; 
to speak directly about the regime’s corruption and failures to address the painful 
economic conditions faced by Haitians throughout the country; and eventually, to win. 
Lerouge would become the “first popularly elected opposition legislator under the 
Duvalier dictatorship,”317 with 34,800 out of 37,200 total votes. 
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Allowing Lerouge to win the seat was Jean-Claude’s attempt to show some 
independence from the traditional hard-line Duvalierists, the “dinosaurs,” who were 
wholly against the idea of political reform.318 These actions by the Duvalier regime 
provided the social and political openings necessary for a number of grassroots social and 
political movements to emerge within key sectors of Haitian society, while leaving the 
regime fragmented between the new reformist Duvalierists and the old-style “dinosaurs.” 
 
CREOLE AND THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
As Baby Doc carried out his kindler-gentler version of Duvalierisme, fundamental 
changes were afoot throughout Haitian society. One of these changes was the role of the 
media in Haiti. In hopes of being seen internationally as “the president of Haiti who had 
irrevocably established democracy,” Jean-Claude’s 1971 constitution guaranteed the 
freedom of speech,319 prompting a resurgence of the independent press like never seen 
before in Haiti. Initially hesitant, the media would come to speak openly and critically 
about the country’s politics and economics,320 a marked shift from the initial days of 
François Duvalier rule, when opposition newspapers were bombed by tonton macoutes, 
and publishers jailed and tortured.321 This media revolution of the early 1970s fostered by 
the United States’ growing support for human rights abroad was central to the rising 
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political consciousness of Haiti’s poor and their eventual entrance into Haitian politics as 
persons with agency. 
While newspapers and independent journals galvanized students and intellectuals 
in Haiti’s largest cities, the real revolution was in radio, where broadcasters increasingly 
spoke directly to Haiti’s poor and illiterate peasants throughout the countryside.322 None 
were more influential than Jean Dominique at Radio Haiti; later Radio Haiti-Inter.323 
Perhaps the radio station’s greatest contribution to Haiti’s struggle for democracy was its 
impact on the country’s language of public discourse. While Haiti’s traditional 
newspapers, its few radio stations, and its single television station provided news solely 
in French, the language of Haiti’s elite, Radio Haiti was the first to begin presenting its 
news segments in Creole, the language of the Haitian masses. This fundamentally 
transformed the notion of who was legitimately allowed to partake in political discourse. 
Later, as the Jean-Claude regime began cracking down on independent media, forcing the 
closing of Radio Haiti and the exile of Jean-Dominique, the Catholic Church’s Radio 
Soleil would come to serve a similar function.324 
Despite being a country established through the revolution of African Creole-
speaking slaves against French colonial rule, for much of its history, Haiti has maintained 
French as the official language of the country to the exclusion of Creole. This 
subordination of Creole to French is fundamentally “an expression of the concrete reality 
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of the relations between dominant and subordinate classes within Haiti.”325 It has meant 
that all official government business was conducted in French, from court proceedings to 
parliamentary debates; formal documents such as deeds, medical records, and building 
permits were written in French; even road signs and the names of public buildings.326 The 
country’s main newspapers of record, Le Nouvelliste and Le Matin, along with Le 
Moniteur, which publishes all new laws and government decrees, were written in French. 
French was, and still is, the primary language of education. Students were taught and 
tested in French, and most textbooks were also in French.327 This was true in a country 
where all Haitians spoke and understood Creole, while perhaps only 5% or less spoke and 
understood French.328 This has had profound impacts for the possibility of democracy in 
Haiti. 
The predominance of French in official circles to the neglect of the Creole 
understood by the majority of Haitians has created a society that is “sharply and 
conspicuously divided between the minority of people who can meaningfully participate 
in the official, French-driven world around them, and the majority, who can’t.”329 Though 
all Haitians, irrespective of class, are fluent in Creole; the capacity to operate in French 
dramatically declines the lower one happens to be on the class scale. While the wealthy 	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elite are typically quite fluent in French, having attended the best Catholic Schools in 
Haiti, which specialize in educating the elite in the necessary French cultural and social 
mores needed to attain power in Haiti, the working class, the urban poor, and the 
peasantry often have little to no knowledge of the language. “Language is thus a cultural 
manifestation of the class struggle, and fluency in French is a weapon of the traditional 
bourgeoisie.”330 
Haitian society is fundamentally structured around the belief that “the people who 
are important in society know and speak French.”331 Those who can only speak Creole 
are politically, economically, socially, and culturally marginalized.332 They are the moun 
andeyo, a term literally meaning “the outside people,” used by the traditional French-
speaking urban elite to describe the black Creole-speaking peasants, and increasingly, the 
urban poor.333 French was a tool to not only exclude the poor from important political and 
economic processes, but also to ideologically justify such exclusion. While it meant that 
the majority of Haitians could not read the laws, decrees, and other proclamations, or 
understand the speeches of presidents and other politicians,334 it also meant that one was 
seen as illiterate, of low socioeconomic status, and generally, backwards, and thus, 
necessarily excluded from the important affairs of state. The maintenance of French as 
the language of public affairs, particularly political affairs, was a means to legitimize the 
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privileged position of the dominant French-speaking elite over the Creole-speaking 
poor.335  
During the 1970s, and 1980s, Haiti’s mass media fundamentally challenged this 
exclusion. Radio Haiti, and later, Radio Soleil’s use of Creole was central in the 
development of a true public sphere in Haiti. “To reach a democratic stage…it is argued 
that a public sphere must be created”…a space for citizen’s to exchange information and 
engage in debate.336 This could not happen within a context where society’s primary 
institutions operated using a language that remained foreign to the vast majority of 
society’s members. Affirmation of Creole’s value in the public sphere implied “a 
rejection of the value system, and the social, political, and economic structures of the 
neocolonialist order”337 that had been sustained by the Haitian elite.  
Creole, “decidedly African in its structure and rhythm, but characteristically 
European in its lexical dynamics,”338 has always been the language around which the 
Haitian masses organized against elite rule, elites who often justified their right to rule on 
their ability to speak French and emulate French mores. For the varied African peoples 
and cultures that commingled on Saint Domingue’s sugar and coffee plantations, Creole 
facilitated the sociopolitical consciousness necessary for revolt against the institutions of 
slavery and colonization. “Creole…provided a common linguistic framework for 
communication among slaves” who, “by the eve of the revolution, acquired an essential 	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unifying tool that enabled…[them] to share experiences, exchange views and opinions, 
communicate their ideas, and even conspire against the master.”339 Once again, in the 
1970s and 80s, Creole would become the language of rebellion against elite rule. This is 
why some have argued that prior to the Jean-Claude regime’s all-out assault against all 
forms of political opposition in 1980, the primary targets of the regime were Creole-
speaking journalists. Creole was viewed as the language of subversion.340 
The switch to Creole as the language of public discourse brought the peasant and 
urban poor into the public sphere in a way they had not been allowed throughout Haiti’s 
history, placing its most disenfranchised at the forefront of the mass rebellion against 
Duvalierisme. Peasants, once too far removed from the centers of power to know the 
details of palace politics in the “Republic of Port-au-Prince,” were suddenly tuned in to 
the latest political developments as cheap transistor radios penetrated Haiti’s countryside. 
Increasingly, those isolated by geography, bad roads, illiteracy, and systemic repression, 
were being heard directly by millions across the country. “The use of Creole in the 
news…[meant] empowerment for the majority who, for the first time, could express 
themselves directly via microphone to a listening audience, discuss their own problems, 
and suggest their own solutions.”341 The radio provided them with information, increased 
their orientation towards politics, and impressed upon them the need for democratic 
change.342 	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The media’s embrace of Creole as the language of public discourse was part of a 
broad cultural shift. The growing power of the movement for democracy in Haiti during 
the 1980s could be seen in the increasing legitimation of Creole as the language of the 
country and its people. In 1987, it was legally established in the new post-Duvalier 
Constitution as an official language of Haiti.343 Laws were implemented requiring Haitian 
schools to teach school children primarily in Creole before shifting to French later on in 
their schooling.344 The promotion of literacy in Creole was viewed by many within the 
popular movement as fundamental to broader political participation and Haitian 
democracy.345 
 
LIBERATING THE HAITIAN CHURCH 
While Haitian radio provided the grassroots movement for democracy with a 
medium for public discourse, the Church became a central institution in its ideological 
and organizational development. This was the result of significant changes occurring in 
the Catholic Church both within Haiti and throughout Latin America and the Caribbean 
in general. 
Like much of the Latin American Church, the Catholic Church in Haiti has 
historically sided with the most powerful institutions in Haitian society, often tacitly 
accepting the subjugation and exploitation of Haiti's poor and destitute masses. But, as 
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new ideologies appeared throughout the region in the middle of the 20th Century, the 
Church’s role in Latin American society was fundamentally challenged. While the 
noiriste346 Francois Duvalier was weakening the power of the Church in Haiti, 
throughout the rest of Latin America, the rise of liberal, nationalist, leftist, and Marxist 
ideologies threatened the very existence of the Church. This period was characterized by 
the upending of traditional elite symbols and institutions by peasant and indigenous 
movements for cultural representation; the transformation of elite-controlled parties of 
notables into mass parties; the rise to power of popular organizations; as well as signature 
reforms in education, literacy, labor rights, trade unionism, land rights, and social 
security.347 
As Latin America was increasingly threatened by social revolution, the Church 
sought to reform itself to align more closely with the region’s poor through the Second 
Vatican Council (Vatican II) between 1962 and 1965.348 These reforms increased the 
usage of local languages in parts of the mass; encouraged congregational participation, 
thus affirming the capacity of the laity for some leadership role within the Church; and 
promoted efforts to reduce poverty and other forms of inequality.349 Nonetheless, certain 
segments of the Church sought to move past reform. Instead, radical Christian doctrines 
focused on empowering the poor and disenfranchised developed throughout Latin 
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America in response to the crisis of development plaguing the region at the time.350 None 
were more central to the transformation of the Latin American Church than Liberation 
Theology. 
Rather than interpreting the Bible as calling for passivity in the face of worldly 
inequality and misery, liberation theology called on the Church to join the struggle 
against oppression in the here and now. Its adherents exhorted the Church to embrace a 
position that emphasized the well-being of the poor and powerless of society as expressed 
in Biblical teachings, what they called the “preferential option for the poor.”351 They 
pointed to the life of Jesus, who championed the cause of the poor and downtrodden 
while confronting the abuses of corrupt politicians and religious figures, as a principle 
example of this preferential option.352 At the 1968 Conference of Latin American 
Bishops (CELAM) in Medellín, this perspective was affirmed, and the Christian 
understanding of ‘salvation’ in the after-life was wedded to the struggle for ‘liberation’ in 
the present. This would be the ideological base from which the grassroots movement for 
democracy in Haiti would grow. 
The emergence of liberation theology in Haiti followed important changes in the 
composition of the Haitian clergy made by Francois Duvalier. After expelling much of 
the foreign Church hierarchy, thought to be antagonistic to his noiriste and pro-Vodou 
orientations, and subsequent excommunication, Duvalier was able to reach a 
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rapprochement with the Church in 1966, whereby he was allowed to name the country’s 
bishops with the approval of the Holy See. While nearly two-thirds of Haiti’s Catholic 
clergy were foreigners when Duvalier took power in 1957, by 1985 the exact opposite 
was true. “The Church would no longer be a white, largely French, institution with 
foreign loyalties. The presence of Haitian bishops would encourage the growth of an 
indigenous clergy,” fundamentally better able to understand the country and its people.353 
Little was it understood by the dictatorship how true this statement would become, and 
more importantly, how threatening this would be for the continuation of Duvalierisme. 
Most of the young Haitian priests appointed during the Duvalier period were from 
poor and middle class rural families, and thus very much aware of the conditions faced by 
Haiti’s impoverished peasantry. Aristide himself was born into a poor peasant family in 
Port-Salut, later moving to Port-au-Prince as a result of his father’s death, where in 1958 
he began his schooling with the Salesian priests, and in 1982, in the midst of the growing 
movement against Duvalierisme, was ordained as a Salesian priest.354  
Like Aristide, many priests realized that a central reason for popular ambivalence 
towards the Church in Haiti was due to its failures to address the fundamental issues 
facing the country’s poor. So, after receiving training abroad, many returned home to 
Haiti’s rural communities and urban slums to engage in grassroots development work,355 
increasingly pushing the Church to recognize “the needs, aspirations and possibilities of 
[the] People of God, in Haiti as elsewhere,” as its primary concern, rejecting what was 	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increasingly viewed as the false separation between the spiritual and the temporal.356 The 
Haitian Church thus shifted from being an institution focused nearly exclusively with the 
spiritual and educational progress of the Francophile urban elite, to one focused on the 
collective welfare of the nation’s poor masses.357 
These priests became active in establishing a variety of organizations and 
institutions that began as measures to address the dearth of pastoral services in Haiti’s 
rural areas but transformed into vehicles to face the various economic, social, and later, 
political issues plaguing the country’s poor. Chief amongst these were the Christian Base 
Communities. Like elsewhere in Latin America, these places where small groups of 
peasants met to discuss local problems and organize social action through the Church, 
became critical sources of popular power. These Christian Base Communities, known in 
Haiti as the Ti-Légliz (Little Churches), l’eglise qui vit la vie du people (the Church that 
lives the life of the people), and Ti Kominote (Little Communities), were strongly 
influenced by liberation theology, and were thus “the most wide-ranging and perhaps the 
most important examples of the new Church and synthesis of religious and secular 
work.”358  
For Bob Corbett, who sat in hundreds of Ti Légliz meetings throughout the 
country for over a decade or so, these were a manifestation of the Church’s shift from the 
individual’s relationship with God, towards a focus on the relationships between those 
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within the community. It was a shift away from hierarchy and towards an egalitarian 
ethos. “Gone [was] the hierarchy (which is the main reason they were lay-led and not 
clergy led). Gone [was] the authority (which is why the leader tend[ed] overwhelmingly 
to ask questions and not give answers).”359 Also, “only one language [was] ever 
mentioned or used” in these meetings: Creole.360 These were fundamental affirmations of 
the centrality of the voices of the Haitian poor in the Ti Legliz movement, and later, the 
Lavalas movement. 
Christian Base Communities, believed to have first appeared in the Brazilian 
countryside during the 1950s, were critical to the praxis of liberation theology.361 They 
played a key role in raising the consciousness and confidence of poor and working class 
people.  “They offer[ed] their members a sense of community, the opportunity to discuss 
problems, and the collective strength to resolve some of them.”362 As institutions 
somewhat removed from the all-seeing-eye of the Church hierarchy, they served as 
democratizing forces within the religion, helping to establish a foundation for the 
emergence of civil society and political organizing that would occur during the period of 
liberalization.  
Alongside the Ti Legliz, various other Catholic organizations were established to 
engage in development work. These included rural producers’ cooperatives and Christian 
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(IDEA) and CARITAS which focused on stimulating rural development by improving 
the human capital of Haiti’s peasantry, training them for positions as community leaders, 
and establishing a grassroots infrastructure in the countryside363; religious orders, like 
Aristide’s Salesians364 and the Twelve Catholic Sisters Charity, which worked with and 
cared for the sick and the poor in the urban slums of Port-au-Prince, like Cité Simone 
(now Cité Soleil); and various other entities such as women’s groups, literacy centers, 
dispensaries, clinics, banks, technical assistance groups, agricultural associations, and 
neighborhood committees. Nearly sixty or so lay groups were engaged in development 
work in Port-au-Prince alone, while three to four hundred more worked throughout 
Haiti’s countryside.365  
While the Ti Legliz did not begin with an overtly political agenda, its ability to 
shift the consciousness of Haiti’s poor had profound political implications. The poor were 
no longer passive in the face of the various problems that overwhelmed their 
communities; they were being transformed into active agents. Increasingly, a feeling and 
sense of self-consciousness and solidarity began developing in the hearts and minds of 
Haiti’s poor through their participation in the Ti Legliz.366 This was “grass roots local 
democracy being born. No talk of ‘Haiti’ or ‘the nation’…it was stuff like: how can we 
grow more food for us (as opposed to the land owner) so we do not suffer hunger? How 
can we get schools for our children and ourselves, so that we aren’t so uninformed of 	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what’s going on...How can we get safer water to drink that isn’t so distant from our 
village and home?”367 They initially focused primarily on addressing basic local needs. 
Nevertheless, in a context where the freedom to assemble for overtly political purposes 
was denied to the population by the Duvalier dictatorship, the Ti Legliz and other 
religious organizations provided the organizational framework for the mass movement 
towards democracy.368 
As the Catholic Church strengthened its position in Haiti’s rural communities and 
urban slums, teaching the country’s poor to solve their problems through their own 
collective action, it proved increasingly threatening to the Duvalier dictatorship, which 
relied on collective apathy and disillusionment to remain in power. As it increasingly 
reached poor communities across the country through its radio programming, pastoral 
letters, and Christian Base Communities, the Church created one of the few national 
networks that could rival that of tonton macoutes, chef de section,369 spies, and the like, 
built by the Duvaliers over their decades in power.370 More importantly, the Church’s 
grassroots institutions were doing the work that the government should have been doing, 
thus providing the people with a vision of what an alternative Haiti, one that was more 
democratic and socially just, could look like; one that placed them at its center. 
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Eventually, the Ti Legliz’s work to empower poor people at the local level to 
better their conditions shifted towards challenging local authorities and elites who relied 
on marginalization and servitude to maintain power. Efforts to dismantle local power 
structures inexorably led to an understanding that they were part and parcel of a larger 
network of control and domination being sustained by the Duvalier regime in Port-au-
Prince. Increasingly it was understood that the poverty of the Haitian masses could not be 
adequately dealt with without addressing the “social-political conditions of the nation at 
large,”371 which meant that the activist segments of the Church would have to challenge 
the repressive government and the class structure that sustained it.372 
They increasingly criticized the government’s expropriation of the country’s most 
valuable lands and natural resources, excessively regressive tax structures that transferred 
wealth from the poor to the elite and those in power,373 and general government 
corruption. The Church eventually turned into a vehicle for poor Haitians to challenge the 
Duvalieriste dictatorships and Haitian elites who supported preserving substantial aspects 
of the status quo once Duvalier was removed from power. 
As Jean-Claude’s so-called liberalization came to an end with the election of 
Ronald Reagan to the U.S. presidency, and repression came back on the table as a 
suitable tool to prevent radical socioeconomic and political change in Haiti,374 the Church 
and its various institutions remained the sole bulwark against the state. While initially 	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focusing exclusively on denouncing the regime’s attacks against Church activists, it 
increasingly challenged all government repression. It also highlighted the government’s 
failures to meet stated development and political promises. “The Church was becoming 
the authority Haitians trusted; working throughout Haiti, protecting people from abuse, 
and keeping them informed.”375 
Escalating regime repression was matched by an increasingly revolutionary tone 
within the activist Church. They eventually called for the destruction of the current 
structure of society and the building of a new one,376 with the Ti Legliz in the vanguard of 
this revolutionary project.377 With the fall of the Duvalier dynasty in 1986, the Catholic 
Church was poised to become the institution to lead the country towards a democratic 
future. Haitians’ sense of the Church’s role in the ousting of Jean-Claude and in building 
a democratic future was portrayed in a variety of ways. Many flew the yellow-and-white 
colors of the Catholic Church alongside the nation’s new red-and-blue flag.378 Others 
painted anonymous murals depicting the Church as a benevolent force for change, Christ 
the Liberator breaking the chains of the people, the sun in veneration of the Church’s 
Radio Soleil [soleil means sun in Haitian Creole], as well as images of the Pope with the 
words ‘on our side.’379 The Church had provided the primary ideological and 
organizational foundations for the mass movement for democracy in Haiti. 
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REDEFINING HUMAN RIGHTS, CONSTRAINING DEMOCRACY 
While the growing importance of democracy promotion within U.S. foreign 
policy was instrumental in the 1986 ouster of dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier and the 
eventual free and fair election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991, its primary objective as 
formulated by the Ronald Reagan administration was to constrain the boundaries of 
change that were being fought for by the various progressive and radical movements 
throughout the Third World, including the popular movement for democracy in Haiti that 
came to be known as Lavalas. 
As Ronald Reagan came to power in 1980, the previous restraints on the Duvalier 
regime’s capacity to use force against the popular movement for democracy in Haiti 
placed on it by the Carter administration’s human rights agenda were subsequently lifted. 
Jean-Claude was essentially allowed to reassert the dictatorial essence of Duvalierisme. 
The regime systematically targeted the progressive media and critical elements of the 
Catholic Church, particularly the Ti Legliz. In 1983 the Haitian constitution was revised 
to reduce the power of the legislature, and as President-for-Life, Duvalier was given the 
ability to adjourn or dissolve the chamber at will, to appoint judges and appeal their 
decisions, as well as the right to name his successor. In the following year, all non-jean-
claudiste political groups were banned, corresponding with a systematic rise in the 
arbitrary arrest and persecution of members of the independent media critical of the 
dictatorship. Nevertheless, this return to a more overt autocracy was paralleled by further 
pretensions towards liberalization. In 1985, the regime held a national referendum on a 
number of constitutional reforms implemented the year prior. Political parties were 
granted the right to participate in national politics granted they met a number of criteria 
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outlined by the regime, one of those being the recognition of Jean-Claude as president-
for-life and his right to name his heir. According to the regime, an absurd 99.8% of voters 
were in favor of the proposals, which supposedly gave legitimacy to the Duvalier 
dynasty.380 Content with these ‘progressive’ steps forward, the Reagan government 
assured the American Congress of Haiti’s emerging democratization and improved 
human rights, thus sanctioning the continued flow of military and economic aid to the 
country.381 
Fundamental to Reagan’s support for Jean-Claude as autocrat was a critique of 
Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy. “Throughout the 1980 presidential campaign, 
candidate Reagan clearly and sharply criticized the Carter human rights policy, arguing 
that it was morally unsound, ineffective, and threatening to United States’ security 
interests.”382 “Reagan promised that he would initiate a more realistic human rights 
program,”383 one that would allow it to address the precipitous collapse of authoritarian 
regimes in Central America, like that of West Point graduate Anastasio Samoza Debayle 
whose family had held power in Nicaragua since 1936 through the U.S created National 
Guard, at the hands of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in the late 1970s. 
The Salvadoran civil war that broke out between the right-wing junta, also supported by 
the U.S., and the leftist Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), that 
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paralleled the Sandinistas coming to power, further highlighted the need to reassess U.S. 
foreign policy.384 
A seminal figure in this reassessment was Georgetown University professor Dr. 
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. In 1979 Kirkpatrick published an article that challenged the Carter 
administration’s notion that there was a democratic alternative to deteriorating 
authoritarian governments. She believed that it was likely that the collapse of these 
regimes would lead to some form of Marxist revolutionary government if the United 
States did not act to defend its allies.385 Kirkpatrick eventually served as Reagan’s foreign 
policy adviser during his 1980 campaign, and was later appointed ambassador to the 
United Nations, the first woman and first Latin Americanist to occupy that position.386 
While the Carter administration made substantial efforts to reign in the violent 
actions of authoritarian regimes against their populations by tying economic and military 
aid to specific improvements on human rights, Reagan whole-heartedly rejected this 
position once his administration came to power. Kirkpatrick attacked Carter for opposing 
authoritarian governments merely because they violated human rights, challenging the 
idea that change in such autocracies was inevitable, desirable, or even in the American 
interest. She viewed Carter’s application of his “utopian” conception of human rights as 
undermining the capacity of regimes friendly to U.S. interests in the region to stay in 
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power while strengthening opposition movements that were anti-American from their 
inception, thus making neither likely to be susceptible to U.S. influence.387 
Kirkpatrick, along with the Reagan administration’s appointee to the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights, Michael Novak, legitimated support for 
authoritarian regimes by distinguishing them from totalitarian ones. They considered this 
the most important political distinction of the twentieth century. Kirkpatrick and Novak 
argued that while “authoritarians sought to preserve ‘traditional’ societies,” they also 
“maintained open capitalist economies.” On the other hand, “totalitarians…sought to 
control every part of society, including the economy.”388 Thus, not all nations erred 
against human rights more or less equally.389 Though the right-wing authoritarians that 
the U.S. had maintained as allies repressed popular movements, they typically left in 
place traditional allocations of wealth, power, status, and other resources. Leftist 
Communist regimes, it was argued, were fundamentally different. They disturbed the 
“habitual rhythms of work and leisure, habitual places of residence, habitual patterns of 
family and personal relations…creat[ing] refugees by the million because they claim the 
jurisdiction over the whole life of the society.”390 Moreover, while change was possible 
under authoritarian regimes, such change could not be expected under totalitarianism. So, 
a realistic human rights policy would support the former as the lesser of two evils, and as 
a means to pre-empt the latter. This formulation was applied to the Haiti case. 	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Once Reagan came to power in 1981, U.S. foreign policy focused less on the 
Duvalier regime’s human rights record, and more on economic reforms and 
modernization as significant criteria for aid. This was in line with the Reagan 
administrations understanding of human rights, particularly the distinctions between 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The belief was that societies like Haiti were 
naturally authoritarian, but that through economic restructuring and free-market 
economic reform, the subsequent economic growth would produce the conditions 
necessary for the emergence of a society that respects human rights, and eventually 
democracy. Authoritarian regimes like Jean-Claude’s could be expected to eventually 
democratize because they were willing to allow freedoms in certain aspects of society, 
namely the economy, while radical communist regimes allowed no freedoms at all. By 
promoting free-market economic reforms in Haiti, the Reagan administration believed 
that it was also promoting the changes necessary to move Haiti closer to protecting 
human rights in the long term. 
So efforts to restructure the Haitian economy began in earnest with the 1982 
appointment of former World Bank official Marc Bazin who initiated major reforms 
involving the national bank, corruption, and the issue of rampant smuggling. Bazin’s 
threat to the economic structure of Duvalier cronyism led to his prompt removal. But 
there were other means to push the regime to open the Haitian economy to greater U.S. 
influence. In exchange for $37.2 million in August 1982 from the IMF, Duvalier 
acquiesced to a number of structural reforms involving Haiti’s system of taxation and 
removal of barriers to increased foreign investment. Almost immediately US offshore 
assembly plants increased their level of activity within the country, prompting President 
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Reagan to send a letter to Duvalier praising Jean-Claude for his commitment to private 
enterprise and economic reform.391 
Thus in the 1980s, the Jean-Claudistes and their international patrons embarked 
on a development strategy focused on shifting the country’s remaining agricultural 
production away from local consumption towards export. This new development strategy 
advocated the establishment of agro-industrial plants in the countryside to process export 
crops, while encouraging the growth of Port-au-Prince’s assembly industry as an 
alternative source of employment for the displaced rural population. The foreign 
exchange earnings from this new export-oriented development paradigm would then be 
used to import food no longer produced domestically. This began the process of 
subsidized foreign rice flooding Haiti’s market, destroying Haitian rice farming, and 
subsequently inducing the mass migration of peasants to the capital for jobs in the 
assembly sector.392 For continued U.S. support in the form of economic aid that the 
regime could pilfer, Baby Doc provided a welcoming investment climate of minimal 
taxes, a general ban on trade unions, low-wages, and unrestricted repatriation of profits. 
Haiti became open for business. The export-manufacturing zones that emerged in Port-
au-Prince during François Duvalier’s rule expanded dramatically in the 1970s and 80s 
under Jean-Claude’s tutelage from 13 in 1966 to nearly 240 by the early 1980s, making 
Haiti the ninth largest assembler of goods for U.S. consumption in the world.393 By 1986 	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the number swelled to over 300 U.S. firms.394 In terms of agriculture, the value of US 
exports to Haiti nearly tripled during this same period. While business was good for U.S. 
companies, wages for the average Haitian between 1980 and 1990 declined by about 
50%, falling in line with the broader doldrums of the region during what came to be 
known as the ‘Lost Decade.’395  
During this same period, the population of Port-au-Prince grew at an 
unsustainable rate as people left the countryside in hopes of finding jobs in the light-
manufacturing industry,396 from nearly 460,000 in the 1960s to over one million in the 
1980s. The next three largest cities in the country also experienced similar growth rates 
during these decades, with Cap Haïtien going from 45,600 to 89,200, Gonaïves from 
28,700 to 58,300, and Les Cayes from 22,600 to 62,500 people.397 This period was 
particularly marked by an increase in the proportion of the population under the age of 
30.398 As the rhetoric of a more promising future espoused by Jean-Claudisme was 
fundamentally contradicted by the regime’s corruption, extortion, and economic 
mismanagement, as well as its turn to repression, this growing urban youth population 
stood up defiantly against the dictatorship. “It was the inhabitants of the provincial cities, 
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especially the young people and students, who held the demonstrations and marches that 
convinced the President he had lost support.”399 
As U.S.-backed Contras and the right-wing governments that remained in power 
in neighboring countries engaged in the wholesale slaughter of their civilian populations, 
pressures on the Reagan administration both domestically and amongst its Latin 
American and European allies to discontinue its support for all repressive regimes across 
the region increased.400 This was true for the Duvalier regime as well, forcing the Reagan 
administration to slowly move away from providing it with support. 
Also, it was increasingly understood that the repression of these regimes was 
simply radicalizing the popular movements rather than eliminating them. Some within the 
administration began to acknowledge that it was because of the repressiveness and 
corruptness of these various autocrats that such broad support for change had emerged. 
While these societies had fundamentally changed, undergoing dramatic socioeconomic 
transformations in terms of population growth and the expansion of their urban middle 
and working classes, there had been no transformation politically.401 In Central America, 
movements for change began as rather moderate broad-based alliances between the 
Catholic Church, the professional classes, as well as working class and peasant-based 
movements.402 The same could be said about the mobilization for democracy in Haiti. 
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Some within the administration realized that “authoritarians had exploited and divided 
their societies until radical revolution became the last hope of the masses and the middle 
class.”403 As the movement in Haiti escalated, the Reagan administration sought to 
forestall this possibility by facilitating a transition from the Duvaliers to the CNG, and 
promising democratic elections.	  
The crisis of legitimacy that plagued the various U.S.-supported right-wing 
regimes throughout the Third World during this period pushed the Reagan regime to 
reassess its foreign policy strategy. It would come to moderate its public support for 
Kirkpatrick’s call to arm the authoritarians, though continuing to do so in more subtle 
ways, and to increasingly promote a shift towards the democracy promotion as a key 
component of U.S. foreign policy.404 Principal to this undertaking were those like 
Secretary of State George P. Shultz. First he challenged the notion that democracy was 
not possible in the developing world by pointing to democratic developments in southern 
Europe and South America.405 He also acknowledged that inequality throughout the 
region was a significant barrier to democracy in Central America and the Caribbean, but 
that radicals were taking advantage of this reality to push for new undemocratic 
revolutionary orders.406 This interpretation of developments within the region would 
allow the Reagan administration to at once denounce the leftists as anti-democrats, but 	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also to proclaim its support for important democratic and economic reforms throughout 
the region, thus narrowing the distance between U.S. material interests and its supposed 
concern for particular values.407 
More importantly, the human rights agenda would be subsumed within the 
framework of democracy promotion. Rather than being understood as an international 
standard, the Reagan administration reduced human rights to represent “a set of values 
embedded in existing national political institutions and legal structures, of which the 
United States were at once the best historical example and the model. In substance, a 
concern for human rights should be a concern about the political regime predicated on 
human rights, namely democracy.”408 
But what kind of democracy would this new foreign policy promote? The Reagan 
administration strategically reduced the fight for political rights as one that excluded 
social and economic rights, and focused instead on political processes and institutions.409 
While the previous international conception of human rights “actually made progress in 
the field of political and civil rights dependent upon the improvement of social and 
economic conditions,”410 the Reagan administration’s notion of human rights involved 
preserving the status quo distribution of economic power in many of the Third World 
countries it sought to democratize. 
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Under Shultz's direction, the State Department would come to organize the 
Campaign for Democracy, Project Democracy, and the National Endowment for 
Democracy, all to give leverage to independent political groups in democratizing 
nations.411 These developments allowed the Reagan administration to gradually expand 
the foreign policy discourse beyond material interests of physical security, well being, 
and access to markets, goods, and investments, towards a seemingly broader conception 
of interests, which included the promotion of democracy and capitalism.412 
Unfortunately, it was strategically ensured that democracy being advocated was a shell of 
what democracy traditionally meant, particularly for the left. Democracy was now a 
conservative tool for managing transitions from overtly authoritarian regimes. 
The United States' shift from explanations of its foreign policy in Central America 
and the Caribbean that focused on security to those that emphasized protecting 
democracy and human rights was a means to maintain public support and legitimacy of 
its foreign policy domestically and among its allies in Latin America and Europe. Later 
this policy would become more strategic, more pre-emptive, as a means to deal with the 
broader issue of the authoritarian crises facing regimes around the world that were 
friendly to the U.S. It could also be used to remove leftist regimes that the U.S. viewed as 
reprehensible. It placed U.S. foreign policy in the developing world on a better moral 
footing, and removed the notion that its efforts in these countries were purely based on 
interests. “Following the U.S. diplomatic interventions against Jean-Claude Duvalier in 
Haiti…the administration released a presidential message in March 1986 that seemingly 	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broadened U.S. goals to include support for all opposition to tyranny, whether of the right 
or the left.”413 Its shift towards supporting democratization and human rights policy 
became a means for it to export “a variety of political technologies, legal models, 
normative discourses regarding the economy or the organization of civil society.”414 
Democracy-promotion thus ceased to be a cloak under which to hide or justify more 
violent tactics, but became a non-violent means to penetrate societies and forestall 
grassroots movements from taking power. Suddenly democracy became relegated to the 
realm of experts, many who invariably emanate from the fount of democracy, the United 
States, rather than within the grassroots movement that mobilized for democratic change. 
 
THE EMBERS OF A NEW HAITI 
Unfortunately for U.S. democracy promoters, the mass mobilization for 
democracy in Haiti did not end with the ouster of Jean-Claude Duvalier. While the media 
and the Church served as the primary avenues through which the Haitian majority would 
come to acquire a new social and political consciousness, they also taught them to reject 
the received wisdom that society’s institutions existed to serve the elite. Increasingly they 
came to espouse the belief that Haitian institutions should serve the poor who made up 
the country’s majority, and sought to either transform these institutions, or abandoned 
them outright to create their own when doing so proved impossible. 
The first aspect of this emergent sense of agency amongst the poor who made up 
the bulk of the popular movement was the rejection of the notion that democracy could 
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be established in Haiti by simply removing Duvalier from power and having elections. 
For the movement, the Duvaliers were simply the public faces of a power structure that 
infiltrated every facet of Haitian society. The movement sought to go beyond the 
elections championed by the international community, towards an overhaul of Haitian 
society itself. They called for Dechoukaj. 
As a word borrowed from Haitian peasant life, “to dechouke a plant is to pull it up 
by its roots. It was a particularly apt metaphor for political changes after Duvalier, 
because it recognized that the dictatorship was more than an oppressive overlay kept in 
power by force alone, but that it had sunk its roots deeply into Haitian society and 
culture.”415 Thus dechoukaj encompassed the entirety of the popular effort to remove 
Duvalierists and Duvalierisme from all areas of economic, social, and political power, 
and to empower the people in all these spheres. The word therefore was used both to refer 
to the killing of makouts and the ransacking of the homes, businesses, or offices of 
Duvalierists, as well as the closing down or reforming of institutions, the firing of 
Duvalierist managers, the changing of Duvalier-era laws, and even the changing of 
popular beliefs and understandings.416 
The movement also challenged the CNGs elections as disingenuous, and as “a 
diversion from the work of building the popular movement.417 Instead, it called on the 
CNG to ‘rache manyòk, bannou tè blanch’ (pull up your manioc fields, give us a clean 
field), “a reference to land tenancy practices whereby a new landowner or tenant would 	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take possession only after the former occupant uprooted their maniocs,” a call for the 
CNG and the army to remove themselves from power in order for true democracy to 
begin.418 
This true democracy lay beyond the formal arena of politics as understood by 
advocates of a polyarchic understanding of democracy. Democracy could not be reduced 
to elections and elite bargaining within institutions. True democracy was what was 
developing within the Ti Legliz. The Ti Legliz did not initially focus on politics per se. It 
first began by democratizing the Church and the relationship between priests and its 
members, emphasizing the capacity of poor Haitians to speak for themselves; to 
understand their own problems; to organize within the Church to seek solutions; and to 
confront structures of power when it became evident that they were the main causes of 
these problems. The Ti Legliz provided a blue print for establishing democracy in Haiti. 
For the movement, all institutions throughout Haitian society would have to be 
transformed in much the same way the Ti Legliz sought to transform the Catholic Church, 
in order for democracy to flourish. 
As the Ti Legliz sought to lead the charge in democratizing Haitian society after 
the fall of Duvalier, the Church hierarchy sought to extricate itself nearly completely 
from the political arena. It urged Haitians to practice restraint, to avoid violence, to 
respect property, and to forgive.419 It called upon Haitian Bishops and priests to withdraw 
from political debates,420 and took aggressive actions against those who did not follow 
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these directives. While critical voices within Radio Soleil were muted,421 and progressive 
seminarians dismissed,422 the Church simultaneously rewarded and promoted 
conservatives who were known to either have strong links to the Duvaliers or to have 
conservative views.423 Even during the CNG’s systematic campaign of violence against 
Church institutions that remained critical of its actions, the Church hierarchy called for 
the people to avoid violence and to resolve political issues non-violently,424 making it 
clear to the public that the Church hierarchy did not wish to see fundamental changes in 
the distribution of power throughout Haitian society. 
This shift in the Church towards the preservation of elite power in Haiti pushed 
many within the popular movement to begin organizing autonomously outside of the 
Church. Some transformed their existing structures into more secularly-oriented popular 
organizations.425 Organizations such as Mouvement Paysans de Papaye/Peasant 
Movement of Papaye (MPP), founded in the early 1970s to train people for religious 
work,426 became overtly political, establishing the National Peasant Movement of the 
Papaye Congress (MPNKP) in 1987, which boasted nearly 100,000 members before the 
1991 coup against the Aristide government.427 MPP served as a model for other peasant 
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collectives like the Tèt Kole Ti Peyizan (Heads Together Little Peasants) movement 
started in 1986.428 
Others “formed non-denominational gwoupman, community groups where issues 
such as agrarian reform, taxation, or irrigation were addressed.”429 They used marches 
and land occupations to fight for agrarian reform and to take back lands previously stolen 
from them by tontons macoutes. They called for the elimination of the chef de section 
system. They sought to change the regressive tax system that distributed their hard earned 
income upward to the wealthy elite by refusing to pay taxes at all. They championed the 
repopulation of Haiti’s black pigs that were eradicated in the early 1980s by the now 
infamous USAID program. In addition, they fought to establish Creole as an official 
language of public discourse and government.430 
Most critical to the next phase of the mass movement for democracy was the 
emergence of Organisations Populaires/Popular Organizations (OPs/POs).431 Many of 
these Popular Organizations formed in places like Cité Soleil (Sun City),432 still a Lavalas 
stronghold today. Previously named Cité Simone after the elder Duvalier’s wife, Cité 
Soleil encapsulates many of the trends that fueled the popular movement against the 
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Duvalier dictatorship. Though currently a slum situated on the northern edge of Port-au-
Prince, the community began as a planned housing development for 52 families that 
worked in the former HASCO sugar complex in 1958, but later came to house those who 
migrated from the countryside in search of work in the nearby Export Processing Zone.433 
Even today “Cité Soleil…[remains] a highly migratory community with strong ties to 
rural areas….Most of the residents…were born outside Port-au-Prince and had migrated 
to the city in search of better economic prospects. They came from rural-based farming 
and marketing families who faced decreased prospects for production.”434 Cité Soleil is 
one example of how the rural-urban migration and slum development caused by the 
neoliberal economic paradigm fueled social mobilization. Others included Bel Air, La 
Saline, and Martissant. “By the mid-80s, a new generation was coming of age in the 
sprawling slums of Port-au-Prince, open to the appeal of liberation theology in the coded 
kreyòl sermons of radical priests—chief among them, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.”435 
From their inception, the young people who formed these Popular Organizations 
rejected the mere institutional trappings of democracy being promoted by those they 
deemed part of Haiti’s professional political class. They saw formal political parties as no 
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distributed. Instead they defined their objective as spreading and defending the rights and 
claims of the popular classes through the ‘power of the street.’ “As far as POs were 
concerned, the people could only count on their own autonomous forms of 
organization…They were radically opposed to traditional, elitist practices that excluded 
or suppressed the will of the majority.”436  
In fact, two Popular Organizations that emerged during the 1985-86 period in 
Aristide’s Saint Jean Bosco parish, Solidarité Ant Jèn (SAJ, Solidarity Among the 
Youths) and Konbit Véyé Yo (Vigilance Committee), joined other organizations like the 
Tèt Kolé pou Youn Mouvman ti-Peyizan (Solidarity with the Small Peasant Movement) in 
publicly opposing Aristide’s decision to participate in the 1990 elections.437 Instead, 
many Popular Organizations believed that democracy had to begin with ordinary Haitians 
organizing in their neighborhoods to take action where the state had not. This meant 
cleaning streets, planting trees, and painting murals to improve otherwise pitiable public 
spaces,438 and arranging basic social services that the state was unwilling or unable to 
provide for the poor people of Haiti’s slums.439 This also meant organizing to protect 
themselves from the reactionary violence of the military dictatorship and their macoute 
allies, and at times, to exact revenge for past injustices. 
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Despite a certain ambivalence to formal electoral politics, it was the Ti Legliz, 
various peasant organizations, and the Popular Organizations that flourished in the period 
immediately after the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship that would prove critical in the 
election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, establishing themselves as the most functional 
structures in the nation’s democratic movement.440 Aristide’s election was a fundamental 
rejection that democracy would become the purview of the middle and upper classes; 
something left up to the professionals. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
 
CRAFTING A DEMOCRACY THAT BINDS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Between Jean-Claude Duvalier's ouster in 1986 and Jean-Bertrand Aristide's 
election in 1990, Haiti’s ostensible democratic transition vacillated between violently 
aborted elections, dubiously selected civilian governments, and more-or-less repressive 
military juntas, devolving into what came to be known infamously as a period of 
"Duvalierism without Duvalier."441 But why had democracy stalled in Haiti over these 4 
years, when a number of powerful domestic and international stakeholders were 
proclaiming their unequivocal support for a transition to democracy from Duvalier's 
Presidency-for-Life?  The question was not whether these power brokers supported 
democracy in Haiti, but rather what kind of democracy were they seeking to establish? 
The truth is, as Haiti's poor, peasant, and working class masses mobilized to dismantle 
the dark legacy of the Duvalier regime, U.S. foreign policy makers, the High Command 
of the Haitian Armed Forces, and a number of prominent Haitian politicians were 
working to craft a polyarchic vision of democracy, utilizing the rhetoric and processes of 
“democratization” to prevent a radical rupture with Haiti's authoritarian past. As efforts to 
push forward a people's agenda gained momentum, a return to repression was utilized to 
reset the so-called democratization process, with the hope of moving towards elections 
without the input of the poor and working class masses. 
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While, at a minimum, polyarchy depends on freedom of expression, associational 
autonomy, and free and fair elections,442 what made polyarchy a particularly useful 
interpretation of democracy for power brokers within and outside of Haiti was its 
rejection of popular participation in the political process, outside of voting, as a necessary 
condition for democracy. One of the principal theorists of polyarchy, Robert Dahl, argued 
that, “what we call ‘democracy’—that is, a system of decision-making in which leaders 
are more or less responsive to the preferences of nonleaders—does seem to operate with a 
relatively low level of citizen participation.”443 This sentiment was echoed within the 
democratic transition literature. While popular mobilization was deemed necessary for 
the dismantling of dictatorships, it could not continue indefinitely if democracy was to be 
consolidated. Accordingly, democracy required a certain degree of "normalcy," which 
entailed the "de-politicization and de-radicalization" of the population.444 The population 
was to become "disillusioned and fatigued" with the political process, making them ripe 
to be “co-opted by better organized and financially more independent social forces," 
particularly the "formerly excluded parties and leaders of the dominant classes and 
middle sectors.”445 
Alongside the emergence of a narrowly defined opposition, polyarchy relies on 
convincing moderates within the previous authoritarian regime, as well as the social 
classes that supported them, to tolerate new “conflicts and demands, modifications in the 	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rules of the game and institutional arrangements, as well as levels and patterns of popular 
demands and organization they would never have accepted at the beginning of the 
transition...”446 In a polyarchic vision of democracy, the accountability of government to 
the people is not established by mass participation in government, but by the bargaining 
and negotiating of organized groups of minorities within representative institutions.447 
Dahl admits that, “attached to the institutions of polyarchal democracy...is a 
nondemocratic process...[of] bargaining among political and bureaucratic elites.”448 
Through its emphasis on the processes of decision-making rather than the 
substance of these processes, polyarchy serves as a useful tool for demobilizing the poor 
and working class majority. While a classical conceptualization of democracy views 
popular participation in politics as necessarily resulting in a more equitable distribution of 
power and resources within society, polyarchy views this as outside the purview of the 
democratic process. Polyarchy thus involves the establishment of nominally democratic 
institutions and processes that filter and fragment the common agenda of the masses so as 
not to threaten the interests of power brokers. 
This chapter focuses on the immediate aftermath of Jean-Claude Duvalier’s 
removal from power in 1986, and the efforts of different powerbrokers to neutralize 
popular criticism of the National Government Council’s legitimacy as the institution to 
move Haiti's democratic transition forward. It addresses the popular ratification of the 
Constitution of 1987, specifically Article 291 barring Duvalierists from holding public 
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office for 10 years, and how this became emblematic of the popular movement's ability to 
co-opt processes initially designed to establish polyarchy for their own agenda. This 
period concludes with the violently aborted elections of November 29, 1987. 
 
SECURING THE STATE 
Within the context of a widening legitimacy crisis for U.S.-supported 
authoritarian regimes across Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1980s, the 
proximate concern of U.S. foreign policy makers regarding Haiti was stability and 
continuity. The day of Jean-Claude's departure, "Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger 
said...the U.S. was very anxious to have stable conditions in Haiti."449 This meant 
demobilizing the popular protest movement, weakening the dominant position of the 
Tonton Macoutes and other hard-line Duvalierists, and subsequently strengthening that of 
a reformed and professionalized Forces Armées d'Haïti (Fad'H) that would then secure 
the authority of a transition government. This, it was hoped, would ensure that the 
contagion of leftist popular uprisings springing forth from Central America would not 
infect Haiti, and potentially the rest of the Caribbean. The U.S. would facilitate "the 
peaceful departure [of Jean-Claude]...in order to ease the transition in Haiti and reduce 
the possible bloodshed."450 Nevertheless, as the U.S., the CNG, and the so-called 
moderate opposition sought to navigate their way towards the electoral politics that are 
the sine qua non of polyarchy, the popular movement would consistently question the 
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very legitimacy of the CNG, eventually commandeering the process of democratic 
transition to push forward an anti-Duvalierist, anti-imperialist, and pro-poor agenda. 
Nearly immediately after Jean-Claude's departure, the U.S. declared Haiti's 
Armed Forces the country's best hope for democracy,451 certifying that his heirs in the 
CNG were complying with the human rights conditions needed to resume aid.452 This 
would lead to the releasing of $26 million in withheld assistance, and the petitioning of 
Congress for $52 million more.453 In 1971, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Clinton Knox had 
similarly exclaimed, “that with U.S. aid Papa Doc’s successor would free the country,”454 
as Jean-Claude Duvalier inherited the office of President of Haiti at the age of 19. 
To enhance the CNG's democratic pedigree, it was floated early on that 
longstanding opponent of the Duvaliers and President of the Haitian League for Human 
Rights, Gerard Gourgue, would be the probable head of the provisional government.455 
Though his eventual appointment as Minister of Justice was praised,456 it would become 
increasingly clear that his function was to provide a patina of popular legitimacy to what 
was essentially a military dictatorship. Four of the six members of the CNG were military 	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officers. The eventual President, Lieutenant General Henri Namphy, was Commander-in-
Chief of the Army. Colonel William Regala was his assistant. And Colonels Prosper 
Avril and Max Valles were heads of the presidential police.457 
While symbolically distancing itself from the legacy of the Duvaliers by officially 
disbanding the Tontons Macoutes,458 dismissing the Haitian Parliament created in the 
fraudulent elections of 1984,459 and abandoning François Duvalier's black and red flag for 
the blue and red flag of independence, the reality was that the CNG, and the Haitian 
Armed Forces that gave it authority, were dominated by Duvalierists. In fact, the one 
other civilian member in the CNG besides Gourgue, Alex Cineas, "held a string of 
important posts under the Duvaliers" and was viewed as a Tonton Macoute by many in 
the popular movement.460 Worse yet, as the CNG called for an investigation into the size 
of Duvalier's wealth and how it was acquired,461 one of its very own members, Prosper 
Avril, had been Jean-Claude's "closest financial confidant during that time and kept 
accounts of all the dictator's financial transactions."462 Avril was a member of François' 
Presidential Guard, and later became a close adviser to Jean-Claude. Similarly, a majority 
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of the provisional government's cabinet members were also well-known Duvalier 
supporters.463 
On February 11, 1986, an unsigned 25-demand document that came to be known 
as the Gonaives Manifesto circulated throughout Port-au-Prince in the name of the 
Haitian people.464 The first element of the people's agenda was Dechoukaj. While 
Dechoukaj was often narrowly associated with the mob lynching of members of 
Duvalier's reviled Tonton Macoutes, the term itself referred to the pulling of a plant up by 
its roots so that it would not grow again. According to Rene Theodore of the Parti Unifié 
des Communistes Haïtiens (PUCH), "after overthrowing the Duvalier government, the 
Haitian popular movement [was] pursuing a very clear objective--cleansing the country 
of all remnants of Duvalierism..."465 For the mass movement, this first meant removing 
Duvalierist elements from the CNG, if not pushing for the dissolution of the CNG 
altogether. Youth demonstrations throughout the capital and the provinces denounced 
Duvalierist members of the CNG,466 calling for the removal of Alex Cineas and Prosper 
Avril in particular.467 As the CNG attempted to reopen schools shuttered since the 
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popular mobilization against Jean-Claude, students across the provinces boycotted, 
"calling for the removal of the six-member military civilian government council almost 
from the start, saying most of its members and numerous Cabinet officials and ministers 
[were] tainted by past links to Duvalier."468 In some instances, public demonstrations 
barred newly appointed ministers from entering their offices due to their past affiliations 
with the Duvalier regime.469  
The popular movement also called for justice, and thus the extradition, arrest, and 
trial of anyone who had committed human rights violations against the population or 
diverted public funds during the 28-year rule of the Duvalier family.470 Emphasis was 
particularly placed on the extradition of Jean-Claude Duvalier and other Gros Macoutes 
who were able to flee the country.471 Yet, as Justice Minister Gerard Gourgue came out 
on national television to declare that the CNG would request the extradition of Duvalier 
from France,472 the Haitian military was playing a covert role in facilitating the departure 
of many of the most reviled Macoutes out of the country. Under the cover of the CNG's 
nighttime curfew, the Haitian Army assisted notorious former Police Chief Albert Pierre, 
along with other prominent macoutes, escape into exile for Brazil.473 "In three years as 
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chief of police and security services, Pierre won a reputation for exceptional brutality. 
According to some accounts, he frequently tortured prisoners and delighted in wearing a 
white hospital coat during torture sessions because he enjoyed seeing the stains left by his 
victims blood."474 It was not until an angry mob physically prevented the Haitian Army 
from escorting infamous former Haitian Secret Police Chief, Luc Desyr, to his Air France 
flight out of the country, did the CNG publicly denounce this policy, arrest Desyr, and 
declare that he would be put on trail.475 U.S. aid would subsequently be doubled to $108 
million, with $1.275 million in Military Assistance Program Funds, $275,000 in 
International Military Education and Training Funds,476 along with $400,000 worth in 
riot control equipment.477 And with this military aid, the CNG was to help the Haitian 
people find their way to democracy. 
According to Namphy, what the Haitian people wanted was "a liberal 
constitution, the reconstruction of a legislative branch resulting from free elections, and 
presidential elections by direct universal suffrage..."478 So on February 26, 1986, the 
CNG announced plans to form a Constituent Assembly to draft a new Constitution along 
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with electoral laws.479 480 These developments would be watched with much reserve 
considering how the U.S. had applauded feigned steps towards political liberalization 
before in the not so distant past. Only a few months prior to the eruption of the mass 
protests that forced Jean-Claude out of power, U.S. diplomats were calling his fraudulent 
"political structure" referendum "a positive step for Haiti," claiming that "the human 
rights situation in the country...had improved..."481 As the referendum affirmed 30 
constitutional amendments put forward by his handpicked unicameral legislature, Jean-
Claude was given power over the newly created prime minister position; power to fire 
elected town mayors;482 and power to revoke the newly established right of political 
parties to exist should they fail to recognize "the Republic's president as supreme arbiter 
and guarantor of the stability of the national institutions for life."483 Duvalier would win 
the July 1985 referendum in the island’s nine districts484 with nearly 2.4 of the reported 
2.6 million total votes.485 Despite denunciations of the entire process by the Haitian 
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Catholic radio station Radio Soleil,486 Reagan's State Department and White House 
would continue to declare their support for the regime, approving $53 million in aid.487 
Following the referendum, Minister of State Jean-Marie Chanoine would declare on 
national television that the opposition had two choices: "to leave or support the Haitian 
Government.”488 
On March 20, 1986, troops from the Leopard battalion, created with U.S. 
assistance in 1971, would go on to kill unarmed protestors in the towns of Martissant and 
Carrefour,489 prompting the resignation of Gourgue, the one member of the CNG with a 
modicum of public trust.490 This marked a significant demarcation in the initial transition 
period, symbolizing the CNG's failure at the outset to mask its authoritarian roots and to 
quietly contain the mass movement in order to manage the transition. Gourgue's 
departure led to the removal of the most visible Duvalierists from the CNG, such as 
Colonels Prosper Avril and Max Valles, as well as civilian Alex Cineas.491 Namphy 
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would declare that "this reshuffle was done to strengthen democracy; that is, for 
democracy to bloom in Haiti."492 
Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the military's repression, 15,000 people would 
march through Port-au-Prince, led by a newly-formed group called the Komite pour 
Ignite Demokrasi/the Committee to Ignite Democracy (KID), made up of journalists, 
students, and young priests of the Ti Legliz. One of its principal leaders, Evans Paul, and 
former Creole Radio newsman, Kompere Plume, called "on Haitians to organize 
themselves along democratic lines in neighborhoods, schools, and work..."493 KID would 
be one of the organizations to promote an alternative to CNG-managed elections. Parallel 
to the march, young unemployed youths set tires and trash on fire at intersections 
throughout the poor sections of Port-au-Prince, stating that "as long as the army's man 
(Namphy) is in power we will never have any real free elections. We need civilians to 
pave the way for democracy."494 Despite the CNG's promises of democracy, the popular 
movement continued to mobilize in the streets, leading Namphy to increasingly use 
reactionary rhetoric and threaten systematic violence against the population. A month 
later, on April 26, 1986, as approximately 7,000 people marched to the infamous Forte 
Dimanche Prison, where prisoners during Jean-Claude Duvalier's regime often entered 
without returning, to memorialize the victims of François Duvalier's reign of terror, the 
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marchers were shot on by the police.495 After this act of repression, Namphy "accused 'a 
small group of agitators' of provoking the troops," claiming that they were attempting to 
find an opportunity to destabilize the government in order to "interrupt the process of 
democratization and 'establish a totalitarian regime."496 The attack would be the worst by 
the CNG since the ouster of Jean-Claude.497 As the fear of further popular unrest grew, 
Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Brigadier 
General Frederick Gordon, Director of the U.S. Defense Department Inter-American 
region, visited Haitian officials to find a means to stave off further instability.498 
Protests would reemerge in June as the population focused its attention on the 
policies of the Minister of Finance and Economy, Leslie Delatour. As plans to close the 
state-owned sugar and oil plants and sell a cement and a flour plant to the private 
sector499 were discovered in a leaked confidential report from the U.S. Embassy in 
Haiti,500 Delatour was denounced as "an American minister who sold out to the World 
Bank."501 Regardless, Justice Minister Francois Latortue would declare that it was not 	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possible to replace Delatour because he had begun many projects that must be completed, 
and that they did not want to "create an image of a country that changes governments 
every week."502 Nevertheless, in the midst of this popular unrest, the CNG would 
announce that it would turn over power to a freely elected government on February 7, 
1988, exactly two years from the day of Jean-Claude's departure.503 The next steps were 
to: "1) to regulate the political parties by decree; 2) to form a constituent assembly; 3) to 
draft a liberal, democratic constitution."504 
As the CNG moved the country towards elections, supporters of the ousted Jean-
Claude Duvalier regime began coming forward to declare their intention to present a 
candidate for the upcoming 1987 presidential elections.505 "A source close to the 
government said: 'This party is the only one among more than 200 that has a possibility 
of winning.' The same source added: 'They know how to organize themselves and fight in 
an electoral campaign. Do not forget that 'Papa Doc' was democratically elected in 
1957.'"506 Simultaneously, rumors concerning the return of the Tonton Macoutes would 
also grow louder.507 While Namphy had formally disbanded the Tonton Macoutes, those 
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who escaped the wrath of dechoukaj, were able to retain their weapons. So, as the specter 
of open Duvalierism reappeared in Haiti, an estimated 50 thousand people took to the 
streets in protest508 in "one of the most important demonstrations following the downfall 
of 'Duvalierism' last 7 February."509 
Rather than acknowledge the legitimacy of the popular mobilization against the 
possibility of a growing Duvalierist and Macoute threat, Namphy argued that the CNG 
was caught between the radical right and radical left. While the CNG was fighting to 
eliminate the "arbitrary and repressive practices of the past" associated with Macoutism, 
it faced an unnamed sector that was infiltrating peaceful demonstrations to "pit the people 
against the Army and the government," to "at any cost and means...ruin the budding 
Haitian democracy."510 Claims that the military has engaged in repression against the 
population were simply dismissed as policing accidents that were exploited by activists. 
Namphy called on "reporters, political leaders, and priests to cease the 'exaggerations and 
the countertruths that stir passions,'"511 "of a people who have lived for 30 years under a 
regressive dictatorship and never had the chance to express themselves."512 These were 
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conditions for "an explosion" as there was "now a desire to take an interest in public 
affairs."513 
While the CNG was working to establish democracy in Haiti, Namphy also 
believed that the population was "not yet sufficiently well- informed to decide which 
option meets their wishes."514 As a result, "the government that would be chosen might 
not be the one that the Haitian people wanted right away."515 This is a sentiment that 
would be echoed by other figures within the CNG.  According to Education Minister 
Rosny Desroches, "there was an unrealistic gap between public expectations from the 
transitional administration and what it was able to deliver...It had to prepare for a 
permanent government and a return to democracy, yet was faced with demands from the 
Haitian people for significant economic advance..."516 Essentially, the participation of the 
people in politics could not be connected to their economic advance. The two were 
mutually exclusive. For Desroches, the two-year transitional period established by the 
CNG was reasonable, so that the appropriate political structures could be established, 
along with the appropriate economic orientation for the country. "Although there was no 
specific tendency within the group forming the council, Desroches said that it, influenced 
by the private sector, was for the evolution of a Haiti with a capitalist economy and close 
ties to the United States.... "517 
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What these statements reveal is that the transition away from Jean-Claude 
Duvalier's presidency-for-life was never about allowing Haiti's working class and peasant 
majority participate in the political process, nor to meet their demands. Rather, the two-
year transition period would allow an unelected body to shape the economics and 
political institutions of the country with the assistance of Haiti's private sector and the 
U.S. foreign policy establishment. But, in order to complete a transition to democracy 
where the poor majority's participation and demands are incidental, the appropriate 
persons would have to be found to take part in elections.  
 
THE RESPONSIBLE OPPOSITION 
The march towards elections would require the CNG to allow for the emergence 
of a political opposition. The question for the CNG was whether it sought to replicate the 
"Duvalier-style" elections of the past; was willing to open up the political process to 
segments of a credible opposition whose function would be to moderate the expectations 
of the population; or would it allow the grassroots organizations to shape Haiti's 
transition towards democracy? As members of the so-called "responsible opposition" 
positioned themselves for power as the CNG pushed forward with its efforts to establish 
polyarchy in Haiti, the popular movement was able to press for its own alternative 
agenda, to the point of discrediting this opposition and threatening the very existence of 
the CNG. 
While upon Jean-Claude's ouster from power, the international and domestic 
media instantly began highlighting prominent figures that were sure to be critical to the 
country's successful transition to democracy, a certain reticence seemed to manifest 
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within the CNG. Though favoring the principle of a "right to return" for exiles, Gerard 
Gourgue thought that the CNG could not ignore the potential risks. So, initially those 
considered "undesirables" arriving without return visas were sent back immediately by 
the government's immigration and police services.518 Despite the CNG slowing the 
process of return for many exiles, the received wisdom was that democracy simply could 
not be established in Haiti without the exiles. 
According to the head of the Haitian Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions 
exiled in Caracas, Venezuela, George Fortune, Haiti was a decapitated society, and thus 
"the presence of the overseas-based exiles was essential to the establishment of 
democracy in Haiti after almost three decades of authoritarian rule by the Duvalier 
dynasty."519 While some rejected the CNG outright as a continuation of the Duvalier 
regime, calling for the establishment of a provisional government in exile,520 others 
believed that not much more could be expected since most of the "opposition" remained 
outside of the country. Those who made this argument believed it was necessary to 
momentarily accept the CNG, which they argued was best positioned to reestablish 
order.521 Once order was reestablished, all the factions of the "responsible" opposition 
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would be positioned to carry out negotiations on a government program.522 Exiled in 
Venezuela, former François Duvalier Minister of Foreign Affairs, Leslie Manigat,523 
viewed the presence of General Namphy and Gerard Gourges in the CNG as positive 
signs for Haiti's democratic transition. The former was "a career officer whose image 
seems to be that of an independent professional," and the latter, "a human rights advocate 
who has become minister of justice."524 According to Manigat, thousands of followers of 
his Rassemblement des Democrates Nationaux Progressistes (RDNP) party, along with 
other Social and Christian Democrats across several Caribbean capitals, were anxious to 
return to Haiti "to participate in the difficult task of rebuilding the country."525 
For the popular movement, members of the so-called "responsible opposition," 
like Manigat, or former Jean-Claude Ministers, Marc Bazin and Hubert de Ronceray, as 
well as staunch opponents of the Duvaliers, Protestant minister Sylvio Claude, and Louis 
Dejoie II, whose father ran against Duvalier in the 1957 elections, were "opportunists" 
and "professional politicians." Following the November 1985 mass protests just before 
Jean-Claude's ouster, grassroots groups like Kontenjan 28 Jiyè (the July 28th Contingent) 
distinguished between the masses, who were out in the streets to end misery, and "the 
opposition," who, while calling for the end of Jean-Claude's presidency-for-life, would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
522 "Dissident Demands Duvalier Extradition," Paris AFP [English Translation], February 7, 1986, Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America, February 11, 1986. 	  
523 Rally of Progressive National Democrats 	  
524 "Group Urges Dismantling of Duvalier Structures," Paris AFP [English Translation], February 17, 
1986, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America February 18, 1986. 	  
525 Ibid. 	  
 
 148 
align themselves with Duvalierists, the dominant classes, and the imperialists if it meant 
having their turn at power.526 
As 1987 approached, and elections loomed less far in the distance, various 
elements of the "responsible opposition" began positioning themselves for office. On 
December 24, 1986, ten leaders of Haiti's moderate political parties announced the 
creation of "a 'joint action pact' for the promotion and defense of democracy," pledging 
"to establish and maintain a regime of pluralist democracy for all political parties without 
exception, provided that the parties abide by the rules of the democratic game. In 
particular these rules include the rejection of any political system which does not respect 
the following: the people's will, as expressed in elections; political and ideological 
pluralism; or legal opposition and the holding of free, periodic elections."527 Amongst the 
most prominent members of this group were Luis Dejoie of the National Industrial and 
Agricultural Party (PAIN); Hubert de Ronceray of the Movement for National 
Development (MDN); Louis Eugene Athis of the Democratic Movement for the 
Liberation of Haiti (MODELH); Marc Bazin of the Movement for the Establishment of 
Democracy in Haiti (MIDH); Gregorio Eugene of the Christian Social Party of Haiti 
(PSCH); and Leslie Manigat of the Union of Progressive National Democrats (RDNP).528 
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These parties were at the forefront of demanding that the CNG allow for the creation of a 
permanent electoral council to organize and supervise the upcoming elections.529 
From January 31 to February 3, 1987, over 300 popular organizations would 
similarly come together for the First National Congress of Democratic Movements, in 
order to establish a national institutional presence for the disparate organizations of the 
popular movement spread across the country.530 For Rene Theodore of PUCH, one of 
only two formal political parties to take part in the Congress, to establish a real and 
authentic democracy in Haiti, it would be necessary to form a government stemming 
from "the people's committees throughout the country, which are the institutions that 
have truly been created by the popular movement..."531 According to Theodore, the 
people did not want traditional style elections, which would only result in the same rulers 
as in the past, but rather leaders that would "promote and effectively institutionalize the 
popular movement that had been watching from the sidelines for a long time."532 Out of 
this meeting, a national umbrella group would be formed called the Comité National du 
Congrès des Mouvements Démocratiques (CONACOM), which brought the various local 
peasant, youth, union, merchant, and women's organizations of the popular movement 
together, not only to resist Macoutism and Duvalierism, but to define a popular agenda 
for a democratic future. CONACOM demanded fundamental changes to Haiti's 	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economic, political, and social life, particularly for the poor, peasant, and working class 
majority. They called for an end to 'the injustice and exploitation' of peasants, workers, 
and artisans," "an agricultural policy that would make them self-sufficient in foodstuffs 
and improve the peasants' condition," agrarian reform, national industry without foreign 
dependency, an army and police force 'at the service of the people,' the elimination of 
justice 'only for the rich,' a revaluation of the Creole language, respect for the Vodou 
religion, and rehabilitation of Haitian traditional medicine.533 
It is within this context of an increasingly mobilized and organized opposition, 
that the constituent assembly was emboldened to draft the Constitution of 1987, which 
would be considered "one of the most liberal constitutions that Haiti has ever had."534 
The creation of the 9-member Electoral Council, appointed by government institutions, 
human rights organizations, the journalists' association, and church representatives, to 
supervise the upcoming elections,535 appealed strongly to the "responsible opposition." 
So did other provisions, such as the reduction of presidential power vis-à-vis a prime 
minister chosen from amongst the representatives of the majority party in the legislature, 
the removal of the president's power to personally select heads of Haiti's armed forces 
and judiciary, and restrictions on the president's ability to dissolve the legislature. That 
the new constitution was drafted in Creole, the language of Haiti's poor majority, 
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alongside the traditional French; called for agrarian reform; and established the 
separation of the police from the armed forces, particularly the chef section that had 
traditionally repressed the peasantry, were particularly directed towards the popular 
movement.536 
Nevertheless, what truly galvanized the population's support for the Constitution 
of 1987 in the March 29 referendum was Article 291 barring those who had been "known 
to have in any way helped or favored the dictatorship established by the Duvalier family" 
from all elected functions for 10 years.537 "The majority of the democratic and 
progressive sectors, peasant and student organizations, and the Catholic Church urged the 
population to vote in favor of the new constitution, which redeems the fundamental civil 
and political rights."538 In fact, a number of the most prominent elements of the popular 
movement, such as CONACOM, representatives from the Ti Legliz and progressive 
Protestants, and the Patriotic Union Bloc announced that they would create popular 
brigades to defend the overwhelmingly approved Constitution of 1987 throughout Haiti's 
towns and rural areas. These brigades would "report to the Provisional Electoral Council 
[CEP] any violations of the constitution in their respective areas, as well as the candidacy 
'for any elected post by any thief or murderer of the overthrown regime.' Those 
responsible for this movement stressed their determination to guarantee CEP's 
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independence, so the country may have democratic elections according to the spirit of the 
current constitution."539 This would be the stage set for the upcoming elections. 
As it became clear that the CNG would not be able to maneuver fellow 
Duvalierists into positions of power through elections, as a result of the CEP, the CNG 
increasingly sought to weaken, control, discredit, or completely disband it. On June 22, 
the CNG would proclaim a new electoral law placing supervision of the upcoming local 
elections in the hands of the Interior Ministry, eliminating "the supervisory function of 
the electoral council."540 A few days later, the CNG would bar Sed Maseille, 
representative of the Catholic Church, and Ernst Verdure, representative of the Protestant 
Church, from sitting on the CEP due to their purported failure to declare their U.S. and 
Canadian citizenships respectively,541 giving the two institutions 48 hours to replace their 
representatives.542 As the CEP refused to step down, accusing the CNG of violating the 
Constitution, and thus invalidating all elections to be held under the government's new 
electoral decree,543 nine key political candidates announced that they would boycott the 
upcoming August local elections, as well as the presidential elections in November."544 
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While, in the midst of this growing political turmoil, the Autonomous Central of 
Haitian Workers (CATH) announced a labor strike for higher salaries and the repatriation 
of mistreated Haitian braceros in the Dominican Republic,545 many suspected the strike 
was to oppose the CNG's disposition towards the newly established CEP. "Contrary to 
what had been expected, some political organizations issued appeals against the strike 
through communiqués published in newspapers and aired on radio and television."546 
Nevertheless, the general strike would be widely observed without much support from 
the "responsible opposition." According to a CATH representative, the success of the 
general strike "shows that the political parties and their so-called leaders are no longer the 
leaders of the Haitians."547 Subsequently, the CNG would order the storming of CATH's 
offices by the military, the arrest of five of its members,548 and the union's dissolution as 
it was deemed to have "violated the basic principal of all unions, that is, to be essentially 
apolitical."549 This would prompt fifty-seven political organizations to escalate the 
confrontation with the CNG even further by calling its actions against the CEP a coup 
d’état and initiating a 24-hour general strike.550 Clustering around the umbrella group, 
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CONACOM, formed earlier in the year by over 300 grassroots organizations,551 the entity 
leading the strike came to be known as the Group of 57. 
As the Group of 57 initiated the mass strike on June 29, Interior Minister and 
member of the CNG, General William Regala made it known that "he would order the 
repression of any violent act or attack against public property,"552 sparking violent 
clashes between the military and protestors across the country.553 554 The intensity of the 
confrontations between the population and the armed forces would prompt General 
Namphy to publicly reject claims that the CNG had political aspirations. Rather, he 
accused hostile sectors of "attempting to stop the election process," and called on "the 
people to help the Armed Forces in the transition toward democracy."555 As the Group of 
57 declared a break in protests on July 3rd, to mourn the 16 people killed as a result of 
the military's repressive actions, the streets of Port-au-Prince and the provincial cities 
would be shaken by the din of posts and pans banging against telephone posts, "a peculiar 
form of citizen's protest that resemble[d] the actions taken at the beginning of last year 
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against the dictator, Jean-Claude Duvalier."556 In order to quell what appeared to be an 
escalating mass movement to oust the government, Namphy would declare the annulment 
of the decree giving the CNG control of the election process,557 while also allowing the 
union CATH to resume its activities.558 
Despite what many within the "responsible opposition" viewed as the 
government's willingness to make concessions, the Group of 57 called for the general 
strike to resume on July 6th throughout the country, in order to force "the resignation of 
the National Government Council (CNG), which it accused of being allied with the 
supporters of Jean-Claude Duvalier."559 Instead, the CNG would defiantly reject the 
Group of 57's call for its resignation, while 35 high ranking officers of the three branches 
of the Haitian Armed Forces went on radio and television to declare their 'total support' 
for the CNG.560 
While the military increasingly came forward to proclaim its support for Namphy 
and the CNG, divisions between the "responsible opposition" and the popular movement 
became increasingly evident. On the one hand, the presidential candidates called on the 
opposition to "show political sobriety" and engage in dialogue with the CNG, 
fundamentally questioning efforts to replace the Namphy government four months before 	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presidential elections. They argued that it would be unwise to "change horses in 
midstream when one is almost all the way across."561 This would be a position strongly 
supported by U.S. officials, particularly Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Caribbean Affairs, Richard Holwill, who while in Haiti to meet with the CNG, stated that 
"elections, not demonstrations, are the way governments are changed in a democracy,"562 
warning that the U.S. would suspend economic aid to Haiti if Namphy was forced to 
resign.563 
On the other hand, across the popular movement, a radically different sentiment 
prevailed. For the four major Haitian trade union federations, CATH/CLAT 
[Autonomous Central of Haitian Workers/Latin American Central Organization of 
Workers], FOS [Federation of Workers' Unions], and CNEH [National Federation of 
Haitian Teachers], the CNG's withdrawal of some decrees was "not sufficient to restore 
the Haitian people's confidence...not as long as all the criminals who murdered the 
children of the Haitian people remain[ed] in their posts and thus are able to repeat their 
acts at any time..."564 This would foreshadow the Election Day violence that would be 
carried out by the CNG and its allies. 
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For Max Bourjolly, Secretary General of PUCH, the way that the Army appeared 
on television, coming "forward like a political party, whose government is the National 
Government Council [CNG],"565 highlighted what was likely an ambition of the military 
to retain power despite their pronouncements to the contrary. While some of the 
presidential candidates contended that replacing the CNG as an institution might violate 
the letter of the Constitution, and others argued that it said nothing about the CNG's 
composition,566 Bourjolly argued that "it is the people who make a Constitution, and it is 
the people who unmake a Constitution...We trust them to make decisions in conformity 
with their interests as a people and also with the national interest...."567 Similarly, Evans 
Paul of KID believed "either the country belongs to the people or it belongs to the CNG. 
If the people are in agreement with the CNG, the CNG will stay. But if the people say the 
CNG must go,"568 then it is their will that must be done. In any case, they viewed the 
Constitution as a phase; "a moment in the life of the Haitian people," not "something 
fixed, definitive, untouchable,"569 that could be used to hamper the will of the people. 
As different factions within the opposition sought to offer alternatives to the 
current military-dominated CNG, again, a rift between the "politicians" and the popular 
movement appeared. Three politicians from the anti-Duvalier wing of the "responsible 	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opposition," Sylvio Claude of the Haitian Christian Democratic Party, Bernard Sansaricq 
of the Haitian People's National Party, and Yves Volel of the Christian Democratic 
Union, would come together in what they called the Coalition for the Final Struggle 
(CLF), presenting themselves as leaders of the opposition to the CNG. Their proposed 
alternative to the CNG, to be headed by 72 year-old vice president of the Court of 
Cessation, Felix Kavanagh, with Gerard Gourgue as vice-president, and retired General 
Jean-Baptist Hilaire, as the third member,570 would be countered by a proposal from the 
Group of 57. Instead, the new CNG, as conceived by the Group of 57, would be 
expanded to five members, to include representatives of the popular movement, such as 
Claudette Werleigh, head of the CARITAS swine repopulation program, to represent the 
rural sector, and Gerard Duclervil, a lay member of the Ti Legliz's development programs 
in Port-au-Prince's poor neighborhoods, to represent the democratic-religious sector. The 
other three positions would be filled by Felix Kavanagh, from the court of appeals, as 
previously called for by the CLF, one representative from the Army, and one 
representative from the human rights organizations.571 Even more critical, the Group of 
57 proposed the establishment of an interdepartmental council made up of two 
representatives from each department be formed to assist the CNG with governing. 
Representatives for this council would be chosen from amongst the multitude of 
grassroots organizations spread throughout the country.572 This proposal reflected the 	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popular movement's emphasis on integrating the grassroots organizations of the poor, 
peasant, and working classes, into the process of governing, which they had been 
traditionally excluded. 
As Sylvio Claude's attempts to take a leadership position in the movement against 
the CNG were rebuffed by the Group of 57, and the population as a whole, his 
antagonism towards the grassroots organizations would become increasingly apparent. 
Claude felt that given his long history opposing the Duvalier dictatorship, that he should 
have been the rightful leader of the popular movement. "I am saying, people of Haiti, that 
I have been fighting on your behalf since 1979...In 1982-83, I alone was standing up to 
Duvalier...I was the only opponent to the Duvalier regime. Now, you have shunted me 
aside.”573 What Claude did not understand was that the popular movement that the Group 
of 57 represented had not chosen candidates yet, nor had it officially determined its 
participation in the upcoming elections. In fact, according to Gerard Pierre Charles, "the 
people suspect politicians, and becoming a candidate is in itself a disqualification..."574 
Though not consisting of groups or leaders with much national profile, the impact of 
CONACOM and the Group of 57's role in the popular mobilization against Namphy and 
the CNG would magnify their importance as the congressional and presidential elections 
approached.575 
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Feeling that his efforts to galvanize the population against the CNG had been 
sabotaged, Claude would go on to denounce what he called the communist infiltration of 
the Group of 57, further distancing himself from the popular movement. He particularly 
resented Rene Theodore's seeming prominence within the Group of 57, as the head of the 
Unified Party of Haitian Communists, PUCH, along with a number of leftist 
organizations. Claude would contend that there were elements within the Group of 57 
that were actually seeking to preserve the CNG's dictatorship so as to foster the internal 
dissention needed for the communist to take power, a refrain that seemed to echo those of 
the CNG's Henry Namphy. He believed that the Group of 57 was preventing democracy 
from emerging in Haiti. "Communism will sow division among them so there can be a 
civil war, so the Communists can seize power...It is where there is no democracy, where 
there is a dictatorship, that it is able to take power." And thus, according to Claude, the 
Haitian people were caught between two coups, that of the CNG, or that of the 
Communists.576 And for this, the U.S. was to blame. “If they had aided the democratic 
sector, given it the logistical means, given it everything it needed to permit it to struggle" 
rather than keeping the CNG in power, leftists would not be the dominant force pressing 
for change.577 
What this conflict between Sylvio Claude and the Group of 57 revealed was the 
total detachment of the presidential candidates from the majority of the poor and working 	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class people that made up Haiti's popular movement. Rather than view the people who 
made up the popular movement as having agency in their mobilization against the CNG, 
Claude would depict them, as had Namphy and other purported power brokers, as 
children being manipulated by "agitators" or "Communists." Rather than conceiving the 
uprooting of Duvalierism and establishment of democracy in Haiti as requiring the active 
mobilization of the people across a multitude of grassroots organizations they built for 
themselves, Claude believed that U.S. actions against the CNG, and in support of the 
CEP, the political parties, the elections, and perhaps his candidacy, would lead to 
democracy. To Evans Paul of KID, it appeared that the likes of Sylvio Claude, and other 
professional politicians, simply could not "place the national interest above a desire for 
power."578 
 
DEATH AT THE POLLS 
With or without the "responsible opposition," the Group of 57 and the popular 
movement it represented would call for a 2nd phase of the general strike on July 13, 
1987. The Group of 57 called on the Haitian people, particularly the peasants and 
merchant women, to stop paying taxes and fees to the government; to "stop putting 
money into the pockets of a government that wastes the people’s money by using it to 
buy weapons for macoutes to kill people with.”579 Broadening their appeal against the 
CNG to those outside of the grassroots organizations, they called on all "the people who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
578 "Democratic Unity Attempts to Eliminate Division," Port-au-Prince Domestic Service [English 
Translation], July 14, 1987, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, July 15, 1987. 	  
579 "Opposition Calls for Strike to Resume 15 July," Port-au-Prince Domestic Service [English 
Translation], July 13, 1987, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, July 14, 1987. 	  
 
 162 
represent this CNG—meaning prefects, magistrates, commissioners information agents, 
members of the Administrative Councils for the Rural Sections" to resign from their posts 
to join the popular movement.580 They would similarly appeal to the soldiers, whom they 
argued, came from amongst the people. 
 In Port-au-Prince a slogan stated the people’s struggle is the struggle   
 of all the oppressed and all the soldiers. In Jeremie, in front of the    
 Army headquarters, the people shouted: Soldiers, you are part of the   
 people. Your parents, your brothers, your friends are of the people.   
 They suffer and struggle alongside the people. You have no right to   
 fire against the people. In Les Cayes and Jeremie, the demonstrators   
 repeated over and over: People’s Army, it is not true that the popular   
 struggle has not echo in this Army of 7,000 soldiers who earn only   
 $100 per month.581 
 
As a result of the broadening of the popular movement against the CNG, the 
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) would be allowed to publish its 129-article decree 
establishing the date of presidential elections as November 29, 1987, as well as election 
guidelines in line with the Constitution of 1987. The decree formally declared the full 
independence and autonomy of the CEP as the "supreme electoral tribunal with 
jurisdiction over the entire country," along with a number of points of particular concern 
to the "responsible opposition." The decree reduced the residency requirement to run for 
office to 1 year, allowing those recently returned from exile to participate in elections as 
candidates. In an attempt to placate the popular movement, the decrees also included a 
number of provisions intended to convince them to participate in the upcoming elections. 
The new guidelines allowed for the establishment of "brigades of poll-watchers, 
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designated for any given place agreement has been reached following consultation among 
religious, peasant, workers’, and democratic organizations."582 Furthermore, the decree 
stipulated that any candidate previously responsible for public funds would have to be 
exonerated before running for office, and most importantly, reaffirmed Article 291 of the 
Constitution of 1987, banning former Duvalierists from public office for 10 years.583 
While Sylvio Claude issued a statement saying that "nobody—no one at all—
should take the risk of organizing elections under the existing provisional National 
Government Council [CNG]," because the CNG was capable of many underhanded 
tricks, in his note, he would also emphasize that "under the Constitution, in Article 31-1, 
it says that all candidates must come from a political party.”584 Though not clear whether 
this was directed at persons within the CNG, or at the Group of 57, it did reveal that he 
still had his eye on possible elections. Conversely, the Group of 57 took an unequivocal, 
and particularly moral, position against any elections while the CNG was still in power. 
"The Group of 57 called on the population to do nothing, "not participate in elections or 
anything else—under this macoute government, which is a totally dependent flunky of a 
foreign government and which pays no attention to anything the Haitian people ask of 
it."585 According to the Group of 57, the people could not support a government that 
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would rather allow contraband in the form of "Miami Rice" to destroy Haiti's agriculture, 
and shuts down Haitian factories in the name of foreign interests, rather than promote 
true development.586 Instead, popular organizations of all stripes would mobilize their 
people to go to the streets against the CNG, and who they believed was keeping it in 
power, the United States. 
The National Federation of Haitian Students, the Committee For a Clearer Vision, 
and the Union of Port-au-Prince Students organized protests in front of the U.S. 
Consulate, where young people shouted "Down with Reagan, down with Reagan!", 
demanding that the U.S. Government stop meddling in Haitian affairs by continuing its 
support for the CNG and Namphy.587 Similar protests, linking the CNG's refusal to step 
down from power, and increased willingness to use force against the population, to the 
U.S., would be organized by other grassroots organizations. A mass rally on 
Charlemagne Peralte Square in Port-au-Prince, organized by the People’s National 
Assembly, reflected on what the July 28, 1915 start of the U.S. occupation of Haiti meant 
to the country's poor and working class masses of 1987. The rally would specifically 
highlight the complicity of "the upper class, and the too-often opportunistic middle class 
composed of intellectuals," who "threw in their lot with the Yankee Americans to exploit 
the country,"588 pointing to the actions of Haiti's current Minister of Finance and 
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Economy, Leslie Delatour, as doing the same. The People's National Assembly, 
identified closely with the Ti Legliz, would be joined by a number of other grassroots 
organizations in calling to the poor and working classes to resist now, just as they had 
resisted then during the caco rebellions of Charlemagne Peralte.589 As the tension 
between the military and protestors, particularly in the poorest communities of Port-au-
Prince and the provincial cities, escalated, they would call on the people to organize 
themselves into self-defense brigades.590 
Rejecting the notion that Haiti faced the threat of U.S. imperialism, General 
Namphy would declare the greatest threat to country at the moment to be those who 
attacked the integrity of the Haitian nation from within, committing excesses as the CNG 
sought to lead the people down the difficult path to democracy. "In these troubled times, 
when blind and unbridled passions seem to take precedence over reason, when freedom 
of speech is too often confused with verbalism and with incitement to riot, it is the 
responsibility of the Armed Forces to enforce respect for republican discipline."591 These 
statements to the Military Academy in Port-au-Prince would signal a shift towards an 
"undeclared war between the opposition and the military.”592 Increasingly, even the most 
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peaceful of demonstrations would face point-blank fire by the army.593 Throughout 
provincial cities of Les Cayes, Cap-Haitien, Jeremie, and Jacmel, the level of repression 
was even more egregious. The homes of those identified with the popular organizations, 
or even the political parties, were burned, while hundreds of others were being arrested 
without ever appearing in court. There was a fear that many may have been executed or 
disappeared.594 Amongst the most troubling incidents in this context of growing 
repression occurred in the remote rural region of Haiti's northwest, the massacre of over 
235 people from the peasant organization Tèt Kole by those affiliated with the local 
landowning elites and allies of the Duvalier regimes.595 
As the media reported on the growing repressiveness of the CNG, it also came 
under attack. On July 29, six of the country's main radio stations (Radio Antilles 
International, Radio Metropole, Radio Haiti Inter, Radio Cacique, Radio Caraibes, Radio 
Soleil), were machine-gunned because of their insistence on maintaining coverage of the 
confrontation between the popular movement and the military.596 "A newsman, whose 
care was hit by soldiers' bullets, commented last Wednesday that 'we are being harassed 
because we are in the places where action takes place and because we are the only ones, 
along with photographers, who can record civilian casualties when the Armed Forces 
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shoot.'"597 The military also intimidated foreign press, barging into the hotel rooms for 
foreign correspondents to seize their footage and documentation of military violence 
against protestors. "The soldiers were especially looking for the videotape of [an] 
incident in which the soldiers fired at demonstrators, scenes filmed and broadcast by the 
U.S. network CBS."598 Asked about the growing assaults on the press by the military, the 
CNG's Information Minister Noel would go on to state that, "the press, too, is guilty of 
misinformation...They need these [foreign] journalists to say, abroad, that we beat people, 
that we assassinated so-and-so, that so-and-so was murdered..."599 
In this new context of unbridled repression, the military increasingly targeted 
members of the opposition with either expulsion or assassination. On August 2nd, 1987, 
46-year-old founder of the Democratic Movement for Haitian Liberation (MODELH) 
party, Louis Athis, would be killed in a rural section of Leogane as he prepared for a 
meeting. Charged by local Duvalierists as a communist, "a group of people armed with 
machetes, clubs, and rocks attacked the MODELH leader." This caused a considerable 
stir since Athis was a leading member of the centrist coalition group, the Democratic 
Center, which included "Louis Dejoie, Marc Bazin, Leslie Manigat, and other leading 
candidates for the Haitian presidency...."600 The Group of 57 would suspend the strike, to 
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spare the population from suffering.601 On August 3, 1987, the CNG would expel Daniel 
Narcisse, one of the leaders of the Group of 57.602 
 
CONCLUSION 
As of the grassroots poor, peasant, and working class organizations were able to 
develop an increasingly unified national presence through the establishment of the 
umbrella group CONACOM, the political landscape in Haiti was drastically altered for 
elements of the "responsible opposition" who perhaps hoped that their prominence in 
national and international political and intellectual circles would propel them to power in 
elections managed by the CNG. As CONACOM, and later, the Group of 57, increasingly 
appeared as the most democratic political organizations at the national level, their support 
for the Constitution of 1987 became indispensible to its moral force. So, the constituent 
assembly, closely aligned with the "responsible opposition," included provisions in the 
Constitution that would give it popular legitimacy. With the population displaying 
overwhelming support for the Constitution in an internationally recognized referendum, it 
could then be used as a shield to protect these politicians from the CNG and other anti-
democratic forces, as they participated in elections.  
What the "responsible opposition" did not anticipate was the backlash that the 
CNG would show towards Article 291 of the Constitution of 1987, barring supporters of 
Duvalier from public office for 10 years. As the "responsible opposition" depended on 	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support from the U.S., that did not come, to counter the growing authoritarianism of the 
CNG, it was CONACOM and the Group of 57 that were able to challenge the CNG due 
to their strong linkages to the various grassroots organizations around the country. So, as 
the Group of 57 called for the population to escalate the mobilization against Namphy 
and the CNG, and it became clear that the "responsible opposition" could not contain the 
popular sector, the regime increasingly abandoned the minimum requirements for 
establishing polyarchy in order to push forward the manipulated elections of Duvalier 
past. The results would be the violently cancelled presidential election of November 
1987, and the subsequently rigged elections of 1988. 
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CHAPTER V. 
 
MANIGAT'S GAMBLE  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The selection of Leslie Manigat in the military-controlled elections of January 17, 
1988 reflected the determination of the Duvalierist military hierarchy, led by Henri 
Namphy, to dictate the terms and parameters of Haiti's transition to polyarchy, and the 
Reagan administration's willingness to accept this in the face of the poor and working 
classes' growing grassroots mobilization for popular democracy. 
This chapter examines efforts by the U.S. and its regional surrogates to obfuscate 
the role of the military and the CNG in orchestrating the election-day violence, framing 
the events in terms of an ideological confrontation between extremes of the left and right 
in Haiti. It specifically analyzes U.S. efforts to convince the "responsible opposition" to 
participate in the manipulated January 1988 elections, and to legitimize the short-lived 
presidency of Leslie Manigat. 
 
FINDING A MINIMAL CONSENSUS 
 Following the November 29, 1988 election-day massacre, Namphy and the 
military hierarchy sought to establish a new consensus whereby the role of Duvalierists in 
the country's political and economic life would be secured. For Namphy, "the historic 
commitment" that should have been made on November 29 could still be made. "The 
worst was not 'inescapable' because a consensus, 'even a minimal one,' [could] be 
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achieved and bare good fruit."603 To establish this minimal consensus, Namphy sought to 
shift influence within the "responsible opposition" from those that sought to align 
themselves with the mobilized population to exclude Duvalierists from political power, 
and possibly prosecute the most reprehensible supporters of the ousted regime, to 
elements within the opposition that were willing to share power alongside Duvalierists, 
particularly in a subservient position. 
 The first step in this process was to issue a decree dissolving the CEP, accusing it 
of "having set itself up as a 'supreme power'..."604 The CNG later "noted in a 
communique that the CEP [had] not been dissolved and [would] continue to exist as a 
constitutional institution,"605 but with individuals not antagonistic to the CNG or 
Duvalierists more broadly. "In contempt of the Constitution, which it continually 
violated, the provisional CNG has dismantled the CEP...to form their own CEP to hold 
their own elections."606  The nine persons appointed to the CEP would be wholly 
unfamiliar to the population, signaling their complete detachment from both the 
"responsible opposition" and the grassroots popular movement.607 "They swore to be 
totally impartial, taking no side; and to fulfill their mission with dignity, fully respecting 	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the Constitution and all dispositions of the electoral decree."608 Impartial was a code 
word for not excluding past supporters of the Duvalier regimes from running for office in 
the upcoming elections. 
 Nevertheless, the hope was to find a figure that would be palatable to the United 
States, and even perhaps segments of the "responsible opposition," without 
fundamentally threatening to the CNG and Duvalierists. So, the new CEP president made 
it clear that while "he regretted that the members of the Constitutional Assembly of 1987 
had put such an article in the Constitution because he personally did not find it fair,"609 
the CEP would "not ignore Article 291 barring fervent Duvalierists, but [would] ensure to 
apply the article properly."610 Subsequently, the most problematic Duvalierist candidates, 
like former finance minister under François Duvalier, Clovis Desinor, and former chief of 
staff, and later interior and national defense minister under François and Jean-Claude, 
Claude Raymond, would be excluded.611 "Western diplomats and many Haitians say the 
rejection of the Duvalier associates, in accordance with a constitutional provision that 
bars key figures from the dictatorship from public life for 10 years, served...to give the 
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election a measure of credibility..."612 The belief amongst the opposition was that "the 
CNG agreed to allow Article 291's application under foreign pressure..."613 
 The two most prominent of the presidential candidates to participate in the 
January 17 elections, had historical ties to the Duvalier regimes, but were in a position to 
claim to have rejected the more reprehensible aspects of these governments. Of note was 
"Hubert de Ronceray, a sociologist and former minister of Jean-Claude Duvalier who 
went over to the opposition and who is also the founder of the Mobilization for National 
Development [MDN]."614 De Ronceray argued that his party was "still the only group 
able to bridge the gap between absolute power, which is the inheritance of a former 
system, and...a dictatorship of the proletariat."615 Leslie Manigat was another to send the 
right signals to the CNG and other Duvalierists. Manigat believed that "the Army 
remain[ed] a reality you cannot get around. If you try to send the Army back to the 
barracks by force, there will be a coup d'etat or civil war," ensuring that "a harder line 
would have every chance of prevailing."616 Instead, "the Army had to be brought into the 
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democracy."617 Manigat's vision was "to democratize and modernize the Armed Forces 
and put it at the service of development."618 But, in order to do this, he believed "there 
had to be a government capable of carrying on a dialogue with the Army."619 Dialogue 
particularly meant absolving the military regime of its past crimes. "Regarding the 19 
November massacres, Manigat said that he trust[ed] the Investigating Commission 
appointed by the National Government Council (CNG) and refused to believe that the 
Army had a share of responsibility in it..."620 
 Manigat similarly positioned himself as the candidate to bridge the gap between 
democracy and Duvalierism. "Asked about de-Duvalierization, he announced that his 
government would not engage in witch-hunts."621 According to Manigat, "for 30 years, 
people had to compromise to survive."622 More importantly, he believed that the Duvalier 
regime represented a significant political line in the country's history that could not be 
ignored or pushed aside. "A political line could not just disappear overnight in a country, 
especially not in Haiti, where a particular political line dominated the political scene for 
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30 years,"623 using the example of fascism in Italy to say that he thought it normal that 
Duvalierism as an ideology should continue in Haiti.624 In his opinion "Duvalier's 
message in 1957 corresponded to something real and profound in Haiti,"625 specifically 
the noiriste position that the black majority, led in particular by the black middle, should 
direct the country's political and economic development. Manigat himself came from a 
black middle-class family of "educators and politicians," whose origins were in Haiti's 
north. His grandfather, former general and presidential candidate, would be exiled as 
ambassador to France in the late 1800s.626 He was in fact an "early supporter of the 
dictator François 'Papa Doc' Duvalier and voted for him as president in 1957."627 
However, he became disillusioned with Duvalierism as this message became deformed, 
with "the will to promote the peasantry and bring it into the mainstream of society turned 
into the exploitation of the peasant; the forces that should have been people's 
forces...transformed into repressive forces."628 Though disappointed by the Duvaliers' 
rule, he rejected vengeance against Duvalierists, and instead spoke of democratizing the 
Duvalierist line. 
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 Both De Ronceray and Manigat presented themselves as alternatives to continued 
confrontation with the Duvalierists, which they believed would lead to a more repressive 
military dictatorship, a leftist revolution, and as a result of either, an occupation by the 
United States. "Admitting that this was a calculated risk...[Manigat] felt the ballot was the 
only peaceful and rapid means of escaping the current situation."629 He asked the "people 
not to be taken in by slogans implying that to vote means to be pro-CNG," contending 
that voting in the January 1988 elections constituted a "patriotic obligation."630 This was 
framed as particularly the case in light of statements by Democratic Senator from New 
York, Patrick Moynihan, in support of "intervention in Haiti by a multinational force so 
that free elections can be held..."631 De Ronceray and Manigat sought to position 
themselves as the nationalist alternatives to elements of the "responsible opposition," like 
Louis Dejoie, who declared that "90 percent of the Haitian people would welcome an 
intervention by a multinational foreign force,"632 echoing Namphy, who claimed that the 
dismissed CEP had committed "high treason" against the Haitian people,633 for having 
invited foreigners "to meddle in Haitian domestic affairs...an affront to our dignity as a 
free and sovereign people."634 De Ronceray would call those in support of international 
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intervention, a "group of frustrated characters who cannot be president, the people who 
throughout history have always tried to sell out the country or give it away in order to 
further their personal interests or the interests of their particular group,"635 while using 
the international community's past support for dictatorship in Haiti to highlight the 
hypocrisy of the notion that this same international community would support free and 
fair elections in Haiti: 
We see they are talking to us about elections in Haiti, elections they would hold 
for us...We wonder why today international forces want to come hold elections 
for us here in Haiti, whereas when we here were fighting to get rid of the 
dictatorship, all the bigshots told us they would not intervene in the internal 
affairs of a country. Back then, they all felt that Jean-Claude Duvalier, that the 
Duvalierists, were an internal Haitian matter and they should not meddle...636 
 
 The positions of De Ronceray and Manigat, as contrasted to that of Louis Dejoie, 
stood in contrast to the grassroots movement, which rejected both military-rigged 
elections to place a pro-Duvalierist puppet in power, or elections conducted under the 
supervision of an international force to place one amongst the members of the 
"responsible opposition" in power. Instead, grassroots organizations like the APN and 
ANOP called for mass mobilization against the current regime. Pressure from the 
grassroots organizations would push the CED, which Dejoie was a member of, to issue a 
communiqué stating their position unequivocally against international intervention.637 
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ELECTIONS BY ANY MEANS 
 While U.S. military and other non-humanitarian aid was suspended, Namphy and 
the military hierarchy calculated that the Reagan administration would be willing to 
accept their "minimal consensus," allowing the Haitian military to manage the country's 
transition to a nominally elected civilian government, and to remain in the background to 
check the potential growth of a radical mass movement. "Despite evidence that elements 
of Haiti's armed forces were involved in violence that forced the cancellation of 
presidential elections, the United States [was] still looking to the military to get the 
elections back on track, Administration officials and foreign diplomats say...There [was] 
a strong belief in some circles in the Administration that the military [was] the only 
organized institution in Haiti capable of bringing about an election."638 
 So, despite the four most prominent presidential candidates639 forming a pact 
called le Comite de L'Entente Democratique (the Committee of Democratic 
Understanding, CED)640 to declare that they would boycott any elections carried out by 
the CNG, the Reagan administration hoped to convince them otherwise. To provide the 
military-run elections with some added legitimacy, "U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Caribbean Affairs Richard Holwill was quoted...as saying U.S. and other foreign 
diplomats were trying to persuade the opposition to join the elections and field a single 
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candidate."641 While Marc Bazin considered the possibility, stating that he had "no 
objections to a formula, as long as it can bring about democracy, economic progress, and 
social justice for Haiti,"642 on the opposing end within the CED would be Louis Dejoie, 
who declared Holwill's statement "inconsiderate, foolish and irresponsible."643 Dejoie felt 
that the U.S. was acting inconsistently, asking the opposition to participate in elections 
that could potentially be rigged, undermining "the valid patriotic actions taken by the 
majority of the Haitian people through its four most popular leaders..."644 
As the CED wrestled with the possibility of fielding a single candidate in the 
January 1988 elections, nearly 50 organizations of a variety of political orientations, 
including Conacom, representing hundreds of grassroots organizations throughout the 
country; CATH, CATH-CLAS, and FOS, representing Haiti's largest labor organizations; 
the Fraternity of Committed Laymen, Frala, representing the Ti Legliz; and the 
Movement of Volunteers for Free Elections in Haiti (Movelh), founded by one of the 
crafters of the Constitution of 1987, Dr. Louis Roy, "issued a message entitled Manifesto 
of the Haitian People in Favor of Democracy" declaring "invalid any election held under 
the current CNG..."645 
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Nevertheless, Gerard Philippe Auguste of the Mouvement Ouvrier Paysan (MOP) 
argued that "rather than the humiliation of asking for one form or another of foreign 
intervention or abstention--both of which are unpatriotic decisions--the MOP chooses 
conditional participation."646 At the head of Daniel Fignole's historic political party, 
rooted in the poor and working class struggle against Duvalierism, Auguste, the 64-year 
old agronomist and UN expert who lived in exile in Africa during the dictatorship, 
perhaps felt that he would be able to present himself as the most popular choice in a field 
of mostly Duvalierists. Instead, Auguste's decision to participate in the January elections 
opened a major fissure within the MOP, leading to a new breakaway party called the 
Daniel Fignole Workers and Peasants Front (Front Daniel Fignole Ouvrier-Paysan), 
which declared "that the front's members [were] not seeking any elected office at this 
time" nor "support any candidates in the coming 17 January elections."647 MOP youth 
organizations throughout the capital would make an even more forceful statement, 
declaring that macoutes had infiltrated the party, and were moving it in a direction 
counter to the legacy of its founder, Daniel Fignole, who "never allowed unscrupulous 
politicians to carry out underhanded dealings at the expense of the people."648 
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What this made clear, was that any candidate that broke away from the majority 
of the "responsible opposition" and the grassroots organizations to participate in the 
elections, would be permanently sullied politically, even Marc Bazin, who would also 
come to speak against elections. Asked whether or not the elections would be valid from 
a constitutional point of view if only 1% of the population participated, Bazin said yes, 
but not from a political point of view. "If you take the position of governing with such an 
infinitesimal fraction of the electorate, this means you have turned your back on 
democracy once and for all, that democracy is just an empty word, that the consent of the 
governed is not necessary..."649 He would even criticize the U.S. for attempting to push 
the elections forward despite their mass boycott by the population, arguing that "it looks 
to me like the Americans are perfectly willing to live with a semblance of a president, a 
semblance of an election, as long as it enables them to save face."650 The CED would 
come to issue a statement castigating any politician who agreed to take part in the CNG's 
electoral farce: 
To those who, out of frenzied ambition, inordinate pride, or naïveté   
 insist on waging, drearily, a diffident and pointless campaign we say:   
 Democracy is not built together with those who practice contempt for life;  
 nor justice with those who are greedy for privileges; nor progress with the   
 supporters of an aberrant and contemptible system which, after 30 years, is  
 synonymous with abject poverty, terror, and humiliation.651 
 
 As the Reagan administration struggled to get the CED to take part in the January 
1988 elections, and thus provide it with some semblance of legitimacy, it relied on proxy 	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governments throughout the Caribbean, particularly that of Jamaica's Edward Seaga, to 
prevent a unified regional response against the upcoming elections, and the civilian 
government to follow. Jamaica under Seaga was one of the U.S.'s closest allies in the 
Caribbean652 Upon being elected in 1980, "Seaga broke off Jamaica's diplomatic relations 
with Cuba, arguing that this was necessary to contain the spread of Cuban communist 
influence in the Caribbean. His government defended the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 
1983 on the same grounds..."653 According to the leader of St. Lucia's small left-leaning 
Progressive Labour Party (PLP), George Odlum, Jamaica's Seaga was the head of "a 
grouping of right-wing ruling political parties in the region" called the Caribbean 
Democratic Union (CDU). According to Odlum, the allure of the CDU for many 
Caribbean political figures was "the provision of funding and assistance in promoting the 
electoral politics of right wing parties with a pro-American stance. But the corollary to 
this is that the CDU is primarily concerned with advancing the geopolitical interests of 
the U.S."654 In the case of Haiti, it is important to note that Seaga's government had been 
instrumental in negotiating the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier and passing of power 
to the CNG in 1986. Seaga would attempt to play a similar role in facilitating a transition 
from the CNG to a nominally elected civilian government. 
Nearly immediately after the November 29, 1987 election-day violence, a group 
of Caribbean leaders led by Jamaica's Seaga, met in Miami, Florida to discuss how best 	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they could "assist Haiti in whatever way possible to establish a firm time-table for 
elections...[and] to establish contact with the Government of Haiti to offer support for the 
holding of new elections..."655 The group, which included John Compton of St. Lucia, 
Dom Martina of the Netherlands Antilles, Henny Eman of Aruba, and representatives 
from St. Vincent and the Grenadines, came to call themselves the Group of Concerned 
Caribbean Leaders (the CCL). Jamaica's Seaga and St. Lucia's Compton, who had been 
principal backers of the U.S.'s 1983 invasion of Grenada, rejected the need for U.S. 
military action in Haiti outright. Instead, the Caribbean leaders would issue a 
communiqué after the meeting stating that, "the cancellation of the Haitian election could 
be attributed to as many motives as there were interest groups,"656 thus treating the 
election-day violence as if it were the result of confrontation between equally complicit 
factions. A week later, as the CCL met with Namphy, Seaga "rejected the culpability of 
the military," stating that, "from the information his group had, it was not true to say that 
the army terrorized people. One of two units might have been involved...but that does not 
make the army as a whole culpable..."657 In fact, Seaga and his group of Caribbean 
leaders welcomed Namphy's announcement of new elections, claiming that he "promised 
adequate security for the poll..."658 During their visit to Haiti, the CCL would not meet 
with any of the former leading presidential candidates of the cancelled November 1987 	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elections, who were organizing themselves to boycott the new January 1988 elections. 
Seaga hoped that perhaps if the composition of the new electoral council were fair, their 
attitude towards the elections would change.659 
Seaga and the CCL would play a central role in preventing the emergence of a 
unified Caribbean Community (CARICOM) response to the CNG's efforts to manipulate 
the upcoming elections. At the January 6 CARICOM meeting in Barbados, a five-
member Haitian delegation led by Louis Dejoie and Jean-Claude Bajeux of the 
democratic opposition struggled to attain a Caricom consensus condemning the CNG as a 
first step towards an international trade embargo against the regime, and as a last resort, 
support for an international peacekeeping force to facilitate the transition to an elected 
civilian government.660 Instead of a pledge from CARICOM that it would not recognize 
any government chosen in the fraudulent January 17 elections, the conference mostly 
stalled in procedural debates regarding whether the meeting would be recognized as a 
formal CARICOM meeting, or one of concerned Caribbean leaders.661 Dejoie, one of the 
Haitian delegates present at the meeting, would point to the role that the Jamaican Prime 
Minister played in tying up the entire process.662 According to Academician Paul La 
Tortue, "there was a struggle by Jamaica to 'take over'...[the] meeting and promote a U.S. 
point of view of the Haitian situation. He also alluded to the presence in Barbados of U.S. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
659 Ibid. 	  
660 "Meeting on Haiti Begins; Haitians Attend," Kingston Domestic Service, January 6, 1988, Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America, January 7, 1988. 	  
661 "Dejoie Statement," Bridgetown CANA [English Translation], January 6, 1988, Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America, January 11, 1988. 	  
662 "Haitian Opposition View," Bridgetown CANA [English Translation], January 7, 1988, Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America, January 11, 1988. 	  
 
 185 
deputy assistant secretary of state for Caribbean affairs, Richard Holwill whom he said 
had 'come out of the blue'..."663 
The communiqué that would emerge from the January CARICOM meeting, while 
expressing concern about the upcoming Haiti elections, simply would not call for their 
cancelation or postponement, as demanded by the Haitian delegation. Instead, 
CARICOM called "on the CNG, the CEP, the Church, the candidates and others that 
exercise authority and influence to open a process of dialogue immediately with a view to 
reducing differences and hostilities, and ensuring that Haiti does not lose this opportunity 
to commence the process of joining the family of democratic nations and establishing the 
international goodwill which can be the springboard for its future development."664 
Essentially, Seaga was able to ensure that no new sanctions were levied against Haiti, that 
foreign military intervention was taken completely off the table, and that emphasis would 
be placed on ensuring that elections were carried out in Haiti, as close to free and fair as 
the CNG would allow. Seaga was quoted as telling diplomats that "the Caribbean leaders 
were originally eager to threaten sanctions against Haiti. However...the head took 
ascendancy over the heart based on their taking into account the stark realities and 
practicalities of the Haitian situation."665 
Speaking as vice president of the Socialist International (SI), former Jamaican 
Prime Minister, Michael Manley, would accuse the Caribbean leaders of engaging in 	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extreme cynicism as concerned the Haiti crisis, and called on the international 
community to unequivocally repudiation the January 17 elections. Manly particularly 
rejected "the suggestion implicit in the Caricom conference that bad elections [were] 
better than no elections," viewing such a position as "contemptuous of democracy and the 
Haitian people..."666 Whether or not the elections carried out be the CNG were moving 
the country towards democracy would not be determined by Haitians within Haiti, neither 
the political parties or the grassroots organizations, but by influential politicians in the so-
called international community. The group of Concerned Caribbean Leaders (CCL) 
would answer Namphy's invitation to observe the January 17 elections.667 Similar 
invitations would be sent to the Organization of American States, the Organization of 
African Unity, the European Community, and the United Nations,668 as the majority of 
Haitians spoke their piece by staying home. 
 
MANIGAT, MAN OF THE MOMENT 
 On January 24, 1988, Leslie Manigat would be declared president of Haiti with 
50.29 percent,669 after an election in which some estimate that as little as 2 percent of the 
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population participated,670 and most deemed fraudulent. Asked about whether the low 
turnout would have an impact on the legitimacy of his government, Manigat asserted that 
"an election was valid merely if it was held and if anyone voted. If there were 
imperfections in the voting, he said, that was to be expected in a country where 
democracy was unknown,"671 echoing the sentiments expressed prior to the elections by 
Jamaica's Seaga. Manigat would contend that while irregularities did occur, they "did not 
occur with a view to favoring one candidate or another in the final result...Irregularities 
occurred, as they occur anywhere in the world; but these irregularities did not affect the 
electoral process itself."672 After the elections "the State Department issued a carefully 
understated rejection...of the legitimacy of the elections...but said that the United States 
would deal with whatever government emerges..."673 
 Namphy and the military hierarchy selected Leslie Manigat as the civilian they 
would entrust with the presidency following the January 17 elections because he could be 
sold to the international community, Haiti's principle institutions, and even the 
"responsible opposition" as respectable and competent. Manigat was described, "of the 11 
candidates running in the second election," as having "by far the most impressive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
670 "CED Declaration," Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network [English Translation], January 19, 1988, 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America, January 20, 1988. 	  
671 Joseph B. Treaster, "A Paradox for Haiti's Presidency: Leslie Francois Manigat," New York Times, 
January 25, 1988. 	  
672 "Manigat Interviewed on U.S. Relations," Port-au-Prince Le Petit Samedi Soir [English Translation], 
January 6-29, 1988, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America, 
February 4, 1988. 	  
673 David K. Shipler, "U.S. Calls Haiti Voting 'Clouded' but Vows to Work With Winner," New York Times, 
January 20, 1988. 	  
 
 188 
credentials."674 He hoped that though the elections were not held under ideal conditions, 
perhaps the United States would come to recognize that he had the right pedigree.  
According to Manigat, "the United States finally realized that, in the final analysis...the 
path taken is the proper path...especially since, basically, Washington knows who we 
are."675 Though he was not Marc Bazin, Manigat believed that as someone known in 
intellectual and political circles in the U.S. and internationally, he could not be dismissed. 
"Of course, we are not as well-known as the man they formerly preferred," stated 
Manigat, "but it is certain that we are known...through our international relations, our 
career...I was part of American academic institutions for a long time---either in the 
universities or at centers like the Woodrow Wilson center, where I was a member of the 
Academic Council for 8 years."676 Jamaica’s Seaga, whose government was amongst the 
first in the region to recognize the new Haitian president,677 would also tout Manigat’s 
prestigious academic career, having taught in France at the Sorbonne, at the University of 
the West Indies, and recently, at the Simon Bolivar University in Venezuela, as a sign 
that he was worthy of international support.678 The hope was that these credentials would 
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create a "favorable prejudice" towards his government, in spite of the flawed the process 
in which he came to power. 
While the events of November 29, 1987, and the subsequent January 17, 1988 
rigged elections, led Democrats in the U.S. Congress to propose an economic blockade 
against the new government, the Reagan administration and the other international 
stakeholders preferred Manigat to the possibility of an openly leftist government.679 
Nevertheless, they were hesitant to give their enthusiastic support for the Manigat 
government. For State Department spokesman, Charles E. Redman, while the U.S. 
Government was "gratified" that the January 17 elections were free of the violence that 
characterized the previous attempt at elections, the quality of the election process did not 
allow it "to put Haiti in the category of countries that have completed a transition to 
democracy."680 Instead, they relied on regional surrogates to frame Manigat's election as 
a step in the right direction. Dominica's Prime Minister, Eugenia Charles, would declare 
her willingness to meet with Haiti's newly elected president, asserting that it would be 
wrong for Caricom to accept the suggestion from some of its members that ties be cut off 
with the new government, "saying she couldn't see how such a step could be justified 
when Caricom maintained relations with former President for Life Jean Claude 'Baby 
Doc' Duvalier."681 For Charles, "at least Mr. Manigat had a portion of the people of Haiti 
say they want him as their leader."682 	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According to Secretary of State George P. Shultz, "while the democratic transition 
that the United States had hoped for in Haiti had not succeeded, it had 'not failed 
either.'"683 U.S. Government officials would establish a number of criteria to evaluate 
whether or not the Manigat government was indeed moving in the right direction. These 
included whether his government was able to operate as "a truly independent and 
responsible organ, rather than just a front for the military"; whether it was clear that his 
intent was to use the flawed elections of January 17 as "a way station to a more 
democratic form of government"; whether he would allow the opposition to operate 
freely; and the extent to which he tried to "bring a broad spectrum of political 
representation into his government."684 Even prior to his selection in the January 17 
elections, the State Department viewed Leslie Manigat's candidacy in positive terms, 
particularly noting his pledge to form a "national unity cabinet that would include a broad 
political spectrum."685 
As Manigat took the U.S.'s "wait and see" attitude as a sign of tacit support, he 
subsequently shifted his focus towards actively recruiting members of "responsible 
opposition" to support his government. Though Manigat had once worked in François 
Duvalier's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he came from amongst the "responsible 
opposition." After serving in the Duvalier government for a few years, Manigat quickly 
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fell from grace, accused of having organized a student strike, and was imprisoned for two 
months, after which he went into exile in 1963, becoming one of the more outspoken 
critics of the regime for 23 years.686 Alongside his academic pursuits in exile, Manigat 
would also come to establish the Assembly of Progressive National Democrats 
(Rassemblement des Démocrates Nationaux Progressistes, or RDNP), with links to the 
emerging Christian Democratic parties throughout the region. Manigat was thus very 
much a member of Haiti's political class. Manigat's first initiative upon coming to power 
was to "once again offer a hand to the opposition,"687 declaring that his government 
would be based on dialogue and consensus, drawing from his experience observing 
Venezuelan democracy firsthand.688 Ironically, Manigat would call on the opposition to 
"respect the rules of the democratic game" and take on their proper role "not to overthrow 
governments but rather to criticize the government, with a view to winning the next 
elections and prodding the government in power to accomplish things."689 
 Many would begin calling on Haiti's institutions, the media, the Church, and 
particularly, the opposition parties, to give Manigat a chance. They argued that Manigat 
was a capable and competent democrat who could lead the country in the right direction 
if the opposition would act responsibly rather than play the role of obstructionists. Former 
CNG Minister of Information, Gerard Noel, would send an open letter to the Episcopal 	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Conference of Haiti, the Catholic Church hiearchy in Haiti, asking it "to designate Msgr 
Joseph Lafontant, the auxiliary bishop of Port-au-Prince, as a kind of mediator, so he can 
see if he can get the opposition and the new government together through negotiations 
and dialogue."690 The Anglican Orthodox Church in Haiti would publish a statement also 
supporting such reconciliation between Manigat and the opposition. The Anglican 
Church believed that, never in its history did Haiti have such an opportunity or such 
potential for democracy. It argued that at this moment in time, Haiti had, "on the one 
hand, a superb democratic accord, made up of structured political parties, with, at their 
heads, men of exceptional intellectual, moral, and patriotic qualities," in the CED and the 
four former presidential candidates, "and on the other hand, a political party and its leader 
possessing these same qualities which have come to power," in Manigat and the 
RDNP.691 The Anglican Church hoped that the CED would organize itself into a 
"constructive opposition" for the new government, while giving it time to prove itself.692 
 Even politicians who boycotted the January 17 elections because they violated the 
Constitution of 1987 began to call for dialogue and reconciliation. This was the position 
of Thomas Desulme, leader of the National Labor Party (PNT), who believed that the 
country found itself having to choose between "a sterile hardening of line...with its 
foreseeable--and unforeseeable--consequences for national sovereignty and its destructive 
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effects on our already so precarious economic and social structures; and a realistic and 
pragmatic attitude..."693 Desulme believed that the stated intentions of Manigat and his 
political party, the RDNP, should not be minimized, considering their declared support 
for civil liberties and policies to uplift the peasant and working classes. He called for a 
truce, to allow the political parties to better organize themselves, so that they can play a 
greater role in facilitating civic education throughout Haiti.694 Eventually, the members of 
the CED began to oblige. 
 While they maintained that the January 17 elections were "an unconstitutional and 
undemocratic farce" and did "not for the time being envision any collaboration with the 
future government," the four members of the Committee for Democratic Agreement 
[CED] pledged to "serve as constructive and loyal opposition groups to the new president 
as long as the new president exhibited a will to establish a true democracy in Haiti."695 
Though it was sad for Louis Dejoie to see Manigat come to power in such an illegal 
fashion, he felt the fact that the Army was no longer in power was a positive. More 
importantly, Dejoie felt that this was the first time in history that Haiti had such a 
"highly-intelligent" and "capable" president, and thus declared that his party would not 
engage in subversive opposition.696 Bazin similarly rejected being part of "a totally 
negative opposition, which constantly criticizes everything and never approves of 	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anything," instead calling on the opposition to be "sober" and "responsible."697 Serge 
Gilles of the National Concerted Action Front (FNC), the banner under which Gerard 
Gourgue ran for president, also called for his party to "structure and organize itself so it 
can be a modern and serious opposition group in Haiti."698 
 After securing nominal support from the "responsible opposition," Manigat began 
working on winning over the country's private sector. On January 27, Manigat would 
meet with 30 of the country's most prominent merchants, businessmen, and industrialists 
at his home699 in order to "get acquainted" and "establish trust" between the government 
and the private sector.700 According to Manigat, the private sector would be essential to a 
process of "integrated economic development for the population," which he deemed 
essential to "social integration."701 While in his inauguration speech, Manigat assured the 
private sector that "the freedom of enterprise [was] inseparable from his concept of 
democracy,"702 he stressed to the urban and rural poor that "because of the seriousness of 
the economic crisis...the arrival of the new administration 'does not mean abundance in 	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the near future but, on the contrary, a progressive austerity to work for a better 
tomorrow.'"703 National reconciliation under Manigat was thus to be built around 
cooperation between a nominally popular "responsible opposition" and civilian 
government that came to power in elections rigged by a Duvalierist military, which 
promises to work in the service of the private sector, while the poor and working class are 
instructed to wait for these policies to bear fruit. 
 
APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE 
 While initially Manigat accepted Namphy and the military hierarchy's "minimal 
consensus," as he received positive signs of support from the international community, 
Haiti's private sector, and segments of "the responsible opposition," he began advocating 
more aggressively for a reformist agenda. To communicate this agenda, Manigat would 
inaugurate a series of radio and television broadcasts called Koze An Ba Tonel Avek Pep 
La, or "A Friendly Chat with the Haitian People," where twice a month, he would speak 
directly to the Haitian people about the progress being made by his government.704 
According to Manigat, "the country had been going in the wrong direction for the past 30 
years. For 30 years, problems were left to accumulate, and bad habits took root in the 
country."705 As a result of this legacy, "abnormality" became engrained in the Haitian 
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government as the norm. So, despite believing that it was necessary to maintain dialogue 
with the Duvalierists, he also found it "normal that, when affecting a revolution, a 
change, at the end of a dictatorship, in making the transition to democracy, you make a 
profound critique of the dictatorship."706 Manigat thus felt that his mandate was to reform 
a government that "had been set up to benefit a particular category of people" and have it 
"serve the entire Haitian people, particularly, those with the greatest need."707 
 For Manigat, this meant shifting the emphasis of gaining access to state power 
away from self-enrichment towards doing work for the public, and thus transforming 
government ministries into "instruments for the policy of social justice and 
modernization," and most importantly, democracy.708 One of the first steps Manigat took 
to emphasize he did not seek government power in order to enrich himself or those 
around him, was to restructure the salary scale, to "take the salaries being paid out by the 
government and try to make them more socially just."709 While Manigat did not deny that 
there were those who deserved high salaries, he argued that they were living "in Haiti---
not in the United States or in France," and that Haiti was a poor country, so those 
working for the public needed "to live within [their] means."710 Moreover, his 
government would not lower the salaries of anyone making below $1,000 a month, 
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promising to raise these salaries as the country's economy began growing again, thus 
reducing "the gap between big and small salaries."711 
 Manigat also pointed to the need to address corruption and graft in government. 
He announced that his government expected stealing from the state to stop, framing his 
anti-corruption stance in social justice terms. According to Manigat, money stolen from 
the state was "the people's money...paid in taxes...from the people's production," "money 
that could have been used to serve the people...to build the roads, schools, dispensaries, 
and hospitals that we need."712 Manigat made increasingly more desperate overtures to 
members of the "responsible opposition" as he faced resistance to his reforms. He called 
on them to take courage, to take a stand, to take initiative, against this legacy of 
corruption in government. "If they leave the field to dishonest people and scoundrels; if 
they allow people in the habit of stealing to continue in the forefront, to surround the 
government, to surround the ministries, they will have only themselves to blame," 
Manigat declared. "Since they know for sure the government now is competent, honest, 
and serious, people who are competent, honest, and serious must support the government. 
They must step up to the foreground."713 
 What would escalate the confrontation between the partisans of the old regime 
and the Manigat government further was its efforts to stop contraband in order to increase 
customs duties. He argued that when his administration came to power, it found the 
government in very poor financial shape, primarily because "the money the government 
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expected to receive from two fundamental sectors, customs and income taxes..." was not 
being adequately collected.714 Therefore, the Manigat government established an anti-
smuggling task force and inspection brigades to monitor activity at the International 
Airport and provincial ports in order to reduce the occurrence of false shipping 
manifestos, phony invoices, bribery, and other measures used to avoid paying proper 
customs dues. Again, these measures would be justified within a framework of social 
justice. What those who sought to avoid paying customs dues and taxes needed to 
understand, Manigat argued, was that, "when you pay taxes, you are helping the 
government open schools, build hospitals, dig irrigation canals, and do what needs to be 
done in the country so that we can truly embark upon the path of development."715 
 While Manigat pursued his reformist agenda, he failed to appropriately appreciate 
the reality that he was placed in power by the military in order to preserve the status quo, 
so as not to threaten the fundamental interests of Duvalierists and those who benefit from 
their access to state power. From the very start, Reverend Allan Kirton of the Caribbean 
Conference of Churches (CCC) warned that it would be nearly impossible for Manigat to 
deliver on his campaign promises to the population. For one, the presidency had been 
fundamentally weakened in the new Constitution of 1987, with power shifted to the 
parliament, which was now dominated by Duvalierists who held 80 percent of the 
seats.716 The power of the Duvalierists was also preserved throughout the countryside, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
714 Ibid. 	  
715 "Measures to Fight Contraband Smuggling Praised," Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale [English 
Translation], April 1, 1988, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America, 
April 25, 1988. 	  
716 "CCC Leader on Haiti's Political Situation," Bridgetown CANA [English Translation], February 24, 
1988, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America, February 25, 1988. 
 
 199 
results of the January 31st CASEC (Administrative Councils for the Communal Sections) 
elections were never released.717 According to the Komite Tet Ansanm pou Hone, Respe, 
Konstitisyon an (the Cooperative Action Committee for the Respect of the Constitution), 
"without the Casecs, there are no municipal assemblies, no departmental assemblies, no 
interdepartmental council, and no Permanent Electoral Council, and thus, no 
decentralization, no participation, and no democracy..."718 So, though Manigat was 
president, most of Haiti's representative institutions were either filled with Duvalierists, 
or were not allowed to operate. 
 As the Manigat government called for reform, increasingly the powerful utilized 
Duvalier-era tactics to reassert their control over the poor and working class. In April, as 
a labor dispute escalated between workers and management, soldiers from Fort Dimanche 
would be sent to the Omnicron factory to reestablish order. 719 Haiti's largest labor 
federations, CATH, FOS, and CNEH, would write to the government's Social Affairs 
Minister to declare that "the presence of soldiers armed to the teeth" in Haiti's factories 
was "designed to intimidate workers and arbitrarily repress their legitimate demands, as 
well as destroy the union movement."720 They also rejected the use of the Duvalierist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
717 "Communal Sections on Official Election Results," Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale [English 
Translation], March 8, 1988, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America, 
March 9, 1988. 	  
718 "Action Committee Calls for New Elections," Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole [English Translation], 
April 25, 1988, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America, April 27, 
1988. 	  
719 "Mill Workers Return; More Labor Conflicts Noted," Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network [English 
Translation], April 14, 1988, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, April 15, 1988. 	  
720 "Unions Address Minister on Rights Violations," Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network [English 
Translation], April 26, 1988, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America, 
April 28, 1988. 
 
 200 
labor code to declare strikes at the Minoterie d'Haiti and Ciment d'Haiti illegal, 
emphasizing that the Constitution of 1987 recognized the people's right to strike.721  
 In the provinces, the return to Duvalierism was particularly pronounced. 
According to PUCH's Rene Theodore, "a series of little chiefs" were reappearing across 
the country, in places like "Les Cayes, where the prefect has said people cannot form 
associations without authorization from him; or in Thiotte, where a communal magistrate 
has said people may not report news over the radio regarding his area without 
authorization."722 Increasingly, the specter of another Jean-Rabel massacre loomed ever-
present in the northwest as peasant organizations, determined to assert their rights to form 
peasant associations, were labeled communists and threatened by the local section chief 
and regional commander.723 
 More problematic still, was the shadow the military continued to cast over 
Manigat's government. Henri Namphy, prior to the cancelled November 1987 elections, 
had "named himself head of the armed forces for three years more, a move that worried 
some in Haiti because the Constitution gives the President the power to appoint the 
Commander in Chief."724 Also, in an attempt to maintain the support of the military high 
command, Manigat appointed Major General Williams Regala the Minister of Interior 	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and National Defense.725 And, even more troubling, Manigat faced the threat of Colonel 
Jean-Claude Paul, unspoken leader of the Tonton Macoutes and commander of the 
notorious Dessalines Battalion,726 whose barracks adjoined the Presidential Palace and 
stored all the ammunition for the Haitian army. Paul was rumored to be responsible for 
orchestrating the November 1987 election-day massacre,727 and accused by the U.S. of 
drug trafficking.728 According to Kirton of the CCC, while Manigat inherited an empty 
treasury, the Haitian Army was flush with cash as a result of its involvement in drug 
trafficking.729 It was also believed that the military was heavily involved in the growing 
contraband trade.730 
 As insecurity increased in Port-au-Prince and the provinces, it became clear that 
the Manigat government was trapped in a particularly precarious situation. On the one 
hand, slogans increasingly hostile to the Manigat government and in support of the Army 
began to appear "written on paper and affixed to walls" across the country.731 On the 
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other hand, the government was entirely dependent on the military to contain the 
escalating criminal activity and destabilization campaign being carried out by armed 
civilians likely connected with macoute forces resurgent in the aftermath of the 
November 29 election-day massacre. It was not clear whether the growing number of 
night robberies, shootings, and murders were simply the result of worsening economic 
conditions, or politically motivated, particularly as these groups were able to avoid 
apprehension by the police.732 Complicating the nature of these events even further, were 
reports that often these acts were being carried out by armed "men wearing military 
uniforms."733 
While he acknowledged his campaign promise of national reconciliation, Manigat 
would also make note on national television, that those who benefited from this policy 
"should not forget that a certain regime was in fact overthrown on 7 February 1986---and 
for very specific reasons."734 According to Manigat, "they were in fact spurned by the 
Haitian people for having killed and stolen and for having gotten this country into the 
condition it is in today."735 Having been rejected by the people, Manigat declared that it 
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would be unreasonable to reestablish this kind of regime in Haiti again, particularly 
through the violence and criminality being carried out on the streets of Port-au-Prince. 
For Manigat, the country had turned the page, and was now writing "a new history on a 
new and virgin page."736 Only twenty-four hours after Manigat ushered that warning, 
"gunmen in a moving car...opened fire on pedestrians in downtown Port-au-Prince," 
killing one and injuring several others.737 
 To counter the growing threat against his government from the reactionary groups 
he aligned himself with to gain the presidency, Manigat would increasingly attempt to 
build support amongst the poor and working class, including the common soldiers. The 
"People's Houses" would be one such initiative targeted to the poor. According to 
Manigat, through a bilateral aid program, Venezuelan soldiers and engineers would work 
closely with the Haitian Army to produce low-cost homes, not only for poor civilians, but 
also for members of the Haitian military. This would "illustrate the Army's new role and, 
at the same time, the new concept of society, to show that we are not starting off on the 
basis of division between the civilians and the military."738 Manigat would also highlight 
a French cooperation program where 40 to 50 villages would be chosen for the 
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installation of solar-powered lights and television sets.739 Despite successes cobbling 
together "$4 million worth of aid from Taiwan, 5 million Deutsche marks from the FRG, 
and $1 million from France," Manigat could not put together a significant enough 
development policy without the $60 million in aid being withheld by the U.S. as a result 
of continued Congressional rejection of the September 17 elections, along with "$20 
million from the World Bank and $17 million from the IMF still pending."740 Without 
enough international aid to build a coalition amongst Haiti's poor and working class, 
Manigat would offer Haiti's peasant majority the one thing that they always coveted, 
access to government land. 
 Manigat's offer of land reform was particularly salient at a moment when the 
peasantry was mobilizing politically to resist the rural power structures that historically 
exploited them. Increasingly, peasants across the country rejected the escalating costs of 
leasing state-owned land. According to the peasants in the southeast, just prior to fall of 
Jean-Claude in February 1986, the cost to rent a carreau [1.29 hectares] of public land 
was about 47 gourdes. In the two years since, they were expected to pay 350 to 600 
gourdes for the same carreau of land.741 Peasant groups levied similar complaints 
throughout the provinces. In the Central Plateau, "everyone you meet talks to you about 
the cost of leasing land from the government," but also the fact that there are no schools, 	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clean drinking water, or dispensaries in their rural communities.742 In La Gonave, "the 
peasants feel it is their duty to pay their leases...so there will be money in the state coffers 
for development. However...nothing is ever done for their villages with the money 
collected from them."743 In Les Cayes, the peasants cried that while "they pay a lot of 
money," to grow on government land, "they have no water with which to irrigate, and if it 
doesn't rain, they lose their harvests."744 Worse still, according to the peasants, was that 
the powerful and wealthy, who could afford to pay the high costs of the lease, were often 
given advantages and paid less.745 Rather than address the concerns of the small peasants, 
powerful local officials threatened to seize and sell the land of families who had been 
leasing from the government "from generation to generation, for 30, 40, and even 50 
years," should they fail to pay their lease for even a week.746 As they were threatened 
with eviction, peasants across the country declared that they were refusing to pay their 
rents and taxes until they were lowered to more reasonable rates, the government 
provided services to their communities, and they were allowed to freely choose their local 
government representatives. Peasants in Hinche declared that anyone who tried "to evict 	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them without giving them a better place to move to [would] face trouble"747 Similarly in 
Maissade, they hoped no one would use force against the peasant population of the areas 
"because if anyone were to employ violence, everyone would rise up and counter such 
violence."748 
On May 1st, Labor Day, Manigat would announce his plan for agrarian reform 
based on "jointly-owned, cooperative rural properties." His government would grant 
nontransferable and indivisible portions of state lands to groups of peasants to work and 
share the profits from in common. These rural cooperatives would be given "priority 
technical support from the state and agricultural credit on privileged conditions," as well 
as support from various government ministries, with the view of modernizing Haitian 
agriculture. According to Manigat, this plan was closely compatible with demands for 
land reform found in the Constitution of 1987.749 
Through this announced land reform, Manigat hoped that he could generate 
enough support for his government that the popular organizations would send the masses 
out in the streets to serve as a counterforce against the threat of a coup d’état by the 
military. Nevertheless, the month of May would be characterized by an escalation in the 
level of insecurity, with over 20 people shot and killed by roving groups of armed men. 
"Mr. Manigat said the climate of insecurity was created by social violence resulting from 
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an improper distribution of wealth, as well as by political violence, which he says is due 
to nostalgia for power, meaning people thirsting for power, people who would like to 
hold onto power but who lost it."750 Again, out of a sense of growing desperation, the 
Manigat government would appeal to the popular organizations by announcing a new 
security plan, which called for "the controlled reorganization of neighborhood 
committees and vigilance brigades...not with a free hand like before, but rather in 
compliance with an overall plan drawn up jointly by the minister of justice and the 
police..."751 The public would also be called upon to cooperate with his government in 
identifying people and cars deemed suspicious.752 
Vigilance committees and brigades throughout the country, such as the National 
Haitian People's Cooperative Action Group, Movement of Democratic Organizations, 
Committee for Vigilance Against Evildoers, and the Veteran Haitian Servicemen's 
Association, instantly denounced Manigat's security plan. They asked the president 
whether he wanted to create vigilance brigades or develop new macoute units.753 Similar 
sentiments were echoed by Sylvio Claude's PDCH, who rejected the notion that the 
current insecurity gave the Manigat government justification to "create an institution 
paralleling the constitutional forces," measures it deemed reminiscent of how François 
Duvalier's tonton macoutes and Jean-Claude's Service d'Information (SD) came into 
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existence.754 The Federation of Neighborhood Committees and Associations (Fedka) 
viewed Manigat's call to integrate the vigilance brigades into the government "an attempt 
to make the people think that the government and the Army are not the ones responsible 
for the current insecurity in Haiti."755 Particularly damning were statements issued by the 
Women's Committee for the Liberation of Haiti, who asked Manigat, where was he when 
the military was "brutally dismantling the vigilance brigades" in order to "prevent the 
people's election from being held?"756 These vigilance committees would call on others 
like themselves to resist being co-opted at all costs. "Do not forget the circumstances 
under which you came into being," they declared. "We will not work with any 
government to which we have not accorded legitimacy."757 
 
THE CHARADE ENDS 
Having failed to recruit the people's organizations to defend his government from 
the threat posed by the military and the roving bands of armed macoutes, Manigat would 
attempt to manipulate an impending conflict between the two most prominent figures 
within the Haitian Army, Lieutenant General Henri Namphy, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army, and Colonel Jean-Claude, head of the Dessalines Battalion, to oust the former 
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head of the CNG. Manigat would turn to the Constitution of 1987, which was violated to 
assure his presidency, in order to claim civilian control over Haiti's armed forces. 
On June 14, 1988, General Namphy would summon Colonel Paul and nine other 
officers separately to give them new assignments. Paul in particular was to be reassigned 
to the Army General Headquarters, and named assistant head of the General Staff. 
"Haitians in close contact with the armed forces...said Colonel Paul returned to his office 
behind the palace and told Mr. Manigat by telephone that he wished to remain as 
commander of the Dessalines Battalion," after which, "Manigat reportedly pledged his 
support for Colonel Paul,"758 who subsequently barricaded himself inside the Dessalines 
barracks, leading to a crisis within Haiti's armed forces. This was the first sign of major 
fractures within the military since it emerged as the dominant political institution 
following Jean-Claude's departure in February 1986. Paul's soldiers would declare that 
they would "not have Col. Paul leave the Dessalines Barracks" but would "either live or 
die with Col. Paul," calling on Namphy to just keep his communiqué.759 Manigat would 
subsequently issue his own, rescinding the military transfers ordered by Namphy, stating 
that "all decisions in connection with the reshuffle were made without the prior 
knowledge of the president of Haiti, who is constitutionally the head of the Haitian 
Armed Forces, even though he does not command them personally."760 Its final words 
called on Namphy to stay the transfers in order to avoid a crisis. 	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While initially rumored that Namphy was planning to use the Leopards Corps and 
other troops to force Paul out of the Dessalines barracks,761 the Haitian Armed Forces 
High Command would issue a statement rescinding the transfer orders, "reaffirm[ing] the 
institution's unreserved loyalty to the nation's government within the framework of the 
dispositions of the Constitution and the law..."762 Manigat would frame the crisis as "a 
democratic learning experience," whereby the "civilian government and the military 
institution have together and in concert given the nation a lesson in patriotism and 
democracy," which made him "optimistic about the future of democracy in Haiti..."763 
For many observers of the standoff, Manigat's actions were a significant departure 
from the cautious obsequiousness he had displayed towards the military since taking part 
in the rigged January elections. Some speculated that perhaps Manigat sought to make a 
deal with Colonel Jean-Claude Paul, not to extradite him to the United States where he 
was being indicted for involvement in drug trafficking, in return for his support against 
Namphy and other officers who were particularly antagonistic towards his government. 
Utilizing the momentum from what turns out to be a pyrrhic victory, Manigat would 
retire Namphy and his supporters from the Army, declaring that it was the president's 
duty as constitutional head of the Haitian Armed Forces to "reestablish the hierarchy so 
as to open the way to democratization and modernization and place the Armed Forces at 
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the service of the nation..."764 Manigat's attempt to reform the country's Armed Forces 
would be sweeping, targeting 37 officers from throughout the high command, the 
Presidential Guard, provincial and district posts, and the police. The changes also 
included the retirement of Colonel Gregoire Figaro, chief of police of the Port-au-Prince, 
believed to be connected to the insecurity rampant throughout the capital; the transfer of 
Colonel Prosper Avril, former member of the CNG, out of the Presidential Guard to a 
staff position; and Captain Ernest Ravix, district commander of St. Marc, believed to be 
in charge of contraband smuggling in the region. In fact, "most of the country's district 
military chiefs, majors and captains who...dominated provincial and rural areas with 
almost dictatorial powers, were to be transferred to powerless staff jobs or to other 
districts far from their current posts."765 
Less than 48 hours later, Namphy would convince commanders Colonel Prosper 
Avril and Major Henri-Robert Augustin of the Presidential Guard, as well as Major Marc 
Charles of the Leopards Corps, to break him out of house arrest and orchestrate a coup 
against President Manigat.766 Leading the Presidential Guard's armored units, the only 
armored units in the country, Namphy would force Colonel Paul and his Dessalines 
Battalion to surrender. Forced into exile, Manigat declared that Namphy and his 
supporters overthrew his government because they were involved in corruption, 
smuggling, and insecurity, and thus resented his government. "Namphy had not been 	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willing to stand by and watch certain friends of his, whom he himself had put in a number 
of key positions in the public administration and who were corrupt, be fired."767 Manigat 
also claimed that Namphy supporter, Captain Ernest Ravix, military commander of Saint-
Marc, was responsible for orchestrating an armed protest by the local population against 
efforts by his government to install a customs director. He believed that the military was 
directly involved in smuggling vehicles into the country, conducting inspections inside 
the military barracks themselves.768 The ousted president also claimed that the 
confrontation between Colonel Jean-Claude Paul and Namphy was due to the arrest of 11 
bandits by the Dessalines Barracks soldiers. Manigat believed that elements of the 
military affiliated with Namphy were directly responsible for the climate of insecurity 
being generated during his 4 months in power. "On several occasions, the government 
was shocked to discover that the people carrying out these actions were members of the 
Armed Forces or Criminal Investigations Department detectives."769 Just as Colonel Paul 
was beginning to uncover the network of criminals, Manigat argued, General Namphy 
sought to transfer him from the powerful position as commander of the Dessalines 
Battalion.770 
Namphy's showdown with Manigat regarding who was the actual head of state, 
would serve as an opportunity for him to completely do away with the pretense of 
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democracy or civilian government in order to establish an outright military dictatorship. 
Nevertheless, in an act of cynicism, Namphy would declare that Manigat: 
The president of the Republic that you chose under the Constitution   
 of 29 March 1987 betrayed your confidence by violating this same    
 Constitution that he solemnly swore to faithfully observe and make   
 others observe...In violation of the Constitution and the law, he    
 deliberately struck a blow a the Army and shook up its High    
 Command, as well as all its cadres, in order to turn it into a docile    
 instrument of his personal power. Through these acts, he imperiled   
 the acquisitions of your glorious revolution of 7 February 1986.771 
 
A day after taking power, Namphy issued a decree dissolving the Haitian 
Parliament.772 He then carried out a series of changes and promotions in the Army, 
mostly annulling or countering measures taken by the ousted President Manigat.773 
Afterward he formed a cabinet exclusively comprised of military men.774 In place of 
Parliament's Chamber of Deputies and Senate, the new military government appointed 
two commissions, consisting of three persons each, to "operate under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Interior and National Defense."775 At the local level, Namphy's 
government envisioned creating administrative councils, made up mostly of former 
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members of the January 17 Duvalierist Parliament, "to promote participation by local 
populations in the management of local public affairs."776 
As the first ostensibly elected government since the ouster of Jean-Claude 
Duvalier fell from grace, "an atmosphere of general indifference" permeated throughout 
Haitian society, particularly amongst the poor and working class majority. There were no 
mass demonstrations for or against the ousted Manigat, or the general who ousted him.777 
According to PUCH leader, Rene Theodore, "Leslie Manigat fell, and not even a dog 
barked after him,"778 a sign of how little anyone cared for his government, condemned by 
the population for having compromised with orchestrators of the November 29 massacre. 
According to the Foreign Minister of Antigua and Barbuda, Lester Bird, Manigat's 
government "represented a cosmetic democracy that was always doomed to fail."779 Now 
that it had, perhaps it was time to push the new military government to allow for "genuine 
democracy." 
 
CONCLUSION 
While Manigat viewed his selection by the military on January 17 as an 
advancement for democracy, most of Haiti's poor and working class saw it for what it 	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was, contempt for a conception of democracy that went beyond the skills and insights of 
a few great personalities to include them as active agents in shaping the direction of 
Haitian society. "We had said from the beginning that Manigat thought his ability to 
maneuver, skill, and intelligence could make up for the mobilization and determination of 
the Haitian people in their struggle to recover their freedom."780 This same criticism 
could be levied against a number of the prominent figures that made up the "responsible 
opposition," whether Marc Bazin, Louis Dejoie, or Sylvio Claude. 
Manigat failed to acknowledge that Duvalierism, whatever it may have begun as, 
evolved into a repressive system and ideology that sought to guarantee privileges and 
benefits for a few, to the detriment of the many. In an underdeveloped country like Haiti, 
where opportunities to generate steady income, let alone wealth, are rather limited for 
most, those included amongst the few rarely relinquish the exorbitant privileges and 
benefits that accrue to them as a result of being close to power, voluntarily. Perhaps it 
was naïveté on the part of Manigat to believe that those who were willing to kill fellow 
Haitians simply for standing in line to vote, would put him into the presidency, only to 
allow him to single-handedly challenge what they were willing to kill to preserve. Or 
perhaps it was hubris. 
Rather than viewing the condition of the poor and working classes in Haiti as 
stemming from a history of systematic repression and exclusion from the political system 
by the powerful, Manigat viewed their economic circumstances as a technical issue that 
he could address if only he was given power. Manigat did not accept that he was only 
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allowed to become President because the military and other power brokers within Haiti 
thought that he was willing to preserve the status quo. Instead, he believed that he could 
generate enough international and domestic goodwill because of his pedigree as a well-
respected intellectual and political figure to push forward a reformist agenda without 
being opposed by those who put him in power in the first place. 
Following the experiences of November 29, 1987, January 17, 1988, and June 20, 
1988, the poor and working class majority understood that there was no compromising 
with those who traditionally despised their autonomous political mobilization and 
organization, whether the partisans of Duvalierism or the "responsible opposition." 
Instead, they rejected the politicians and political parties, in support of those who called 
on them to act as agents rather than subjects in the process of democratic transition. From 
the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, to his election in 1990, no one exemplified this 
position more than the Catholic Priest turned presidential candidate, Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
 
JUSTICE BEFORE ELECTIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 What the demise of the Manigat government made abundantly clear, was that 
changes to the status quo distribution of resources and power in a society as vastly 
unequal as Haiti, even through moderate reforms, simply was not possible without 
confronting longstanding systems that maintained such inequality. While the subsequent 
overthrow of Henri Namphy by noncommissioned officers, the eventual ouster of his 
successor, General Prosper Avril, and the emergence of a civilian provisional government 
led by Ertha Pascale-Trouillot, were lauded as steps forward towards a democratic Haiti, 
many viewed the promise and prospect of elections as a distraction from the popular 
impulse for justice. 
 These crises throughout Haiti's democratic transition would expose a growing rift 
within the democratic opposition, between those who thought that elections alone, even 
when severely compromised, would lead the way to democracy, and those who believed 
that only popular mobilization in the streets, and even possible violent confrontations 
with Haiti's systems of unjust power and privilege, would bring the country closer to 
popular democracy. Jean-Bertrand Aristide's entrance into the 1990 presidential race, 
despite being a longstanding critic of participating in elections before Duvalierists and 
macoutes were brought to justice, would be an attempt to bridge the gap between the two 
positions, with the hope of using the momentum of the mass mobilization for elections to 
establish a government with a popular mandate to push forward an agenda defined by the 
people. Despite winning the 1990 presidential election with the overwhelming support of 
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the population, it became increasingly clear that the “responsible opposition” and the 
international community would do as much as possible to hamstring his reformist agenda, 
using the logic and rhetoric of polyarchy. 
 
COMPROMISING WITH HARDLINERS 
After taking power on June 20, 1988, Henri Namphy declared that "the proof 
[had] been given," and it was clear that "the time [was] not yet ripe for elections in Haiti," 
if it ever would be.781 The military had "handed over power to an elected Government, a 
civilian Government, and it didn't work out."782 According to Namphy, after February 7, 
1986, the politicians returned from exile, bringing with them "foreign models" and 
"parties of all political persuasions" to "impose their views on Haiti..."783 The minimal 
consensus the military had hoped to establish with Manigat failed. Now, it was time for 
the Army to lead the country the way it should and ought to be led.784 
This first meant doing away with the Constitution of 1987, "drawn up and ratified 
in an atmosphere of passion and emotionalism...stray[ing] too far from our mores, 
adopting elements foreign to our history and to our traditions."785 Instead, "a new, equally 
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democratic charter" would consolidate the acquisitions of February 6, 1986, "while 
taking into account Haitian reality."786 
Namphy declared that his government would focus its energies on development, 
"stressing that the country's primary need [was] not politics but rather education, 
development, and jobs."787 Namphy called on all Haitians, "without distinctions of color, 
class, degree of wealth, religious convictions, or political ideology,"788 to join the military 
government in helping the country move towards development. The question of 
development would itself be a technocratic rather than political matter. Namphy believed 
it was necessary to bypass the "politicians" and work directly with the people to move the 
country forward. The military government thus created the National Office for the 
Coordination of Micro-Projects, whose mission would be "to facilitate voluntary 
participation of the rural population in identifying their needs, defining their priorities, 
and implementing micro-projects retained by the executive."789 The military promised to 
take 15 million gourdes from the public treasury to launch an action program focused on 
creating 15,000 jobs for the underprivileged.790 Some of this money would be targeted to 
the particularly impoverished communities of Port-au-Prince, while a portion would be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
786 Ibid. 	  
787 "Namphy Says Country Not Ready for Elections," July 27, 1988, Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS) Daily Reports. 	  
788 "Namphy Address on New 'Democratic Charter,'" Port-au-Prince Domestic Service, July 8, 1988. 	  
789 "Decentralized Project Coordination Agency Formed," Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale [English 
Translation], July 15, 1988, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America, 
July 18, 1988. 	  
790 "Military Government Announces Job Program," Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole [English 
Translation], July 20, 1988, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America, 
July 22, 1988. 	  
 
 220 
devoted to establishing irrigation systems in the countryside and the distribution of 
Creole pigs to poor peasant families.791 Rather than allowing the poor and working class 
to create their own autonomous representative bodies or choose their own representatives, 
the military government assigned development agents for each of the country's 
administrative districts, which it touted as part of its efforts to decentralize 
development.792 According to Namphy, dialogue and compromise with the opposition 
was not necessary to implementing development. 
Despite Namphy's invectives against politics and politicians, a number of 
prominent figures within the "responsible opposition" believed that dialogue with the 
military government was not only still possible, but also the only way forward. At the 
forefront of this call for dialogue with the military regime was Marc Bazin. While he 
acknowledged the fact that, whether the opposition liked it or not, the Army held the 
reins of power, Bazin believed it was necessary for them to accept Namphy's invitation to 
"make a new start."793 Despite the risks, he believed that dialogue was "the only solution 
and would be good for the entire country in general" if not "an absolute necessity."794 He 
proposed that the government begin "organizing a number of meetings between 
representatives of the Army, the administration and political parties, the private sector, 
the churches, the civilian society, and the unions...to quickly prepare a set of proposals 	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and recommendations designed to allow the dialogue to begin quickly so as to save this 
country..."795 Serges Gilles of the Nationalistic and Progressive Revolutionary Party of 
Haiti (Panpra) would second Bazin's proposal for dialogue as the only "means for 
democrats to extricate themselves," rejecting the notion that this was "the same as the 
calculated risk that former President Leslie Manigat took in last 17 January's fraud-ridden 
election..."796 Bazin and Gilles were not without their critics. 
According to Sylvio Claude's PDCH, dialogue was not possible with Namphy 
after "all the evil deeds that have been committed in Haiti since February 1986," and 
particularly impossible "without the Constitution of 1987, which is the expression of the 
people's rights, the expression of the national sovereignty."797 Rather than seek dialogue 
with dictators, PDCH called on all those who sought to speak for the Haitian people, to 
begin the dialogue "with the people first, in order to verify the people's mandate."798 For 
many within the popular movement, Bazin's call for dialogue showed a particular 
contempt for even the most reductive understandings of democracy. Representatives from 
12 lay groups799 from throughout the country would issue a statement declaring that: 
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The ideas and desires of the majority of the Haitian people must be   
 pursued. The will of no person, nor any group of people, can be    
 substituted for the will of the majority of the Haitian people. This means   
 that a person who has appointed himself chief of state represents nothing.   
 The will of a group of people making their own law in Haiti cannot   
 represent anything. Thus, the only government with a right to run the   
 country is a government on which a majority of people in the country   
 agree...800 
 
While the likes of Bazin and Gilles were calling for dialogue with the military 
regime, the level of repression against the popular organizations that openly challenged a 
return to Duvalierism was consistently escalating. Only two days after taking power, the 
Namphy government responded to a strike by five hundred workers at a Government-
owned flower mill in protest against the reinstatement of corrupt managers, by dismissing 
union leaders and over 80 other workers at gunpoint.801 In the second day of the strike, 
the reinstated director would come to work carrying an Uzi, while members of the 
military carried out the dismissals.802 According to CATH, the Autonomous Organization 
of Haitian Workers, 
Ever since the military government seized power, employers have    
 become more arrogant and more aggressive. They tell you outright that   
 they are in power now. And it's true. They really are, because    
 throughout the world, no military government has ever done anything   
 for the masses. Such governments are never into benefiting the people.   
 They are always on the side of the wealthy bourgeoisie.803 	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A month after the military returned to power, Lafontant Joseph, former senatorial 
candidate in the cancelled November 1987 elections, described by many as "the lawyer of 
laborers, peasants, and workers in general," would be violently murdered by unknown 
assailants.804 This would be followed by the killing of 10 members of the Labadie Youth 
Movement in the Commune of Petite Riviere de l'Artibonite. It was noted that the 
murdered Lafontant Joseph had been the group's legal representative.805 These murders 
coincided with what many believed was the open reemergence of macoutes groups. 
Joseph and his wife, Raymonde, of the Women's Committee Against Torture, were 
primary targets of a hit list being circulated throughout the country by macoutes forces.806 
On August 18, 1988, the military government's development adviser and former 
deputy under Duvalier, Luc Felix, would organize a large gathering in Jeremie to 
inaugurate the formation of what he called the Club Fraternite. Felix invited those who 
were still "living in caves," a reference to macoutes who went into hiding during the 
dechoukaj, to join the club, promising that they would have the protection of the police 
and the Army against those who would destroy the country by making Haiti 
communist.807 Felix exclaimed that General Namphy was ready to give them roads, 	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water, houses, and access to credit without interest, if they would defend the current 
regime.808 Those who observed the gathering from a distance noted that many of the 
participants were former macoutes who expected to be armed by the government.809 The 
Namphy government would subsequently declare assemblies forbidden unless an Army 
member was allowed to take part.810 
In this context of escalating repression of the popular organizations, the Union of 
Democratic Patriots (Union des Patriotes Democrates, UPD), headed by Rockefeller 
Guerre, called on the population to rid themselves of Namphy's military government. The 
UPD not only rejected Bazin's call for dialogue, it also rejected the campaign by Sylvio 
Claude and other politicians for the reinstatement of the Constitution of 1987. For the 
UPD, the Constitution was not enough to challenge a government that did not represent 
the will of the Haitian people nor respect their basic human rights. "The UPD position is 
in keeping with a democratic philosophy...When a long series of abuses and usurpations, 
all converging invariably toward the same end, clearly show that there is a design to 
subject the people to absolute despotism, the people have the right and even the duty to 
throw off the yoke of such a government and to give themselves new guarantors of their 
future security."811 Evidence of this emergent absolutism was not difficult to find. 
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A PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY 
Aristide first came to prominence in 1985, when, despite the legacy of repression, 
even against members of the Church, he issued a Mass rebuking the Jean-Claude 
Duvalier regime. Many would come to cite this mass as lighting the fire of the mass 
movement that would eventually remove Jean-Claude from power. According to one 
political observer of this period, Aristide was "the only real leader...thrust forward by the 
coup against the Duvaliers" who "kept the same line throughout...anti-Government, anti-
military and anti-imperialism."812 
What particularly distinguished Aristide from the "responsible opposition," was 
his conviction that a system that relied on the unjust use of violence to subjugate and 
exclude the poor from politics could not be compromised with. Rather, such a system had 
to be confronted by the mobilization of the poor and working class masses, whose use of 
force to undo such a system must by definition be considered the epitome of democratic 
justice. Aristide appealed to the grassroots organizations particularly because he rejected 
the ethos of civility and non-violence called for by the "responsible opposition" in the 
face of escalating violence directed at them by the military government. 
In fact, Aristide sought to legitimize the right to self-defense and armed struggle 
in his sermons, situating the resistance movement against Haiti's military within the 
context of the Bible. A few months prior to the November 29 election-day massacre, 
Aristide would use a passage from the Bible that he believed reflected what Jesus called 
on his followers to do as they faced the threat of death at the hands of their adversaries, 	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just as the poor people in Haiti faced the threat of death at the hands of the macoutes.813 
Aristide noted that, while the Church had always told the people that Jesus did not agree 
with the use of weapons, here was a passage in the Bible, where Jesus, increasingly 
encircled by his enemies, called on his followers who did not have swords, to sell their 
garments in order to obtain them. He thus asked whether, "inside Haiti, where Article 268 
of the Constitution asks that people who wish to possess weapons be given the right to 
possess weapons in their homes to use for the purpose of legitimate defense—in the name 
of that faith in Jesus Christ; and with the Constitution that Haiti has—would it be a sin? 
Would it be a crime for us to have weapons at home with which to defend ourselves from 
the terrorist army?"814 Aristide believed that it was irresponsible for him, the Church, or 
anyone to chastise the poor, who could only challenge the increasing repression of the 
macoutes' and military's guns with their bare hands and farm tools. 
Aristide also believed it was irresponsible to ask the people to participate in the 
elections of November 1987, or any future elections for that matter, while macoutes 
continued to maintain power. The poor and working class could not face the systematic 
terror directed at them through elections. He was therefore particularly opposed to the 
people's participation in elections organized by forces that relied on repression and 
exclusion to maintain their status. While even the leadership of some of the grassroots 
organizations were willing to compromise on participating in elections despite the 
escalating threat of violence, Aristide remained one of the few public figures to 	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unequivocally reject elections organized by the CNG. He vehemently denounced "the 
complicity of U.S. imperialism" in agreeing "to massacre the Haitian people through the 
CNG," which was "trying to organize false elections to have a macoute in power."815 
Aristide would be closely aligned with the popular organizations most resistant to 
defining democracy exclusively as the holding of elections. Central to the opposition in 
Port-au-Prince was the People's National Assembly (the APN), whose founding congress 
on March 7-8, 1987 was hosted by Aristide at his St. Jean Bosco parish. "The APN 
dedicated itself to become an independent and combative popular organization which 
would challenge the opportunism and treachery of Haiti's democratic bourgeoisie and 
petty bourgeoisie, who advocated, even then, collaboration with imperialism and 
accommodation with Duvalierism."816 While the "responsible opposition" generated 
international support for elections in 1987, groups like the APN believed that democracy 
could only be established through the mobilization of the popular sectors. The APN "said 
that no elections [were] possible under the CNG and the CEP," because "the CNG [had] 
no moral prestige with which to organize elections...So we say: Down with all dishonest 
elections...."817 Aristide, the APN, and the other popular organizations that boycotted the 
November 1987 elections would declare anyone who pushed the population towards 
elections before the just power of the people could restructure Haiti's institutions so that 
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they ceased to exclude and oppress the poor majority, accomplices to the election-day 
violence. 
In the aftermath of the massacre, Aristide levied a particularly strong rebuke 
against the U.S.'s role in supporting the elections. He declared that it was clear that the 
American government was a co-conspirator in the election-day violence. "We have been 
saying we refused to enter elections with the CNG. But the Americans didn't hear; they 
didn't see. Just like a big overlord they said, 'Okay, we have to have elections...' The 
Haitian people see that the American government is responsible--along with the Haitian 
government---for those who have died."818 Aristide would make a similar judgment of the 
Catholic Church hierarchy for having galvanized support for the November 1987 
elections when many in the Ti Legliz were against them. According to Aristide, "neither 
the apostolic nuncio nor certain other bishops were able to hear the voice of God's people 
and obey it. They preferred to organize themselves to send people out to participate in 
elections. What did this lead to? To bloodshed."819 Rather than issue commands from on 
high, Aristide believed it was imperative that the Church hierarchy, the nuns, and the 
priests: 
 Listen, now more than ever, to the voice of God's people, the majority of 
 whom see that in order for things to change, there must be  participation 
 by the entire mass of God's people, in unity, in communion with the 
 Episcopal Conference...the Episcopal Conference cannot simply decide to 
 take it upon itself to decide for the masses of the people. Rather, the 
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 decision must be reached together with the masses, so that it will not lead 
 to corpses and to bloodshed...820 
 
Even organizations tied to the popular movement, such as KID and Conacom, 
which at one time believed that elections were possible under military rule, began 
denouncing leaders that claimed to speak for the masses. One of the biggest mistakes 
KID acknowledged, was "that it did not protest vehemently enough against all the 
various, seemingly sincere wheeler-dealers who pretended to be defending the Haitian 
people's interests but who were really serving their own personal ambitions...These 
wheeler-dealers [had] yet to admit their errors to the people...their own responsibility in 
the 29 November massacre."821 From that point on, KID would call all organizations 
claiming to be part of the people's camp to "make a clear commitment to establishing the 
people's struggle on the basis of unity of organization, unity of strategy in the battle plan, 
and unity of action--which are indispensable for the real democracy that the Haitian 
people need..."822 They would unite principally behind the call for justice before 
elections. In a limited sense, they called for legal justice to be carried out for those who 
were murdered as a result of the various Duvalierist governments. In a broader sense, 
their call for justice referred to the overturning of unjust structures of power, privilege, 
and domination that had existed in Haiti since before 1804. He acknowledged that in 
Haiti's situation, democracy had to be revolutionary. Aristide "never believed in 
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elections," or that "elections would bring a solution." Instead, he believed that the 
solution to the people's oppression would "be the child of a true revolution."823 
Aristide simply did not believe it was possible for the poor and working classes to 
dismantle the structures of economic and social inequality and exclusion through 
elections. He framed the struggle for democracy in Haiti in ways that most public figures, 
particularly within the Church, were willing to do: in terms of class struggle. At a May 
14, 1988 rally celebrating the 8-year anniversary of the labor organization, CATH, 
Aristide "opened the rally with a request for blessings not from the bigshots' God, he said, 
but from the God of the poor..." asking Him "to help all CATH members, all peasants, all 
workers, and all the poor by sweeping away all the evil people seeking to crush and 
mistreat them."824 He continued, praising 
CATH's efforts as a labor union to bring a little light to the workers,   
 who can now distinguish their friends from their enemies, and to    
 make the workers understand the situation: the property owners are   
 abusing them, the state is crushing them, and other reactionary    
 sectors are roughing them up. Father Aristide said that only the    
 proper organization of CATH, of unions, other sectors that love the   
 masses, workers, and peasants, can lead to proper change, meaning   
 real change.825  
 
Aristide rejected the notion that the poor and working class were to simply be 
passive subjects, left outside of the political process. Instead, Aristide was a leading voice 
in calling on the military regime, the "responsible opposition," and the international 	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community, to recognize the political agency of the poor, to view the transition to 
democracy as a process of empowering the poor and marginalized. CATH's Secretary 
General, Yves Antoine Richard, would echo these sentiments at the same rally with a call 
to the people to continue mobilizing for a revolution, so that a participative democracy 
"in which the masses feel they are in power, in which the masses feel that they are 
directing their country politically, economically, and socially," may bloom.826 
What made Aristide and the Ti Legliz particularly threatening was their ability to 
progressively usurp the moral authority of the Catholic Church. Aristide increasingly 
highlighted the growing division within the Church between the Church hierarchy and the 
poor and working class majority who sat in its pews. He specifically highlighted the 
complicity of segments of the Church with the powerful. While the majority of the 
church, made up of the laity, was under the table, the majority of bishops were seated at 
the table with the bourgeoisie.827 
Aristide persistently challenged whether or not the word of the Church should be 
defined by statements made by the Church hierarchy, or by the positions taken by the 
various grassroots lay organizations that reflected the sentiments of the majority. In 
speaking about the Catholic Church's supposed silence after the rigged elections on 
January 19, 1988, and Manigat's ouster the following June, Aristide rejected the notion 
that the bishops were the Catholic Church. "It is false when people say, simply because 
the bishops have not spoken out, that the church has not spoken. The bishops are not the 	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church...The bishops are members of the church. They are the elder brothers in the 
church. The church is God's people, as defined by Vatican II."828 For Aristide, the church 
had consistently spoken through the many church groups that made up the Til Legliz. 
"For example, on 7 February 1986 the bishops called for reconciliation, reconciliation. 
The rest of the church, the majority, saw farther ahead, spoke more clearly, and said, yes 
reconciliation, but justice must also be done..."829 Aristide rejected the hierarchical nature 
of the church, and increasingly called for the church to take on a more democratic 
orientation within itself. As the Church hierarchy resisted, a rift would emerge between it 
and what many began to call the People's Church or the Church of the Poor. 
Lying in the middle of the massive slum city of La Saline, a living embodiment of 
injustice itself, Aristide's St. Jean Bosco Church became an epicenter for the popular 
organizations that shared his belief in mobilizing to undo Haiti's historical systems of 
injustice. St. Jean Bosco would increasingly come to symbolize the People's Church, as 
the poor and orphaned youth of the impoverished neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince, 
joined the student organizations, the labor unions, the women's organizations, the peasant 
groups, and popular organizations to challenge the various dictatorial regimes to emerge 
in the wake of Jean-Claude Duvalier's demise. This set Aristide and his St. Jean Bosco 
parish on a collision course with Namphy's military regime. On September 11, 1988, 
nearly 100 men wearing red armbands and red shirts, armed with revolvers, steel rods, 
pointed sticks, machetes, and knives, would burst into the church during Aristide's 	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Sunday mass, launching one of the vilest attacks on the population since the November 
1987 election-day massacre, killing 11 churchgoers and wounding 77 more. The attack 
coincided with opposition leaders' call for the population to wear white in support of the 
reinstatement of the Constitution of 1987.830 Aristide would only be able to get away as a 
result of the protection of a number of his loyal parishioners. Growing evidence 
implicated the Mayor of Port-au-Prince, former Duvalier era army colonel and police 
chief, Frank Romain, who likely received backing from the Namphy government, given 
threatening statements made by the General at City Hall only a few days prior to the 
incident.831 When asked about the assault, Romain declared that Aristide had been "justly 
punished" and that "he who sows the wind reaps the storms."832 
 
STIFLING THE SEPTEMBER 17 MOVEMENT 
On September 17, 1988, the message of upending unjust institutions would 
infiltrate the barracks of Haiti's Armed Forces, leading to a coup d’état against Namphy 
by junior officers within the Presidential Guard, and the mobilization of regular soldiers 
(Ti Soldats) across the country against higher-ups they believed were responsible for 
preserving macoutism within the military. Sergeant Joseph Hébreux, leader of the 
movement of non-commissioned officers, was the first to appear on television to justify 
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the coup against Namphy based on a "desire to restore the prestige of Haiti, sullied by so 
many actions that have revolted the sensibilities of the Haitian people...as well as those of 
the enlisted men of the FADH, who can no longer hold their heads high."833 Despite 
resistance from some of the soldiers, General Prosper Avril would be appointed the new 
head of state to replace Namphy as the result of a compromise between senior officers, 
sergeants, and the non-commissioned officers represented by Hébreux. "Sergeant 
Hébreux had been the soldier's first choice as President," but he was afraid of the job, so 
they took their chances with Avril.834 The consensus amongst them was that he was the 
"most capable officer, in view of his vast political military experience, to satisfy the 
people's demands."835 In a proclamation read during the broadcast with Hébreux, Avril 
declared that this new government envisioned a "country where freedom flourishes, 
where human rights are guaranteed, and where dialogue is the basis of national 
reconciliation."836 
While the senior officers were able to maneuver around the reform-minded 
Heubreux to place Prosper Avril, their preferred choice, at the head of the new 
government, a growing linkage was occurring across the country between what came to 
be known as the September 17 Movement, led by the enlisted men, and the grassroots 	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people's movement for popular democracy. According to one of the enlisted soldiers, all 
of the crooked acts by the military were being orchestrated by "certain bigshots, who 
[were] tolerating a number of violent acts because they [were] not willing to lose...certain 
privileges, such as big cars, big houses, millions of dollars..."837 According to the 
soldiers, "as long as the majority of these higher-ups [were] still on the scene, nothing 
[could] change for the young officers, the enlisted men, and the Haitian people in 
general...There [was] at present a dawning of awareness among the enlisted men..."838 
What followed was the mobilization of enlisted men across the country to purge 
Duvalierist and macoute officers from their posts, dropping them off at the Army General 
Headquarters, where they waited for them to be imprisoned by the new government. 
They declared that, "in order to realize democracy, it [was] necessary for the Duvalierists 
to be out of the picture. As long as they [were] around, commanding and in power, 
democracy [would] never be able to get a foothold..."839 In Gonaives, soldiers rallied to 
demand the immediate departure of their district commander840 as 8,000 people took to 
the streets in support of them. "The soldiers, who were out with the people, told us these 
individuals were the ones muzzling the people and obstructing democracy."841 As two 
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more Haitian Army commanders were removed by their soldiers, these men declared that 
they would "establish democracy once and for all, and...rid the Army of Duvalier, 
Namphy, and Manigat supporters.'"842 The purge would impact officers from across the 
Armed Forces, from the Navy and the Air force, to the Leopard Corps and the police. 
When it would all be said and done, "nearly 60 Haitian army officers, many of them 
considered powerful and influential" were swept out of the armed forces.843 
Alongside these sackings, the enlisted soldiers hunted down members of the 
notorious Criminal Investigations Department and partisans of Port-au-Prince mayor 
Frank Romain, accused of orchestrating the September 11 attack on St. Jean Bosco 
parishioners that sparked the coup d’état and subsequent dismissals. Enlisted men would 
arrest David Philogene, the Opak section chief accused of carrying out the August 1987 
mob killing of Louis Eugene Athis, leader of the political party Modelh.844 Those they 
did not kill themselves, they turned over to the crowds, who then stoned or hacked them 
to death.845 A number would have their corpses burned on "a pyre set near the St. Jean 
Bosco Church" itself,846 a display of what they called "the people's justice."847 
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While Dr. Louis Roy, one of the crafters of the 1987 Constitution, believed that 
"vigilantism" was a concern, he also acknowledged that the 1986 purge following the 
departure of Jean-Claude had "stopped far too short" and such purges were unavoidable 
given that the people could not "leave it to the courts."848 In the town of Côtes-de-Fer, 
185 km south of Port-au-Prince, soldiers actually supported the establishment of a 
People's Court "made up of the town's population, who serve[d] as jurors, while the heads 
of the neighborhood committees act[ed] as judges."849 According to the youth groups 
who organized the court, "officials of the fallen regimes--from President Duvalier's to 
Namphy's--[were] judged by this court...The accused people [were] not mistreated, and 
[were] given every chance to speak during the trial--to give their opinion, say what they 
[thought] freely, and defend themselves."850 The People's Court specifically questioned 
macoutes government officials about stolen community land and money.851 
For many, this was the first time they had witnessed enlisted men playing a 
central and autonomous role in the country's politics, demanding that the Avril 
government pursue the disarming of the Tontons Macoutes, a transition to civilian rule, 
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and improvements in the living conditions of the population.852 Nevertheless, many were 
doubtful that the noncommissioned officers would remain an effective check on Avril's 
intrigues. For one, Avril had a long history of serving as close advisor and confidant to a 
number of Duvalierist governments. Moreover, General Avril held a law degree, and had 
training from Navy and Marine Corps installations in the United States,853 whereas the 
noncommissioned officers were largely young, uneducated, and most importantly, 
inexperienced.854 That said, Reagan White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater indicated 
that though "the Administration saw little difference between General Avril's 
Government and that of General Namphy," it was interested in seeing who was appointed 
to key positions in the Government, which would give the U.S. "a good feel for how he 
intend[ed] to proceed."855 
While the coup sparked a growing movement linking an increasingly reoriented 
Haitian Army to the grassroots movement for democracy, Prosper Avril would use his 
position as provisional president to contain what the military hierarchy feared was a 
growing radicalism both within its ranks and in Haitian society more broadly. While 
Avril had served as "Namphy's right arm," what he understood that Namphy did not was 
that the exclusion of the "responsible opposition" and brazen use of violence against 
peaceful churchgoers, only served to increase the legitimacy of Aristide and the 
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grassroots organizations' message that confrontation was the only way to undo the 
institutions that preserved Haiti's unjust reality. 
Therefore, Avril adopted a public policy of open dialogue with the "responsible 
opposition," while covertly suppressing the September 17 movement of the Ti Soldats 
and the grassroots organizations. Upon becoming the transitional president with Hébreux 
by his side, Avril announced that they would form a mostly civilian cabinet,856 which 
would be "indispensable transition toward the implantation of democracy, which is the 
final objective of the military government."857 Though many within the Haitian private 
sector, the political class, and U.S. foreign policy establishment were "skeptical of 
General Avril because he was a trusted aide of the Duvaliers" they were "encouraged by 
the general's assertion that he [saw] himself as a transitional figure on the road to 
elections..."858 According to one businessman, while Avril was not necessarily any better 
than the others who worked with Duvalier, he was smart, not known to be cruel, and most 
importantly, he promised to restart the democratic process again.859 Members of the 
Federation of Private Sector Associations of Haiti and the Haitian Manufacturers 
Association would petition the U.S. to release some of the $70 million in aid suspended 
since the November 1987 election-day massacre, because "they feared that no leader 
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could gain sufficient popular support to govern without an infusion of money."860 Despite 
being encouraged by General Avril's words, and the civilian cabinet, a U.S. Embassy 
spokesman believed that his government needed to do more in terms of securing human 
and civil rights, stemming drug trafficking, and making clear progress towards 
democracy, before action would be taken by the U.S. Government regarding aid.861 
In his first address to the nation, Avril declared that the "people [were] waiting--
and legitimately so--for us to prove to them, through our actions, that we truly wish and 
are able to serve their cause, with security and order reestablished, in an impartial 
manner, and within the framework of permanent dialogue with them..."862 Nearly 
immediately, a number of prominent members of the "responsible opposition" declared 
their willingness to talk to the new General in the presidential palace. Former presidential 
candidate, Gerard Gourgue of the FNC, would declare in a statement to Radio Antilles 
Internationales, that "Avril seem[ed] to be 'an open person,' to whom a vote of confidence 
and some time must be given," and that he and the FNC were "willing to talk to anyone 
who [had] good faith and goodwill."863 Avril subsequently hosted a series of meetings 
with Gourgue, Sylvio Claude of the PDCH, Louis Dejoie of PAIN, Marc Bazin of the 
MIDH, Serge Gilles of the BIP, Victor Benoit of Conacom, and, in what would be 
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highlighted as a historic first, the head of the Haitian Communist Party (PUCH), Mr. 
Rene Theodore.864 The meetings mostly focused on establishing a timetable for elections, 
the formation of a Provisional Electoral Council, and possible amendments to the 
Constitution of 1987.865 Afterwards, Dejoie announced that the Avril government was 
"completely in accord with the democratic process," while Bazin declared that "Haiti 
would seem to no longer be a country that is dominated by its army, but a country with an 
army that is at the disposal of the country..."866 He called the meeting "a triumph for the 
idea of dialogue," arguing that "as long as we can talk to the military government in Haiti 
everything [was] possible..."867 
Support for the Avril regime amongst the "responsible opposition" and the 
international community would increase with the dismissal of Colonel Jean-Claude Paul 
of the Dessalines Battalion on October 2, 1988. While initially after coming to power 
Avril considered naming Colonel Paul the commander-in-chief of the army, this would 
be ruled out by U.S. Ambassador, Brunson McKinley, who declared such a move an 
impediment to the restoration of aid considering Paul's Federal grand jury indictment on 
drug trafficking charges.868 Understanding that without the release of this aid money, his 
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government would not survive, General Avril retired Colonel Paul with the understanding 
that he would not be extradited to the United States to stand trial.869 The removal of Paul 
was viewed by the U.S. as an encouraging move in the right direction.870 A month after 
being dismissed, Colonel Paul would die from a heart attack many believed was induced 
by poisoning.871 
While U.S. officials were adamant that there needed to be "concrete 
improvements on human rights and progress toward democracy before the money 
start[ed] flowing again,"872 the Reagan Administration would work around a 
Congressional ban to make available $30 million. This represented a major shift in policy 
toward the Haitian government. Though some foreign aid specialists criticized the U.S. 
release of aid money, considering that Avril had "delivered little on his promises,"873 a 
number of prominent Haitians saw "no competent alternative and fear[ed] that if his 
Government falls, it might be replaced by a committee of noncommissioned officers like 
those who took credit for the coup in September."874 
As Avril maneuvered to increase the legitimacy of his transitional government in 
the eyes of the international community, the popular organizations increasingly 
denounced dialogue with what they viewed as a continuation of Duvalierism without 	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Duvalier. For many Haitians, nothing had changed. The officers removed from the 
military during the September 17 movement remained a threat to the population, 
considering the Avril government's failure to detain and disarm them. This was similarly 
true of the hundreds and perhaps thousands of macoutes spread across the country. Most 
disturbing was the failure of the Avril government to take action against Claude 
Raymond, a former Duvalierist chief of staff of the Army and prominent macoutes, who 
many believed was responsible for the November 29 election-day massacre. "The limited 
nature of the purge of tontons macoutes" and the "lack of sanctions against the dismissed 
officers" raised a number of questions regarding the intentions of the Avril 
government.875 
Though Namphy was removed from power, the National Alliance of People's 
Organizations (ANOP) had not forgotten that the population once mobilized against the 
likes Avril when he was a member of the CNG. So it rejected the notion of dialogue with 
the current regime.876 In remembrance of the murders carried out by the military regimes 
in Martissant, at Fort Dimanche, and on November 29, ANOP continued setting up 
vigilance brigades so the citizenry could continue defending itself from what it believed 
was yet another criminal government.877 Similarly, the Federation of Brigades of Port-au-
Prince (Federasyon Brigad Nan Potoprens) denounced the Avril government and the 
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elections without first seeking justice. In a press release, they declared:  
We, whose brothers and mothers died in front of the polling stations on   
 Ruelle Vaillant and in the Artibonite; we whose husbands, sisters,    
 and brothers had their guts spilled, or were barbecued, or shot dead at St.   
 Jean Bosco Church, declare that not until we can feel the desire of the   
 government in power to give us justice, not until it sets public action in   
 motion against all the criminals, will we follow the path outlined for us,   
 with all the traps it contains. This is to say that these brigades do not at all   
 believe in this business of elections for the time being--not until there has   
 been a  thorough cleanup in the way things are being run, not until there   
 has been a trial, and not until all the victimized people have been given   
 justice.878 
 
Aristide, in his first major sermon following the September 11 attack, would echo 
these same sentiments. He demanded to know why the criminals responsible for the 
murderers at Fort Dimanche, at Ruelle Vaillant, at St. Jean Bosco, in Jean-Rabel, in 
Labadie, of Louis Eugene Athis, of Yves Volel, of Lafontant Joseph, and countless 
others, were not being sought out by the Avril government, disarmed, arrested, and tried 
in the people's courts. He warned that if steps were not taken to administer justice 
immediately, before elections, the same forces of the past would return, only to massacre 
the people worse than before.879 
These warnings would come to seem prescient as Avril began systematically 
weakening the influence of the officers and soldiers most active in the September 17 
Movement, eventually plotting to remove them from the military entirely. Though Avril 
and Hébreux initially shared an office and always appeared together, many doubted that 	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that the lower officers, who came to form a 30-member liaison committee, had much 
authority.880 As Avril consolidated his hold over the military, reestablishing discipline 
and the chain-of-command, it became increasingly clear that Hébreux's role was merely 
symbolic. Some believed Avril was simply "using the lower-ranking soldiers as a buffer 
in carrying out his own policies," passing off decisions protested by the opposition as 
what the "little soldiers want[ed]."881 This became more apparent as his government was 
increasingly lauded in the U.S. press as "a surprising chance for democracy."882 While 
Haiti's chief delegate at the United Nations declared that the Avril government was a 
reflection of "the people's commitment to irreversible democracy,"883 the Ti Soldats who 
sparked the mobilizations of September 17 uprisings were protesting that they were the 
"victims of a crooked domination..."884 While they wanted to appoint representatives of 
the popular organizations to the ministries, to ensure that the interests of the people were 
defended, the military government ensured the opposite. "Macoutes were removed and 
other macoutes were appointed in their place."885 
Avril's first overt challenge to the new order the Ti Soldats and the grassroots 
organizations sought to create would be to declare the People's Court in Côtes-de-Fer 
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illegal. Subsequently, the Avril government would send soldiers in battle gear with heavy 
weapons to disband the outdoor court, installing a new commanding officer to replace the 
one chosen by the Ti Soldats and the local population in the aftermath of September 
17.886 Avril and his counterparts would later use a coup attempt in October by rival 
macoutes forces within the military as an opportunity to remove the soldiers who 
participated in the September 17 uprising against Duvalierism from the military entirely. 
Nearly a dozen of the noncommissioned officers who put him into power would be jailed, 
and the 30-member liaison committee subsequently disbanded. Months later they would 
be released without explanation. Rather than a response to the coup attempt, the arrests 
were merely part of a broader agenda to consolidate his power.887 As the Ti Soldats were 
sufficiently bowed, Avril began targeting elements of the opposition, arresting 
Rockefeller Guerre and Sylvan Jolibois for a small explosion during Carnival, likely 
carried out by macoutes, only to release them days later, again without explanation.888 
Despite acknowledgement that Avril's record on human rights was hampered by 
arbitrary arrests, the U.S. government argued that his responses to protests were 
restrained, involving tear gas and clubs, but no deaths. The argument for tolerating 
Avril's abuses was that he had to "move slowly so as not to provoke the thugs and power 
brokers from the Duvalier days."889 Similar claims would come from amongst the 
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"responsible opposition." While some viewed his televised discussions with the 
opposition regarding the creation of an electoral council as "evidence of a desire to delay 
elections," a number of centrist politicians declared that it was "not important whether 
General Avril [was] trustworthy or personally believe[d] in democracy." Rather, what 
mattered to them was that he controlled the army, was open to dialogue with the 
opposition, and had no alternative but to move towards elections if U.S. aid was to be 
resumed.890 After surviving a mutiny among two of the Haitian Armed Forces' main 
units, the Dessalines Battalion and Leopards Corps, Congress would approve a limited 
restoration of aid, and begin discussing the possibility of resuming a "limited amount of 
military assistance...to permit the Haitian armed forces to maintain public order."891 
While some viewed the armed confrontation with the mutinous military units as 
deriving from Avril's failure to move against Duvalierists as vigorously as was demanded 
by the Ti Soldats and the grassroots organizations at the outset,892 others contended that 
the Avril government was as corrupt and rapacious as those who sought to displace it. 
According to many in the popular movement, the Avril government's "house cleaning" of 
the military was mostly directed towards his rivals rather than those who were known to 
be involved in criminal activity. As he removed his rivals from the military, those loyal to 
him were placed in a more secure position to profit from cocaine trafficking, smuggling 
of imported goods, and general theft and extortion.893 While the Avril government failed 	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to address the escalating insecurity in Port-au-Prince, characterized by frequent robberies, 
rapes, and murders, it had been active in mobilizing the military and police to crack down 
on the vigilance brigades established to protect poor communities from macoutes 
violence. In the rural areas, government forces actively harassed and detained members 
of peasant and youth organizations critical of the Avril government.894  
Even claims by the State Department that the Avril government was making 
strides towards democracy, at least at a Constitutional level, would also be challenged. 
While General Avril reinstated the Constitution of 1987, one of the conditions for aid 
renewal, this was not without some critical modifications. He specifically excluded 38 
articles from the original Constitution that limited presidential power over the legislature, 
the high court, and the armed forces.895 Nevertheless, the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, 
Clinton McKinley, a good friend of General Avril, continued "working non-stop to 
convince Congress that [though] all the necessary conditions for elections in Haiti [were] 
not yet present...all efforts [were] really being made so that there [could] one day be 
elections...[so that] aid for fiscal year 1989-90...[would] be unblocked."896 
According to CATH's Executive Secretary Jean Auguste Mesyeux, the "business 
of free elections in Haiti [was] a dream. We are not against there being elections. 
However, we say that the political climate is clearly unfavorable for elections. There are a 
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number of signs that clearly indicate that we are heading straight for another 29 
November,"897 and thus another election-day massacre. For the Comme Il Faut 
Cooperation Group, "the solution to the Haitian people's problems [did] not lie in rigged 
elections. Only a people's government can satisfy the Haitian people's demands, such as 
the demands for creole pigs, health care, education, justice, a decline in the cost of living, 
and security."898 
 
DIALOGUE RUNS ITS COURSE 
As the Avril government gained greater legitimacy internationally, it became 
more and more apparent that it sought to commit Haiti to a number of internationally 
binding agreements before a democratically elected government could come to power. 
This would lead to increased confrontation with both the "responsible opposition" and the 
grassroots organizations. One of the first of such actions resisted by the opposition was 
the Avril Government's contract with the American company Monte Christi Corporation 
S.A. setting up a free trade industrial zone in the northeast of the country in an area 
known as Plantation Dauphin near Fort Liberte. According to Finance Minister Leonce 
Thelusma, the Haitian Government would own 30 percent of the project through the 
leased land, while Haitian businessmen and the Monte Christi Corporation would own 
the remaining 70 percent.899 Almost immediately the People's National Assembly (APN) 	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noted that an unelected provisional government was signing a contract with a foreign 
company without even putting the matter up for public debate, nor had it made the 
contract public so everyone could see what was stipulated in it. The APN would declare 
that "General Avril's de facto government [was] not empowered by the Constitution to 
make long-term commitments in the name of the Haitian Government"900 PUCH declared 
that since Avril set up an electoral council to organize elections, he acknowledged that 
his government was provisional, and thus had "no mandate to negotiate any contract that 
constitutes a commitment that will affect the nation's economic and political future."901 
Conacom contended that "in the absence of a parliament, the de facto government, acting 
as both executive and legislative branches of government, [was] taking measures 
which...[could] have profound consequences on the nation's future."902 The Finance 
Minister would retort that the government did not stop existing just because it was 
provisional. That since the legislature did not exist, if he waited for them, when would the 
country be able to function?903 
Confrontation with the Avril government would escalate further as the opposition 
rejected efforts by his government to push through structural adjustment reforms. 	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According to Max Bourjolly of PUCH, "one of the IMF premises for applying its 
measures is that Haiti lives beyond its means. This is completely absurd in a country 
where 80 percent of the population lives on the threshold of poverty."904 Bourjolly 
believed that it was not possible to apply the IMF's austerity measures and transition to 
democracy simultaneously. At a time when the people were close to being able to choose 
their own government, one obligated to carry out policies to their benefit, the IMF was 
locking the Haitian government in a position where it would be forced to reduce its role 
in providing services such as education and healthcare, which were never provided to 
begin with. "The masses would be the principal victims of such a situation. They would 
not be able to demand their rights."905  
According to the Coordinating Body of People's Organizations of the Artibonite 
(Copal), as money was siphoned out of various government enterprises, leaving them in a 
deficit, the country's foreign debt went unpaid. Now, the IMF and the Americans were 
asking the Haitian Government "to apply a policy of austerity to pay the foreign debt so 
millions [could] continue to pour into Swiss banks," rather than to serve the population as 
intended.906 The National Alliance of People's Organizations (ANOP) rejected the notion 
that the poor and working class should be made to repay debts that they did not incur.907 
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To carry out such policies, "there would [have to] be a strong-man government in 
place,"908 leaving no room for any real democracy to exist. 
Some juxtaposed the government's call for austerity with the granting of a free 
trade zone to "American, Dominican, and other capitalists, who won't have to pay a red 
cent in taxes..."909 Rather than forcing the large merchants and industrialists to fulfill their 
tax obligations, the government was going to tax the small Haitian vendors, drivers, and 
other working class citizens to death,910 while eviscerating their purchasing power by 
devaluing the Haitian gourde, further increasing the cost of cooking oil, flour, sugar, 
soap, gas, cement, tin sheeting, and other goods that the poor and working class depend 
on. The MPP called on the government to "issue a decree abolishing the taxes the 
peasants pay to lease government lands, which are completely eroded. Obtain the money, 
instead, from the salaries being paid to bigshots and from the profits the bourgeois make 
at the expense of the Haitian people, whether it be in commerce, factories, banks, or 
elsewhere."911 The Haitian Chamber of Commerce and Industry similarly criticized the 
government for "forcing the have-nots to squeeze blood from a turnip." Instead, they 
called on the government to focus on the fact that 60 percent of the budgets of Haiti's 
state-owned industries, such as the Minoterie (the national flour mill), Ciment d'Haiti 
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(Haiti's cement plant), and Teleco (the national telephone company), go to only 20 
percent of employees in the form of salaries. Rather than serve as sinecures for the 
politically connected, the Chamber viewed the reform of these state-owned companies, as 
well as efforts to end the contraband trade that costs the country $60 million a year in 
unpaid customs duties,912 as the only viable ways to move Haiti towards development, 
rejecting the IMF's austerity. 
Seventeen unions, political parties, and grassroots organizations from across the 
ideological spectrum would come together to demand that the Avril government annul 
the economic agreements made with the IMF at the expense of the Haitian people. They 
would call on the population to mobilize on September 18 for a 15-minute work stoppage 
that day at noon pou bat teneb, to beat on their pots and pans and honk their car horns, 
across all the neighborhoods, all the towns, and all the rural sections of Haiti, as a 
warning to the Avril government. Should the government fail to adhere to the will of the 
population, they would call for a general strike.913 The government reacted to this threat 
by arresting Max Bourjolly, one of the leaders of PUCH, along with two members of the 
Federation of Neighborhood Committees and Associations. Attacks would also be 
launched against the headquarters of the popular organization Comme Il Faut, affiliated 
with KID.914 
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Avril in an interview would state that it was too late to dissolve the agreement, 
and that "faced with imminent economic catastrophe, the government had its back to the 
wall and was forced to take measures to redress the situation."915 Avril argued that "once 
an agreement [had] been singed...it [was] signed for good. So, [could] we now go and 
renege? [Could] we now tell the IMF that we [were] taking back our signature? That is 
unheard of...We have already signed and already received the money."916 Instead, he 
reproached the leaders of the strike, saying that they should have sought the path of 
dialogue rather than pursue a path that was not going to lead to anything. Maurepas 
Auguste of the Movement for Democratic Unity (MDU) would counter this statement 
declaring, "rather it is you, as chief of state, who should have engaged in dialogue with 
[the] people before taking your measures!"917 
As the number of organizations in support of a general strike increased to over 30, 
and the strike date was set for September 27, 1989, the Ministry of Information and 
Coordination announced that a draft electoral calendar had been submitted by the 
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to the Avril government, setting the dates for local 
elections in April 1990, for legislative elections in July, runoff legislative elections in 
August, and presidential elections in October, with a possible runoff set for November 	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1990.918 While the Avril government declared "the publication of this calendar...an 
important step in the realization of the democratic process,"919 and the State Department 
announced that it was encouraged by this development,920 PUCH viewed the release of 
the election calendar at this time as simply a government attempt to dampen the resolve 
of the organizations planning the September 27 strike, perhaps enticing elements of the 
"responsible opposition" to return to a more conciliatory position.921  
A closer look at the electoral calendar itself highlighted what the general secretary 
of PUCH, Rene Theodore, believed was an intent to fragment the voting process, 
possibly opening the door to massive levels of fraud considering Haiti's lack of capacity. 
Conacom, which recently became an official political party, viewed the election calendar 
as particularly convoluted. According to the new party's Secretary General, Victor 
Benoit, the calendar not only allowed the provisional government to remain in office for 
another 18 months, despite widespread disapproval of its actions, but it asked the 
population to vote 8 different times, which was likely to demobilize it.922 
On September 27, a general strike would completely paralyze Port-au-Prince and 
much of the provinces. Public transportation was nonexistent throughout the country, 
factories were shut down, and even flights were impacted. The organizers of the 	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September 27 strike declared that they were not going to rest on the laurels of their recent 
success, but rather build on it. According to Evans Paul of KID, the success of the strike 
highlighted the people's conviction and willingness to sacrifice in order to see a change, 
the lack of public support for the Avril government across a broad cross-section of 
Haitian society, and that the people were once again beginning to mobilize despite the 
year or so of government repression. "We feel that it is long overdue for a small handful 
of people to stop making decisions for the Haitian people, to stop taking care of their own 
affairs at the expense of the Haitian people, to stop making decisions that are detrimental 
to the Haitian people and nation."923 Paul would call on those who did not take part in the 
strike to confront their consciences and join the people's camp.924 The group of 30-
something organizations would form a pressure group called the Rassemblement National 
(National Assemblage) to demand greater transparency in the management of public 
affairs and the right to maintain oversight over government decisions.925 "This was an 
expression of the need for Haiti to have a counter power...that even can orient the 
government and government decisions in the direction of the interests of the nation and 
the masses...Perhaps it [would] even manage to form an executive that [would] accept 
control and that [would] itself be capable of ensuring a truly democratic transition."926  
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In Gonaives, protestors from the impoverished neighborhoods of Raboteau, Jubile 
Blanc, and Lot Bo Kanal erected burning tires across intersections and clashed with the 
military as they declared that they were not only mobilizing to address the high cost of 
living and insecurity, but to tell the general that he had "to uproot his cassava plants and 
move off the land...so that they can install a civilian government."927 A similar 
mobilization would begin in Petit-Goave, where barricades burned and slogans across 
walls read, "Down with the Avril-Heubreux government" and "The revolution is going to 
begin."928 The National Assemblage would announce plans for a national march on 
November 29, in memory of those who were killed during the 1987 election-day 
violence, and to demand that Avril step down from power.929 
A few days after calling for a popular mobilization, the Avril government would 
arrest three prominent figures within the National Assemblage, Jean Auguste Mesyeux of 
CATH, Evans Paul of the KID, and former soldier, Etienne Marino, a prominent figure 
within the 17 September People's Organization (OP-17). The government claimed to find 
a number of assault rifles, bullets, and dynamite in their homes, declaring that their 
objective was "to assassinate the president of the military government, eliminate all 
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FADH officers, and kill certain prominent civilians, and form a popular militia."930 The 
government would name a number of other individuals who were being sought after as a 
result of being implicated in the plot. According to Eddy Volel of the Christian 
Democratic Assembly (RDC), the Avril government arrested the three men "in Duvalier 
fashion, in order to defuse all the movements of generalized protest that are going to 
be."931 The arrests and beatings would lead to a two-day general strike on November 7 
and 8.932 
CATH Secretary General Yves Antoine Richard would declare that the strike was 
not simply about having the three men released, but "to rekindle the people's battle, 
which must not stop along the way...Even if they are released, we must continue 
'Operation Sweep Them Away.'"933 While Richard called on the population to reject 
those who would seek to shift the people's agenda away from confronting Duvalierism 
and macoutism towards elections, Bourjolly called for those politicians who put 
"themselves under the government's wing so that it [could] hold for them the kind of 
election it held for Manigat on 17 September" to "raise their voices loudly to condemn 
these acts of intimidation and terrorism that have just been committed against the 
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democratic sector, so that public opinion will not point the finger at them too, as 
accomplices to what [was being done here."934 
Nevertheless, the members of the CEP would declare that they were "organizing 
themselves so that they [could] give the Haitian people proper elections."935 They simply 
asked the Haitian people to trust them. This position would be supported by the National 
Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ANDP), which was made up of Marc Bazin's 
MIDH, Deajean Belizaire's MNP-28, and Serge Gilles' Panpra. While the ANDP 
congratulated those responsible for carrying out the two-day strike, it stated that in "all 
crisis situations, there are two possible paths to a solution...one based on a policy of 
force, and the other based on political force...ANDP feels the strategy based on political 
force is the proper approach, an appropriate...realistic, and reasonable approach."936 
Though this meant advocating for the legal and Constitutional rights of the three arrested 
men, it also meant holding free and fair democratic elections as soon as possible. For the 
ANDP, this was the only realistic way to move beyond the current crisis.937 
 The position of ANDP would stand in contrast to that of six centrist political 
parties938 who would call for another 24-hour strike on November 22, declaring that "the 
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mobilization of the Haitian people would continue until the de facto government of Lt. 
Gen. Prosper Avril left power."939 This call for dialogue became increasingly problematic 
as armed civilians beat and gunned down three young members of Leslie Manigat's 
Assembly of Progressive National Democrats (RDNP) for putting up posters calling for 
the return of the exiled former president.940 Pressure would be applied by the new U.S. 
Ambassador to Haiti, Alvin Adams, who "recalled the military government's irrevocable 
promise to relinquish power to a civilian government and expressed the hope that the 
elections would be free and honest and would take place in a climate of security."941 
In January, the conflict between the opposition and the Avril government would 
come to a head, sparked by Avril's unannounced 8-day state trip to Taiwan in an effort to 
promote greater South-South diplomacy.942 Nearly immediately, PUCH's Rene Theodore 
declared his disapproval of the state trip decalring that "an unpopular government like 
Prosper Avril's [had] no right to travel abroad in the name of the Republic."943 With that 
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same rationale, Dr. Louis Roy, Father Antoine Adrien, and Antoine Izmery, of the Unity 
Committee for the Respect of the Constitution, would send a telex message to the 
Taiwanese Government declaring that "the Haitian people were not aware of the reason 
for General Avril's visit and that any agreements with him would not be binding,"944 
stifling any possible deals the government hoped to make while abroad.945 
Upon his return from Taiwan on January 15, Avril declared that the political 
parties were not opposing the government when they took the actions they did, but rather 
betraying the Haitian people.946 The following week, armed civilians would begin 
targeting journalists critical of the regime, with the murder of Radio Cacique journalist 
Jean Andre Wilfrid Destin serving as the initial sign of the state's repression to come.947 
The Avril government would use the murder of Colonel Andre Neptune to declare a state 
of siege, after which the military began arresting opposition leaders.948 "Considering the 
series of acts against the public order...which tend to hinder the normal functioning of the 
national institutions and perturb the democratic process," the Avril government would 
temporarily suspend a number of articles of the Constitution and declare 30 days of 
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martial law.949 The government subsequently issued a decree reinstating entry visas for 
Haitians, "considering that the very easy access to the national territory...favor the entry 
of agents of subversion."950 While many opposition leaders would be released, Max 
Bourjolly of PUCH, Hubert de Ronceray of MDN, Louis E. Roy of the Organization for 
the Defense of the Constitution, Sylvain Jolibois of the Jean-Jacques Dessalines 
Nationalist Sector, Michel Legros of the League for the Installation of Democracy, 
Gerard Emile Brun of Conacom, and Max Montreiul of the neighborhood committee of 
Cap Haitien would all be expelled from the country.951 
The Minister of Interior and Defense would later announce that those expelled 
during the state of siege would have an opportunity to return for the presidential elections 
in October.952 Many within the opposition viewed this announcement as part of a broader 
strategy by the Avril government to ensure that candidates closely aligned with the 
regime would dominate the elections for local and municipal offices, as well as the 
legislature. This also made certain that "any candidate who return[ed] from exile late in 
the year would begin the presidential campaign with a severe handicap."953 
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State Department spokesman, Richard A. Boucher, would issue a statement 
announcing that General Avril's actions undermined "the confidence voters must have to 
participate in a credible electoral process as well as the confidence of the international 
community in Haiti's commitment to that process."954 While these sentiments would be 
echoed by Alvin P. Adams, the American Ambassador in Haiti, "he indicated, however, 
that the United States was holding out hope that General Avril would reverse himself" 
and restore "confidence in the electoral process."955 As the U.S., France, and Canada 
moved to suspended current economic aid to Haiti,956 the Avril government lifted the 
state-of-siege. This prompted Marc Bazin and his ANDP coalition to issue a statement 
expressing satisfaction with Avril's pledge to hold elections this year as promised. The 
coalition believed that it was now time for "all true democrats" to urge the CEP to "take 
all useful steps to insure the regularity of the electoral process and the credibility of the 
results."957 On February 7, the fourth anniversary of the fall of the Jean-Claude Duvalier 
regime, Avril would announce a general amnesty, releasing the four opposition 
politicians that were previously accused of trying to assassinate him. "In a message to the 
nation, Avril called for a dialogue and concerted efforts with a view to a peaceful and 
democratic transition..."958 
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Rather than engage in dialogue, the population took to the streets. The National 
Front Against Repression declared that "the primary objective of 7 February 1986 was 
not to merely shuffle privileges around...but rather to put an end to such privileges."959 
Instead, it called on the Haitian people to mobilize against what it increasingly deemed 
"democratic posturing."960 Joseph Manusi Pierre, secretary general of the Autonomous 
Organization of Haitian Workers, believed that "this business of elections [had] 
demobilized the masses;" that many political leaders simply were not in touch with the 
country's realities or the critical juncture which it was currently in.961 Breaking a long 
silence, Aristide would call upon "all democratic forces, all antimacoute political forces, 
and nondemagogic ecclesiastical forces to come together so we can nationalistically put 
together a lucid, cooperative assembly."962 The growing mobilization of the grassroots 
organizations would lead the political parties, including the ANDP, to take an 
unequivocal position against the possibility of having elections under the Avril 
government.963 On March 10, 1990, Avril would announce his resignation, after weeks of 
mass anti-government demonstrations throughout the country. 	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THE PERSUIT OF POLYARCHY 
 As Avril was forced out of power, the opposition would come together to form a 
transitional government consisting of a provisional president chosen from the Court of 
Cassation, and a Council of State made up of representatives from the country's principle 
sectors964 to maintain public oversight over the policies of the provisional government.965 
Together, the provisional president and the Council of State would "establish the 
political, institutional, and administrative conditions and the security necessary for the 
holding of unfettered, honest, democratic elections as soon as possible..."966 As Ertha 
Pascal-Trouillot came to power as the provisional president, the "responsible opposition," 
represented by the country's 11 most prominent political parties, and an increasingly 
visible center-left opposition represented by the Komité Tèt Ansanm pou Onè Respè 
Konstitisyon (the Unity Committee for the Respect of the Constitution), came to form the 
Assemblée de Concertation (the Assembly for Concerted Action).967 As the potential for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
964 The Council of State would be composed of representatives of the Episcopal Conference of Haiti, the 
Federation of Protestant Churches, the unions, the peasants, the private sector, the education sector, the 
socio-professional sector, the press, the human rights organizations, the Army, and the bar. 	  
965 "Opposition Unites Around 'Common Alternative,'" Port-au-Prince Radio Antilles Internationales 
[English Translation], March 5, 1990, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin 
America, March 6, 1990. 	  
966 "Details of Proposed Alternative to Avril Outlined," Port-au-Prince Radio Antilles Internationales 
[English Translation], March 8, 1990, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin 
America, March 9, 1990. 	  
967 Dejean Belizaire's National Patriotic Movement of 28 November (MNP-28); March Bazin's Movement 
for the Establishment of Democracy in Haiti (MIDH); Arnold Antonin's Nationalistic and Progressive 
Revolutionary Party of Haiti (Panpra); Emmanuel V. Beauvais's Movement for the Organization of the 
Country (MOP); Victor Benoit's National Committee of the Congress of Democratic Movements 
(Conacom); Edouard Tardieu's Social Christian People's Party of Haiti (PPSC); Seymour Romain's 
Naitonal Democratic Progressive Party of Haiti (PNDPH); Walter Floril's Union of Haitian 
Constitutionalists (UCH); Sylvio Claude's Haitian Christian Democratic Party (PDCH); Rene Theodore's 
Unified Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH); and Leroy Antoine's Mobilizaiton for National 
Development (MDN). 	  
 
 266 
free and fair elections increasingly became a reality, the center-left and center-right 
within the Assembly for Concerted Action began positioning themselves to shape an 
increasingly likely post-Duvalierist democratic Haiti. According to commentary from the 
Cuban media, the United States was still searching for "its dream figure, that is, someone 
to take over the reins of the island who will covertly follow U.S. orders but at the same 
time, of course, have a convincing enough image to avoid great social upheavals as far as 
possible."968 Many believed that Marc Bazin of the National Alliance for Democracy and 
Progress (ANDP) coalition was that figure. 
 Bazin, like Manigat before him, had the right pedigree for the presidency 
according to the various domestic and international power brokers concerned with Haiti's 
democratic transition. Louis Bazin, his father, served as a Senator from the Artibonite 
Department. Bazin himself studied law, economics, and sociology in Port-au-Prince, 
before attending the Solvay Institute of Sociology in Brussels, Belgium.969 In 1982, the 
Reagan Administration and the World Bank would insist that the Jean-Claude Duvalier 
government name Bazin, a World Bank development economist at the time, Minister of 
Finance in order to administer a number of reforms demanded by both so Haiti could 
continue receiving aid.970 Forced into exile after only six months in the position due to his 
aggressiveness in attempting to clean up the country's finances, upon his return after the 
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fall of the Jean-Claude regime in 1986, Bazin would be described as "the most able 
aspirant for supreme executive office" whose "advent would be welcomed by 
Washington."971 
 More importantly, at this critical political juncture, Bazin rejected the population's 
calls for justice before elections, declaring that "antimacoutism" could not "constitute a 
government platform."972 Since Duvalierists were Haitians as well, he could "under no 
circumstances be the president of only a part of the Haitians," and thus could not support 
what he called "returning to the past to settle old scores."973 Instead, he believed that the 
way forward was to move towards polyarchy. According to Bazin, the transition would 
take place in two stages. "The first stage would be the election itself, which would allow 
the Haitian people to express their preference for this or that platform. In the second 
stage, the government elected on the basis of the choice made by the population can open 
itself up to other political families for a government of national unity based on a minimal 
common program..."974 The National Endowment for Democracy and the State 
Department's Office of Democratic Initiatives would spend over $12 million preparing 
for the 1990 elections, with a proportion of this going towards the Bazin candidacy.975 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
971 Graham Norton, "Review: The Haiti File," The World Today 42, no. 6 (June 1986), 108. 	  
972 "MIDH's Bazin Interviewed by Government Paper," Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole [English 
Translation], April 9, 1990, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports, Latin America, 
April 10, 1990. 	  
973 Ibid. 	  
974 Ibid. 	  
975 Clifford E. Griffin, "Haiti's Democratic Challenge," Third World Quarterly 13, No. 4 (1992), 669. 	  
 
 268 
 In spite of Bazin's popularity with the U.S. and the international community, the 
population pursued its own agenda. The union federations976 called for a complete 
"change in the Haitian Government's traditional structures. Otherwise, they say, as much 
will have been accomplished as if one had washed one's hands and then wiped them on 
the dusty ground to dry them..."977 They believed that the Council of State, an institution 
that emerged out of the popular mobilization against Avril's military dictatorship, should 
be made a stronger institution vis-à-vis the executive, which represented remnants of 
Duvalierist regimes past. "The first objective [was] to strengthen the Council of State, so 
that it can become the real, organized expression of the Haitian people's basic demands 
within the government,"978 and thus force the provisional president to carry out its will. 
 The tensions that would emerge between the Trouillot government and the 
Council of State would come from its unwillingness to allow it to perform its oversight 
function, appointing ministers and attempting to make long-term economic agreements 
without the Council's approval. Tensions also revolved around the Trouillot government's 
failure to take action against macoutes and elements of the military that were committing 
crimes against the population. Father Yvon Massac called on the government to "order 
the Army to pursue them everywhere in Haiti," declaring that "this cleanup [was] part of 
the preparation for elections that the new provisional government [had] been given the 
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mission of holding..."979 After dismissals of a number of soldiers close to the Avril 
regime, former Presidential Guard soldier who headed the 17 September People's 
Organization, Frantz Patrick Beauchard, called on the government to not only fire these 
officers, but to arrest, jail, and try them.980 According to Aristide, the government had 
two choices regarding the threat of violence against the population that continued to exist, 
"either it chooses the Haitian people's path, that is, arrests and brings to trial the 
criminals...to provide security for the Haitian people---or it chooses the path of the 
macoutes, that is, talking politically about reconciliation without at the same time 
evoking justice to make it a reality."981 
 As former Namphy acolyte, Williams Regala, and notorious macoute, Roger 
Lafontant, were allowed to return to Haiti without any resistance from the Haitian 
military or police, many within the opposition feared that the Duvalierists were preparing 
to orchestrate another election-day massacre. A "spate of unpunished killings and armed 
robberies in the capital...reminded many of the months of violence and intimidation by 
opponents of democratic change that preceded the 1987 elections."982 This also created a 
greater rift among the political parties as the center-right parties (PDCH, MDN, MOP, 
Panpra, the MNP-28, and the MIDH) rejected an ultimatum given to Trouillot by the 	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center-left parties, demanding her government take action against the Duvalierists or be 
replaced by someone chosen by the State Council. 
 Once Lafontant announced his candidacy for president, declaring himself the 
"leader of the national reconciliation," the newly formed center-left coalition, the Fron 
Nasyonal Pou Chanjman ak Demokrasi (the National Front for Change and Democracy - 
FNCD),983 would recruit Aristide to run for the presidency, in hopes of mobilizing the 
population against efforts by the Duvalierists to retake power. All the same, Aristide's 
candidacy went beyond preventing Lafontant from coming to power. For the center-left 
parties of the FNCD, it was also about finding a candidate that could galvanize the 
grassroots behind participation in the elections in a way that their previous choice, Victor 
Benoit, could not. The FNCD's hope was that Aristide could bridge the divide that had 
emerged between the center-left parties and the grassroots organizations that grew as a 
result of the former's participation and support for the failed November 1987 elections. 
Their fear was that a low-turn out election would likely benefit the heavily financed 
campaign of conservative candidate Marc Bazin and his ANDP coalition. 
 For Aristide, participation in the 1990 elections was a significant departure from 
his previous position of justice before elections. Prior to his entry into the race, the 
grassroots peasants organizations, popular organizations, neighborhood committees, and 
vigilance brigades sought to create a common agenda to organize against elections not 
directed by the interests of the people. Groups like Tet Kole argued that the majority of 
the population was being ignored, both by the traditional political parties, and by the 
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international community. They rejected being dragged into elections which existed to 
further the interests of others and not their own. They viewed the democracy being 
clamored for by the Haitian elite and the international community as a democracy that 
goes against the interests of the people, a democracy where the people have no voice. Tet 
Kole called on the poor masses to organize themselves across Haitian society, to establish 
true popular organizations that they controled in order to push for their own interests, 
while also calling for a single course of action guided by the Haitian people's demands 
for a people's alternative. 
 Aristide explained that he decided to take part in the 1990 elections, unlike 
elections of the recent past, because he felt that the likelihood of these elections being 
truly free and fair was much greater. The international context seemed ripe for Haiti's 
democratic transition. Most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean had made the 
transition from military rule to elected civilian governments. The leftist Sandinista 
government in Nicaragua peacefully transferred power to the opposition after supposed 
free and fair elections in February 1990. Also, the end of the Cold War and emergence of 
democratically elected governments throughout Eastern Europe also created a context 
where the international community would likely support elections, even the election of a 
leftist candidate. The Haitian military itself was now headed by Hérard Abraham, who 
seemed uninterested in politics, and had given up power to Ertha Pascale-Trouillot only 
72 hours after Avril had stepped down. 
 While fundamentally rejecting the notion that elections could be a panacea for 
Haiti's problems, Aristide saw an opportunity for the popular movement to divert the 
elections towards their demands with a unified agenda represented by his candidacy as 
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"the people's alternative." According to Aristide, the people wanted Duvalierists to be 
excluded from government office, and prosecuted for committing crimes against the 
people. He believed that these objectives would have to be accomplished if any of the 
other provisions in the constitution were to ever be seriously adhered to. For Aristide, the 
only way elections would be able to accomplish the people's will, was if they were 
directed by the mass mobilization of the population, just as the removal of Jean-Claude 
Duvalier was accomplished in 1986.984 Aristide's entry into the presidential race would 
fundamentally strengthen the position of the center-left FNCD coalition in relation to 
Marc Bazin's center-right ANDP coalition, by wedding the momentum of grassroots 
mobilization for popular democracy to the election process. 
 As Aristide's entry into the presidential race lead to 80% of Haiti's eligible 
citizens registering to vote,985 former Roman Catholic priest and human rights leader, 
Jean-Claude Bajeux, declared that no one knew "how Aristide conceive[d] the 
presidency,"986 something he viewed as particularly dangerous. Others thought that since 
Aristide had entered the presidential race rather late, and without a formally structured 
political party, even if he won the presidency, the opposition would control the 
legislature, thus "assuring a system of checks and balances and a novel air of democratic 	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debate."987 As it was declared that Aristide won the presidential elections with 67% of the 
vote, and the opposition feared that the FNCD would similarly dominate the legislative 
elections, Louis Dejoie, who received less than 9% of the votes, argued that "many 
people [were] disillusioned that this could represent the elimination of political parties in 
Haiti."988 Though Aristide was popularly elected in one of the country's few free and fair 
elections in its history, Dejoie contended that the Haitian population's lack of experience 
with a functioning democracy impeded their ability to fully "grasp the importance of the 
interplay of parties and institutions like the National Assembly."989 
 Other members of the "responsible opposition" increasingly expressed their 
concern that without a strong opposition, the Constitution, the rule of law, and the very 
essence of the country's new democracy would suffer.990 François Benoit of Bazin's 
ANDP, would make the argument that no group could govern the country alone, and 
therefore "the best thing for Haitian democracy would be for Aristide to choose a Prime 
Minister from the opposition, even if he emerge[d] with a majority and [did] not have 
to."991 Election observers, former President Jimmy Carter and former National Security 
Council staff member, Robert Pastor, would make a similar suggestion, stating that 
though Aristide began with a mindset that troubled Washington, they were left hopeful 
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after a discussion with him about possibly appointing Bazin as his Prime Minister,992 the 
runner up in the presidential race who only garnered 12% of the vote. 
 While Aristide made it a point during his campaign to moderate his rhetoric, 
shifting to a more conciliatory posture towards those he had previously counted as 
enemies of the Haitian people, many of these groups immediately began their plans to 
constrain the ability of his government to carry out reforms that would adhere to the will 
of the poor and working class majority. As he "thanked the United States for its support 
of the election process, recognized the contribution of the army in guaranteeing the 
balloting, and said he was willing to cooperate with military officers, private business and 
opposition political parties to unite the country,"993 these various powerbrokers displayed 
a cautious pessimism. Though the population demanded wholesale changes to the Haitian 
Armed Forces, beginning with the retirement of most of the senior officers, a number of 
Western diplomats were "not encouraging such a restructuring," but would nevertheless 
avoid making vocal statements against such a move should the rule of law be upheld and 
human rights respected.994 Similarly, Western diplomats stated that while it was true that 
Aristide had strong popular support, his economic platform focused on reducing 
corruption and graft in state-owned enterprises, protecting key domestic industries, and 
land reform simply could not by itself "create a modern economy capable of ending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
992 Clifford Krauss, "Haitian Victor Reportedly Ready to Soften Stands, New York Times, December 20, 
1990. 	  
993 Ibid. 	  
994 Howard W. French, "Haiti Leader Faces Task of Controlling Military," New York Times, December 20, 
1990. 	  
 
 275 
Haiti's poverty" without international support.995 "While American commitment to 
respecting the result of the election was irrevocable, significant development assistance 
would depend on 'macro-economic policies that are sound,'"996 essentially the liberal 
economic policies that were promoted by the IMF, which the population mobilized 
against during the Avril government. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 What the period from the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier on February 7, 1986, and 
the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide on December 16, 1990 reveals about Haiti's 
democratic transition, was the difference in what the poor and working class expected 
from democracy, as compared to what the "responsible opposition," as represented by the 
political parties, along with their supporters amongst the major powers, believed 
democracy entailed. On the one hand, it was clear that the grassroots organizations of the 
poor majority conceived of democratization as a process by which they were increasingly 
integrated into the political decision-making process as autonomous agents, with 
particular interests in dismantling Haiti's historical structures of injustice and exclusion. 
Within such a context, democracy takes on a rather radical orientation, particularly if one 
considers the degree of injustice and exclusion that characterizes Haitian society. On the 
other hand, the "responsible opposition" and their international supporters, viewed 
democracy as a process by which the holders of power, particularly the military and the 
economic elite, agree to share power with a class of professional politicians, as long as 	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their positions of power within society are not fundamentally threatened. Such an 
understanding of democracy is rather conservative in orientation.  
 While in a more egalitarian society, the distance between the agenda of the 
professional political class and the majority is narrower, and thus demands that 
democracy serve an instrument of radical change is tempered, in a context such as Haiti's 
where they are rather disparate, these two conceptions of democracy are diametrically 
opposed to one another, which explains why Haiti's democratic transition is marred by 
numerous start and stop fits. The election of Aristide, someone outside of the political 
class, with strong ties to the grassroots organizations of the poor and working class, 
fundamentally threatens the interests of power brokers, because he was brought to power 
by a radical democratic impulse. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
CONCLUSION 
 For Haiti's poor and working class majority, Jean-Bertrand Aristide's victory in 
the December 16, 1990 elections represented a proximity to the halls of power that they 
had not experienced, perhaps since the 19th century, if ever. During his inaugural 
address, Aristide declared, "From 1791 to 1991, it took 200 years of travel to obtain our 
second independence. When our mother Haiti gave birth to our first independence, our 
ancestors had said: Freedom or death...Today, 7 February 1991, on our second 
independence, we are screaming with all our strength: Democracy or death!"997 This was 
a sentiment that had been clearly expressed just a month prior. 
 On January 7, 1991, when a small faction of the Haitian military aligned itself 
with notorious macoute Roger Lafontant to strangle the Lavalas government in its crib 
before it could even come to power, the population mobilized to defend what they viewed 
as the beginnings of their popular democracy. While the Army Chief, General Herard 
Abraham, was able to reverse the coup, arresting Lafontant and his accomplices, the 
population mobilized to exact retribution on the sectors of Haitian society believed 
responsible. With barricades set-up throughout Port-au-Prince and the provincial cities, 
the population set out in search of macoutes of all stripes. Many would lose "their lives at 
the hands of the people...lynched, stoned, beaten to death, or burned alive," in what was 
known as Pere Lebrun.998 The population similarly ravaged the homes, offices, and stores 
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of those that were viewed as active or tacit Lafontant collaborators. They destroyed the 
office of Duvalierist newspaper, Le Petit Samedi Soir, and ransacked the home of Hubert 
de Ronceray of the Mobilization for National Development (MDN) party, who just prior 
to election-day formed an alliance with Lafontant's Duvalierist Union for National 
Reconciliation (URN) party.999 Next in line were the symbols of the Catholic Church 
hierarchy. Angry Lavalas supporters ravaged the home of the Apostolic Nuncio and the 
Vatican Embassy in Haiti. They similarly destroyed the Episcopal Conference building, 
and the home of the Archbishop of Port-au-Prince, Francois Wolf Ligondé, who in a New 
Year's homily called on "Haitian citizens" not to be afraid, because "dictatorships [were] 
based on fear...fear of thieves, fear of attacks, and fear of uprootings to come," a 
reference to what he called the possibility of Aristide's "socio-Bolshevik" government.1000 
For many, including human rights advocate Jean-Claude Bajeux, this was tantamount to 
officially giving "his benediction to the coup."1001 The population would also burn the 
historic Port-au-Prince Cathedral, built in 1821,1002 where Ligondé's New Years sermon 
had been held. Along with the Church, the people attacked the private sector. Prior to the 
election, "one downtown businessman said in a typical assessment of Father Aristide 
from those in the entrepreneurial class, 'If it comes to a choice between the ultra-left and 	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the ultra-right, I am ready to form an alliance with the ultra-right.'"1003 Many commercial 
businesses would be plundered and destroyed during the turbulence.1004 Following the 
maelstrom, over 75 people were dead, 150 wounded.1005 
 Unlike November 29, 1987, this time the population was not going to wait for 
Haiti's institutions, which had failed to carry out justice time and time again. Instead they 
were going to mobilize themselves to ensure that justice would be served. They declared 
that 
The people must completely do away with the Macoutes so that the Macoutes do 
not completely do away with them. The sole remedy for Macoutes is 'dechoucage' 
(uprooting) and 'pere lebrun'...All Macoutes, with no exceptions, must be 
uprooted: Macoutes in priestly robes, Macoutes in blue uniforms, Macoutes in 
khaki, American Macoutes, and American henchmen Macoutes...We will not give 
the Macoutes another chance to assassinate the people...It is only the people that 
can give themselves security.1006 
 
 While the U.S. condemned the violent reaction of the population to the coup, 
denouncing what they viewed as Aristide's failure to unequivocally condemn the mob 
violence, he retorted that "When those that are unarmed stand firm on the ground with 
their bare hands, in a spirit of solidarity, facing gun-toting individuals, they are 
crystallizing a divine power to restore justice and democracy."1007 Now that the popular 
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mobilization of the poor and working class masses had given him an election victory, had 
defended this victory when it came under threat, Aristide believed it was important to 
bind this mobilization to the process of governing. With Operation Lavalas over, it was 
now time for Organization Lavalas to "build the country we want, a country with mutual 
respect, full employment, and justice for all;1008 a country where the poor are able to 
share in the country's wealth. Aristide declared that this time "the situation [would] really 
change, because we are organizing ourselves so the situation can change."1009 He 
promised that his government would remain faithful to the people "in order to draw 
nearer toward the national direction."1010 
 Nevertheless, Aristide's government would have to straddle the line between the 
Haitian military, which was still heavily infiltrated with Duvalierists, and had gotten used 
to the spoils of power, from contraband smuggling and drug trafficking, to repressing and 
extorting the peasant population of the Haitian countryside; the legislature, which despite 
its lack of popularity, viewed the process of governing as its prerogative; the Haitian 
economic elite, who were wholly antagonistic to any economic reforms that would 
redistribute the nation's resources more equitably; and the United States, which also 
rejected the political and economic ideological orientation of the newly established 
Aristide government. As the Aristide government vacillated between the agenda 
demanded by the grassroots organizations, and policies advocated by the Haitian elite and 	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U.S. foreign policy establishment, in order to receive desperately needed aid, an already 
tenuous situation would spiral into a political crisis, leading to the ouster of his 
government. 
 Though the Haitian Armed Forces seemed to be the most significant threat to the 
viability of a Lavalas government, the various fissures within the military that emerged 
over the 5-year period of transition left it relatively weakened, at least initially, in the face 
of an Aristide government with a mobilized population behind it and international 
legitimacy. "Within hours of being sworn in...Aristide said that all but two of the army's 
eight generals would be given a 'well-earned retirement.'"1011 In the aftermath of the 
dechoukaj against Lafontant and his supporters, "analysts say the popular new President 
decided that the time was right for a radical restructuring of a force regarded here as 
repressive and corrupt..."1012 Aristide would reinstate and promote a number of military 
officers previously discharged by the Prosper Avril government due to their ties to the 
September 17, 1988 uprising against Duvalierists within the military.1013Alongside 
reforms within the Haitian Armed Forces, the Aristide government also worked to 
fundamentally transform the Haitian judicial system. This would begin with a major 
reshuffling of judges and prosecutors,1014 and the selection of entirely new members of 
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the Haitian Supreme Court.1015 With a new judiciary in place, the Aristide government 
would begin pursuing justice against those who committed atrocities against the Haitian 
people. An inter-ministerial commission was established to review judicial dossiers and 
resume investigations that were still pending on the various killings carried out during the 
transition period, such as the massacres at "Jean-Rabel, Piatte, Saint-Jean Bosco, Danty, 
and so on."1016Arrest warrants would be issued for Nichole Poitevien accused of 
involvement in the Jean-Rabel massacre; Polynice Volcy, a suspect in the Gervais 
massacre in Saint-Marc; and former CNG figure, William Regala, accused of 
orchestrating the November 29, 1987 election-day massacre.1017 
 The Aristide government would similarly pursue those who were believed to have 
committed economic injustices against the Haitian people, starting with the former 
provisional president, Ertha Pascal Trouillot. While the decree preventing Trouillot and 
over 200 members of her government from the leaving the country would be 
characterized by the Haitian political class and the U.S. foreign policy establishment 
as...the impetus for this action by the Aristide government actually came from the 
grassroots organizations. A day before his inauguration, 381 members of the Ti Legliz 
petitioned their new president, asking that since this was "the first time the country 
[would] have an honest government," that it had an obligation to "take back the people's 	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money."1018 They called on the new Aristide government to prevent Trouillot, her 
ministers, and all other former government officials from leaving the country without 
giving the people an accounting of how public funds were handed over to his 
administration. "We believe in you, Titide [Father Aristide's nickname]. You can trust in 
us to set up barriers so that no plunderer leaves the country with a pile of money that they 
are going to enjoy abroad while we have nothing to eat here."1019 The Haitian judiciary 
would be mobilized to prosecute macoutes accused of embezzling public funds.1020 
 Aristide would also seek to reorient the relationship between the state and the 
population, from one of economic exploitation to one of economic justice. Aristide 
declared his government's commitment to the people by renouncing his salary in the face 
of the country's immense poverty. "I, too, come to say that I can also give my meager 
contribution in another way. This means that the day of the president getting paid 50,000 
gourdes [$10,000] per month is over...this is a scandal in a country where people do not 
have food to eat, where people cannot find a job...No matter how much you pay me, I 
will accept it."1021 This would be a first step towards reforming the state, shifting it from 
an instrument of wealth acquisition for the political class towards an instrument of social 
justice. The Papaye Peasants Movement (MPP) would follow Aristide's call, proposing 	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that the salaries of all state employees be lowered. According to the MPP, how could a 
member of Parliament demand $2,000 or $3,000 a month in salary, when "three-fourths 
of the people who sent the deputies and senators to the chambers cannot afford to eat 
even twice a day" or "afford to send their children to school."1022 Or, when "a school 
teacher who is educating our children does not even get $200?"1023 MPP declared that 
one of the first ways that members of Parliament could show that they had not forgotten 
the people they represented, was to lower their salaries in light of the dire financial straits 
faced by the country's poor majority. In order to address corruption and graft, Aristide 
appeared on national television one month after taking office to list the monthly salary 
expenses of each government ministry, along with the "number of cars and drivers in 
each."1024 
 Alongside efforts to reign in the economic excesses of those in positions of 
power, the Lavalas government also sought to wean the country off of its dependence on 
international aid. This would begin with the popular mobilization of the grassroots 
organizations to raise money for the government a few coins at a time. The organization 
of a "Campaign for National Dignity" by Port-au-Prince's Community of Small Churches 
(Ti Communaute l'Eglise) via radio broadcasts, would serve as a powerful symbolic 
challenge to the country's elite to also contribute their fair share. On March 24, 1991, the 
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Ti Legliz would raise nearly 500,190 gourdes, or $100,038. While they acknowledged 
that this amount was nothing in comparison to what the government actually needed to 
carry out a pro-poor agenda, nevertheless, it represented an important coming together of 
ordinary Haitians, who, with "the little money that they had to live on," brought five and 
ten cents at a time, supported the idea of a "Haiti for all of us and all of us for Haiti."1025 
 The "Campaign for National Dignity" was very similar to the proto-noiriste 
President Dumarsais Estimé's 1947 nationalist call to all Haitians to help "Pay Five 
Million" (Payons Cinq Millions) in order to reduce the country's outstanding debt to the 
United States, a legacy of the 19-year U.S. occupation from 1915 to 1934. Having been 
denied a loan from the EX-IM bank due to his government's electoral promise of 
"financial liberation," Estimé would make a "stirring radio address imploring the nation 
to assist him in raising an internal loan for the repayment of the debt...claiming that 'with 
them or without them we will liberate the country.'" Members of the legislature, the 
private sector, workers, and even school children would get behind the effort, helping to 
raise $7.6 million in three months, a feat unmatched in Haitian history. The people 
declared, "Dessalines liberated the country politically and now Estimé [has] liberated the 
country economically."1026 Aristide would seek to do the same. 
 In a speech, President Aristide "stressed that the country's economic start [could] 
be achieved with Haitian funds."1027 Paraphrasing Pope John-Paul II, Aristide declared 	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that "all private property has a social mortgage, and added: to mortgage the sovereignty is 
to reject dignity."1028 He declared that his plan for renewing the national economy would 
"not be dictated from abroad," but rather, "grounded in Haitian reality," and would 
depend on the national bourgeoisie's investment in the country.1029 In a meeting with 
representatives of the country's private sector, Aristide spoke of the need for dialogue 
between the two powers: the political and the economic. "I am part of the political power, 
as you are part of the economic power," Aristide announced. But, it is the country's 6.5 
million inhabitants, the people themselves, "who are a bridge between economics and 
politics."1030  
 While the Aristide government was able to raise a last minute loan of $5.3 million 
from the Haitian elite during a period of acute economic crisis, through what some 
interpreted as a subtle threat, the economic and political constraints on his government 
became increasingly apparent. The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) would suspend the millions it had been funneling into Haiti to promote low-
cost investment in the light-manufacturing sector due to what it deemed were decisions 
that undermined the country's long-term economic growth.1031 The Agency particularly 
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rejected Aristide's efforts to raise the country's minim wage from 15 gourdes to 28.5 
gourdes a day, or essentially from $3 to $5.70 a day."1032 Aristide's government would 
also face resistance from the Haitian private sector, who argued that it was the 
appropriate economic solution for the country considering increased competition for low-
wage labor from nearby Caribbean countries such as Jamaica and the Dominican 
Republic. They argued that raising wages would cause industry to leave Haiti, thus 
increasing the unemployment rate and thus poverty.1033 
 Six months into power, the Lavalas government would be forced to go to the 
World Bank to secure $442 million in new loans and aid for Haiti. "As alternative 
efforts...failed, Haitians close to the President say he gradually resigned himself to 
contracting large-scale international assistance to bring new jobs, clean drinking water 
and passable roads to the hemisphere's poorest country."1034 
 While the Aristide government was being forced towards accommodation, the 
grassroots organizations increasingly criticized what they viewed as the lack of 
substantive change to their daily circumstances. In fact, in his first few weeks in power, 
as many workers in government ministries and state owned enterprises mobilized against 
holdovers from the military government, Aristide would repudiate what he called 
"untimely uprooting operations," declaring that reforms of the bureaucracy would not be 
carried through witch-hunts. He would also condemn the increasing number of popular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1032 "Aristide, Private Sector Debate Economic Solution," Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole, April 2, 1991. 	  
1033 Ibid. 	  
1034 Howard W. French, "After 6 Months of Changes, Haiti is Surprised by its Leaders," New York Times, 
August 4, 1991.	  
 
 288 
occupations of unused public and private land across the country.1035 As the Aristide 
government sought to establish price controls on essential goods, particularly rice, 
cement, and refined sugar,1036 throughout the provinces, thousands of demonstrators took 
to the streets to protest the high cost of living, ransacking businesses and warehouses 
believed to be stockpiling goods in order to inflate their prices.1037 The organization Tet 
Kole Ti Paysan Haitien believed that some sectors of the society had "an interest in 
hurting the people" in order to "sow confusion in popular matters."1038 
 While during the four-year transition period, Aristide's message served to magnify 
the perspective of Haiti's poor and marginalized majority, his presidential candidacy in 
the 1990 elections unwittingly legitimized a political process that was never designed to 
be inclusive of this class or its grassroots organizations. Nevertheless, Aristide believed 
that he could link the mobilization of the masses during the elections to the power of the 
Haitian state in order to push forward a people's agenda. Once in the presidency, it 
became increasingly evident that elections were intended to be a vehicle to empower 
politicians and political parties, and not the movement. The presidency served to 
constrain Aristide's previous clarion call for the radical transformation of Haitian society 	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through mass mobilization. Having adopted a more reformist position, Aristide 
increasingly felt the need to compromise with many of the reactionary forces in 
government and society that he previously spoke out against. Despite his efforts to pursue 
a moderate reformist agenda, he was vehemently opposed by the political parties and by 
U.S. foreign policy establishment. In a society such as Haiti's where those who held 
power always sought to do so absolutely, even moderate sensible calls for reform and 
justice were deemed radical. Perhaps most threatening to the military and its backers in 
Haiti and abroad, was the intense pressure that the grassroots movement placed on 
Aristide's government to move beyond the obstructionism faced by his government from 
the legislature, towards the use of executive power for radical change, without concern 
for the niceties of polyarchy. 
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